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Definition of Terms and Abbreviations
The following definitions will clarify the terminology and its use in this thesis.
• HMO: Health Maintenance Organisations offer prepaid, comprehensive health 
coverage for both hospital and physician services.
• PBM: Pharmacy Benefits Management are third party organisations that 
administer prescription drug benefits.
• Pharmacopolitics: Lobbying activities carried out by the pharmaceutical 
industry aimed at influencing government, the public and HMO officials.
• Pharmacopolitics manager: The in-house lobbyist of a pharmaceutical 
company.
• Formularies: An HMO approved list of prescription drugs available to 
individuals dependent on their health care coverage and only through specific 
pharmacies. HMOs often restrict or limit the type and number of medicines 
allowed for reimbursement by limiting the drug formulary list. Formularies are 
either "closed," including only certain drugs or "open," including all drugs. Both 
types of formularies typically impose a cost scale requiring consumers to pay 
more for certain brands or types of drugs.
• Rebates: Reimbursements given to HMOs and PBMs related to the 
consumption of a pharmaceutical company's products on a specific formulary. 
This reimbursement is given in return for the inclusion of the company's 
products in a closed formulary.
VIII
Dossier: Information given to the HMOs and public officials about a new 
product or technology. The dossier could include scientific evidence, approval 
of the product, clinical trials and pharma-economic studies.
Generic drug: A generic drug is the chemical equivalent of a drug that has an 
expired patent. When a brand name drug's patent expires, other pharmaceutical 
companies can produce the same active chemical compound and sell the drug 
under its generic name.
IX
Abstract
The main purpose of the research was to examine the process of lobbying in the context 
of the pharmaceutical industry. It sought to explore "why" and "how" multinational 
companies carried out pharmaceutical lobbying in Argentina.
The study aimed to build valid substantive theory that could be used to analyse 
pharmaceutical lobbying from different perspectives and used corporatism and 
pluralism to explain the relationship between the pharmaceutical industry and 
government. The application of interest groups formation theory permitted the 
identification of the pharmaceutical industry as an interest group and the identification 
of its lobbying style. Lobbying theories based on contribution payments and 
transmission of information were explored in order to understand the use of these 
policies in the process of pharmaceutical lobbying. The review of literature on 
American pharmaceutical lobbying helped in understanding the peculiar instruments 
and practices present in pharmaceutical lobbying and gave the reader an understanding 
of the characteristics of this market.
The research took a phenomenological methodological approach and the research 
paradigm was post-positivist and constructivist. The researcher followed the grounded 
theory methodology approach of Strauss and Corbin. The researcher collected data 
through in-depth semi-structured interviews and participant observation of in-house and 
external pharmaceutical lobbyists as well as officials.
The study made several contributions. Firstly, it positioned the pharmaceutical industry 
as an interest group in the pluralism-corporatism axis as a means to provide a 
framework for the understanding of its lobbying activities. Secondly, the study defined 
the lobbying style of the pharmaceutical industry in Argentina compared to lobbying
X
performed in the USA and the EU. Thirdly, it provided a pharmaceutical industry basic 
lobbying model for Argentina that can be tested in other countries. Finally, it provided a 




1.1 Background of the study
Health care is one of the most important issues for a government in terms of economic 
resources, votes and the quality of life for a country's inhabitants (Neri, 2002). Health 
care in Argentina was regulated by the state and provided by Health Management 
Organisations (state, provincial, trade union and private) as well as by public hospitals 
and was supplied by health professionals, the pharmaceutical industry and the medical 
devices industry. This third sector - the supply sector - consistently maintained an 
interest in influencing both the regulation and provision sectors with the aim of 
obtaining a larger share of the market. For the purposes of illustration the researcher 
created two simplified schemas that depict the supply-demand dynamics of the 
Argentine system. Firstly, the researcher showed the provision of health care by state 
hospitals to people without health care coverage. This part of the population mainly 
represents those on a low-income or without a formal job. The following figure depicts 







The state, through tenders and via its national and provincial administrative 
departments, bought the medicines and medical devices to supply to state hospitals. 
Health professionals were contracted by the hospitals to provide health care to patients 
without health care coverage; the hospitals should provide medicines and health care. 
The reality was that most of the time, due to the lack of funds, out-patients received no 
medicines and surgery patients had to buy medical devices such as pace-makers, 
prothesis, etc. This is the supply-demand dynamics of the public system. However, this 
research focused on the private system that consisted of the state as a regulator, the 
Health Management Organisations (HMDs) as the providers of health care, the 
pharmaceutical industry, the health professionals and the medical devices industry as 
the supplier to the HMOs. The following schema depicts the dynamics of the private 
health system:
The state, through congress and its administrative departments, enacted legislation and 
regulations that influence the business and profits of the HMOs and the supply sector. 
Health maintenance organisations offered prepaid, comprehensive health coverage for
both hospital and physician services. They contracted clinics and individual physicians 
to provide health care to their affiliates. They also contracted pharmacies to ensure that 
their affiliates received a reimbursement when they bought medicine. The supply sector 
was composed of health professionals, the medical devices industry and the 
pharmaceutical industry. The health professionals and clinics were contracted by the 
HMDs to provide health care to its affiliates. The medical devices industry sold its 
medical devices to the HMOs, such as stents, prothesis, pace-makers, etc. The 
pharmaceutical industry sold medicine directly to the pharmacies. Patients bought them 
from the pharmacies and received reimbursement. The connection between the 
pharmaceutical industry and the HMOs began with the introduction of closed 
formularies. A formulary was an HMD approved list of prescription drugs available to 
individuals dependent on their health care coverage and only through specific 
pharmacies. HMOs often restricted or limited the type and number of medicines 
allowed for reimbursement by limiting the drug formulary list. Formularies were either 
"closed," including only certain drugs or "open," including all drugs. The objective of 
the pharmaceutical companies was to have their products included in the closed 
formularies. The two schemas are a brief description of how the supply-demand 
dynamics of the system worked. The system has been explained further in following 
chapters.
Changes in federal legislation had a dramatic impact on the strategy and performance of 
companies within the health care industry. As health care was one of the most sensitive 
issues for voters, and for legislators, any law passed by parliament received a lot of 
attention from the media and the public. During the past few decades legislators had 
both economic and social motives for their increased commitment in health affairs. 
Legislators had selected specific areas of the health industry, and specific companies,
for monitoring standards, subsidies, protection, regulation and deregulation. The 
importance of the legislative process to health businesses was highlighted by 
congressional debates over issues such as medicines, HMDs and medical care 
(Vazquez, 2002).
In response to an active congressional agenda, interest groups- such as the trade unions, 
professional associations and the pharmaceutical industry- employed a wide variety of 
means to attempt to influence the legislative process. These tactics included financial 
contributions to the legislators or their parties and direct lobbying of legislators through 
professional lobbyists or corporate executives (Felicio, 2002).
In recent years the multinational pharmaceutical industry significantly increased its 
investment in lobbying. Felicio (2002) mentioned two important changes in health care 
regulations that persuaded the multinational pharmaceutical companies to create a full- 
time job of in-house lobbyist. The first was the issue of the "Programa Medico 
Obligatorio" (PMO) law, which passed through Parliament with little influence from the 
pharmaceutical industry. This law dictated which pharmaceutical drugs and medical 
practices must be reimbursed by the HMOs.
The second was the introduction of closed formularies in the HMOs. A closed 
formulary was a restricted list of products; only products on the list would be 
reimbursed. These lists were made available to physicians and pharmacists in order to 
guide them in the prescribing and dispensing of pharmaceutical products (Dranove 
2003). The objective behind the introduction of formularies was cost containment. 
Formularies, and their implications, are explained in Chapter Two.
Corporate executives realised that they needed to devote new resources towards 
lobbying HMOs and legislators. Consequently, departments were created within the
companies where managers not only devoted their attention to lobbying the legislators 
but to lobbying all the key players in the health care system such as HMOs and central 
and provincial governments. This type of lobbying activity carried out by the 
pharmaceutical industry in Argentina has been named "pharmacopolitics" and the 
managers in charge of the activities are pharmacopolitics managers.
The role of the pharmapolitics manager essentially involved "lobbying the key officials 
in the health care system so as to introduce new policies or changes to existing 
regulations, which would benefit the pharmaceutical companies" (Quinones 2002). The 
main objective of this position was to lobby legislators and both public and HMO 
officials. According to Moloney (1996), pharmapolitics managers were in house 
lobbyists who lobbied only for their employer. The characteristics of the job are 
described in chapters Two and Four. Vazquez (2002) suggested that pharmapolitics 
activities were a highly effective means, perhaps the single most effective means, by 
which multinational pharmaceutical companies might influence the federal legislative 
process and the HMOs.
1.2 Profile of author
I hold a Masters Degree in Business Administration from the Argentine Catholic 
University (UCA) and an Accountancy Degree, also from UCA. I taught Costs at UCA 
after I finished my degree and held the position of head of assistant professors. My 
vocational background, after I finished with the University, was in marketing and sales. 
For many years, I worked in a marketing and sales role for multinational companies 
including Novartis, GSK, Altana, Roche, Schering and Pfizer. I started working as a 
pharmacopolitics manager for Alcon Labs Argentina, a multinational pharmaceutical 
company dedicated to the field of ophthalmology, in June 2001. I began as a
counsellor/advisor in pharmacopolitics and one year later was appointed 
pharmacopolitics manager. My responsibilities were to lobby HMO and public officials 
mainly with the aim of securing formulary positions for the company's strategic 
products. This was the first time I had worked full-time as an in-house lobbyist having 
previously carried out occasional lobbying in the marketing and sales jobs. As 
mentioned before, I began my DBA in February 2002 and so my learning curve in the 
pharmacopolitics job grew in parallel with the development of my research. It was a 
parallel process of reflection in the research project and the understanding of the 
lobbying process in my job; complete understanding was never final but always in a 
process of development, through introspection and interaction with others in the 
lobbying process.
During this process I, the researcher, also had to decide on the ideal methodology for 
the research. The researcher initially had the idea to develop a quantitative Bayesian 
approach but gradually changed to an approach that tallied with the game theory as the 
meso-theory of lobbying was mostly based on the game theory. However, the researcher 
realised that this was taking an analytic approach to understand a few controlled 
variables and a systemic approach was required for a deeper understanding of the 
interaction of variables in a complex environment. Consequently, the approach decided 
on was phenomenological with the ultimate aim of developing a deep understanding of 
the lobbying process carried out by multinationals in Argentina. The researcher 
analysed the different possible methodologies available and concluded that case study 
research and grounded theory were the best fit for the research process. The researcher 
first opted for a case study research methodology looking for literal and theoretical 
replication across the cases. However, later, the researcher decided to use grounded 
theory as a methodology due to the distinctive advantage that it commenced from
specific 'grounded in reality' situations (a pharmaceutical company) with the intent of 
understanding the nature and rationale of observed incidents. The literature review was 
carried out at the same time as the change of methodology. The researcher followed the 
DBA process by going from practice into theory and back to practice. He began with an 
empirical knowledge of the research subject, reviewed the formal theory and through 
the process of data collection and building sub-categories so developed the substantive 
theory. At the same time as the research process developed, the researcher became a 
member of the pharmacopolitics committee of the Multinational Pharmaceutical 
Chamber (CAEMe), of the pharmacopolitics committee of Disprofarma and of the audit 
committee of HMO agreements of the multinational companies in Argentina. This 
provided the opportunity of experiencing new situations in which cooperative lobbying 
decisions were made, i.e. when lobbying was carried out by coalition.
The main issue for the researcher was how to detach himself from previously held 
beliefs and to diminish bias in the research process. The researcher was concerned not 
with the interviews themselves but in the interpretation of concepts that were implied in 
the interviews. It was useful to be an 'insider' as, most of the time, the language used 
was indicative of situations or events already known to the researcher. The fact of being 
a participant of the research subject provided access and understanding of the processes 
studied but on the other hand posed the problem of bias in the interpretation of the data. 
It was an important tool for the researcher to be able to identify the effect of'self in the 
relationship between actions and interactions, as this could affect the research subject 
and the development of the substantive theory. In the study the researcher tried to 
maintain theoretical sensitivity and checked the data gathered by a process of constant 
comparative analysis. In this way the researcher remained focused on the data and the 
development of the substantive theory of pharmaceutical lobbying rather than self
analysis or allowing the research to be derailed by preconceived ideas. The researcher 
tried to avoid bias through the iterative and constant comparison of the data.
1.3 Aim and focus of the research
This study focused on the multinational pharmaceutical industry and addressed the 
question of how pharmaceutical companies influenced both the government and Health 
Management Organisations (HMOs). For the purpose of this research these two types of 
activities are referred to as pharmacopolifics (Quinones, 2002) as defined in Argentina. 
The research also looked at the expected outcomes and motivations of pharmacopolitics 
activities. The study developed substantive theory concerning how, in Argentina, 
government officials were lobbied and HMOs influenced, especially in the design of 
formularies. The study only concerned itself with the multinational pharmaceutical 
industry in Argentina.
The researcher first considered investigation lobbying from the perspective of the 
individual company as a lobbying actor. Through the research process it became 
apparent that it was also necessary to consider the pharmaceutical industry as an interest 
group that also lobbied officials and the government and pursued special interests for 
the whole industry or groups of companies. Therefore, the research describes companies 
and their pharmacopolitics managers as lobbying actors and the pharmaceutical 
industry, or coalitions of companies, as an interest group. In order to accomplish the 
aims of this study, the following research questions were asked:
a) Why do multinational pharmaceutical companies in Argentina lobby officials?
b) How do multinational pharmaceutical companies carry out lobbying activities?
The question "why" reflected the incentives of pharmaceutical companies to influence 
legislators and the decisions of officials. The question "how" reflected how the lobbying 
process was undertaken by pharmaceutical companies. The researcher used the two 
main research questions, together with the literature review, for the development of a 
fixed set of sub-questions for the interview process. The interviews were the main 
origin of this study's data, followed by participant observation, therefore the researcher 
needed to develop a broad set of interview questions to be able to gather as much as 
data as possible to build the substantive theory. The fixed set of questions are as 
follows:
a) Who are the officials that pharmaceutical companies choose as targets for 
lobbying?
b) What do you think are the key motivations for pharmaceutical companies to 
lobby public and HMO officials?
c) What are the objectives that you seek when you lobby officials?
d) Who are the participants in the process of pharmaceutical lobbying?
e) What do you think are the key issues for success when you engage in lobbying?
f) How would you describe the process of pharmaceutical lobbying?
g) Which strategy do you follow if you want to influence an official?
h) How much relevance do you give to scientific information in the process of
lobbying? 
i) Are there other non-scientific instruments that you use to achieve your
objective?
j) When a lobbying process is not successful, what do you do next? 
k) Is pharmaceutical lobbying carried out alone or in a cooperative way? 
I) Do you think that it is possible to free-ride?
The answers to these questions were therefore the origin of the majority of the data in 
this research. The researcher modified the approach to these questions to adapt to the 
different perspectives of the interviewee i.e. whether they were a pharmacopolitics 
manager, a public or HMO official or an external lobbyist. The questions helped to 
ensure the same information resulted from the interviews and facilitated the process of 
coding and building the categories. The questions were open and aimed at enhancing the 
richness of the data; they also permitted the researcher to probe each of the responses in 
depth. The interviews generated the most important data for this research. The approach 
to the research questions has been explained in detail in the methodology chapter.
The researcher's objective was not to focus on the moral implications of lobbying. The 
researcher aimed to develop substantive theory about the pharmaceutical lobbying 
process separate from moral considerations. The term 'contribution payments' was 
found in the meso-theory of lobbying. Grossman and Helpmann (1994) were first to 
state that contributions provide incentives for the politician to deviate from the best 
policy choice and that payments were given to political parties. The different authors 
who extended Grossman and Helpmann's model (including Grossman and Helpmann 
(1995)) used the term devoid of any moral implications- not mentioning whether the 
contribution payments were for the officials themselves or the political parties- and left 
the moral interpretation of the models to the reader. The researcher followed the 
neutrality shown in the meso-theory of lobbying but at the same time recognised that 
contribution payments as a term, within the research, was ambiguous- sometimes it 
depicted corruption in the process of lobbying. The culture in which the research took 
place, the Argentine market, also permitted a wide acceptance of contribution payments. 
'Ethics' emerged as a concept in the open coding process and the researcher comments 
briefly on this concept in Chapter Five.
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1.4 The significance of the study
Pharmaceutical lobbying as a subject has been studied from the perspective of its 
application in different markets, especially in the USA. There have been numerous 
reports from interest groups such as Public Citizen (2001) and Common Cause (2001), 
that have explained the implementation of pharmaceutical lobbying in Washington. The 
researcher, on beginning the literature search for pharmaceutical lobbying in Argentina, 
found that there had been no systematic review of how the lobbying process was 
undertaken by pharmaceutical companies in this country. Thus, the focus of this 
proposed doctoral research - lobbying by the multinational pharmaceutical industry in 
Argentina - was new and had not been studied before. The researcher found an 
opportunity to build theory about pharmaceutical lobbying in Argentina, contribute to 
the body of knowledge concerning lobbying theory and also provide a basis for 
investigators to test the theory in other countries.
The researcher first focused on finding a definition of lobbying that would give a 
common framework for the research process. Lobbying was an instrument available to 
those interested in advocating and advancing their interests and objectives openly with 
respect to legislative and executive decision making (Jobst, 2002) but as a term was 
used in different contexts and situations with different interpretations. The Oxford 
English Dictionary Online (2002) defined lobbying as:
"1. To influence (members of the house of legislature) in the exercise of their 
legislative functions by frequenting the lobby. Also, to procure the passing of (a 
measure) through congress by means of such influence"
"2. To frequent the lobby of a legislative assembly for the purpose of 
influencing members' votes; to solicit the votes of members"
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The Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2002) introduced "influencing public officials" to the 
definition and therefore broadening the target of lobbying and not limiting it only to the 
legislators. It also defined lobbying as an influence "toward a desired action". It 
confirmed that there was an objective to be reached. Eisenhardt & Bourgeouis III (1988) 
used a broad definition of lobbying in which the target of lobbying could be any 
official. Moloney and Jordan (1996) broadened this definition stating that lobbying 
included an intelligence role (monitoring, interpretation, research) and an operational 
role (planning and representation to decision makers). Moloney and Jordan's (1996) 
approach was used for this research as it provides a framework to understand the word 
lobbying every time it is used.
The researcher secondly analysed lobbying regulations in different countries to 
determine whether different regulations could affect the research process. Lobbying in 
the USA per se constitutes a lawful opportunity available for interest groups to exert 
influence and to impact on policy. Interest groups and lobbying actors had to disclose 
their investment on lobbying congress, which provided transparency to the system 
(Public Citizen, 2004). The right to lobby in the USA (Jobst, 2002, p.3) was derived 
implicitly from the First Amendment of the Constitution which stated "Congress shall 
make no law [...] abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for redress of grievances". 
The rationale of lobbyists stems from the belief that a democratic society did not 
necessarily guarantee equal access of individual opinion and, hence, any tool to foster 
awareness of the legislators about certain topics should be allowed. As Lord (2000, 
p.293.) wrote, legislators "face a lack of knowledge about relevant public policy 
priorities and preferences" due to limited personal and staff time and resources. Lord 
(2000) also confirmed that legislators must rely to a great degree on the information that
12
they received from different lobbying groups in order to make decisions on different 
subjects. In the European Union there was an increase in lobbying following the Single 
European Act (Howell, 2004). Mazey and Richarson (1993) commented that officials in 
the European Community were trying to accommodate to lobbying exerted by pressure 
groups because there was no regulation of the activity. In Brussels there was debate 
about how to establish greater transparency in lobbying but, at the time of writing, there 
had been no regulation except for voluntary initiatives (Meliss, 2006). The researcher 
discovered that lobbying in Argentina was not regulated (Neri, 2002). In 2003, 
President Kirchner issued a decree whereby public officials should divulge interviews 
with companies, external lobbyists or interest groups where the official could be 
requested to make a decision regarding a particular interest. Public officials, with the 
exception of one minister, did not comply with the decree (Resales, 2006). So, 
essentially, lobbying in Argentina was not regulated. This lack of regulation helped the 
interviewees to freely express their opinions about how lobbying was executed by the 
pharmaceutical industry in Argentina.
The researcher reviewed the literature in order to identify the theoretical perspectives 
around which to carry out the research. The researcher approached the formal theory of 
lobbying from three different perspectives. The macro-theory of lobbying referred to the 
different models about interest group formation. The study of the theoretical models of 
pluralism and corporatism, with its variations of meso-corporatism and corporate 
pluralism, provided the basis for understanding how interest groups were incorporated 
as co-responsible partners in the decision-making process. The research addressed the 
position of the pharmaceutical industry as an interest group in the pluralism-corporatism 
axis. Salisbury's (1984) definition of interest group indicated that corporations, state 
and local governments, universities, think tanks and other institutions of the private
13
sector were also groups with interest representation. The researcher used this definition 
of interest group when he referred to the pharmaceutical industry. Interest group theory 
(Olson, 1965, Salisbury, 1969) shifted attention from external to internal interest group 
problems, focusing on why members adhered to an interest group. Olson (1965) in his 
Logic of Collective Action stated that a rational, self interested individual would not 
contribute to the costs of collective action and thus would free-ride unless there was 
coercion to force them to do otherwise. Furthermore he stated that there had to be 
selective incentives to group members so that they stayed in the group. Walker (1991), 
Maloney & Jordan (1997), Kimber (1981) disagreed with Olson and provided new 
insights to the theory. The researcher investigated free riding and coercion among 
companies. Salisbury (1969) emphasised the role of the "entrepreneurs" within the 
interest group. Walker (1983) introduced the concept of patronage, which stated that 
there were some groups that were funded by the government or private interests. The 
author studied interest group theory in relation to lobbying- the subject area of this 
research. Olson (1965) and Moe (1980) saw lobbying as a by-product of group activity. 
Salisbury (1969) suggested that lobbying by group leaders was related to the leaders' 
choice and values and not to members' demands. Salisbury (1984) identified 
corporations as important lobbying actors. Moloney and Jordan (1996) also noted the 
interaction of corporations in government decision circles. Howell (2004) and Kirchner 
(1980) referred to organisations that influenced the public bodies by lobbying for the 
interests of the sector that they represented. Woll (2006) and Coen (1997) noticed that 
the term interest groups excluded firms and their political influence yet firms were 
important lobbying actors. For this research the pharmaceutical industry is considered 
an interest group and the pharmaceutical companies and pharmacopolitics managers as 
lobbying actors. The researcher studied the lobbying activity of the pharmaceutical 
industry as an interest group and researched group formation between pharmaceutical
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companies and the relationship between members of a coalition. The researcher also 
investigated the lobbying activities of the individual company as actors in direct 
representation of their interests in decision-making circles. Woll (2006) argued that 
lobbying style was different depending on the context in which lobbying actors carried 
out their lobbying. The researcher identified and compared the pharmaceutical lobbying 
styles of the USA and the EU to those in Argentina.
After analysing interest group theory, the researcher decided to focus on the meso- 
theory of lobbying. One of the research questions was how lobbying was exerted and 
the meso-theory of lobbying proved to be the most appropriate for this purpose. The 
meso-theory of lobbying was based on game theory and Nash's equilibrium. It provided 
a logical framework of how lobbying was exerted. The meso-theory of lobbying 
considered two channels of influence: contribution payments and transmission of 
information, the first being contribution payments. Grossman and Helpman (1994) 
developed the first model by adapting the common agency theory to the lobbying 
situation. This model established an official and a set of interest groups. The interest 
groups made offers to the official to try to influence his/her decision. The official had to 
decide which action to take and how this decision reduced aggregate welfare. Rama and 
Tabellini (1998) established the cooperation between interest groups in the model. 
Grossman and Helpman (1995) completed the model with the interaction of lobbying 
actors in different countries. Maggi and Rodriguez Clare (2000) introduced the choice 
of different policy instruments. Damania and Fredriksson (2000) focused on the 
incentives to free-ride when different interest groups followed a common interest. The 
other channel of influence was the transmission of information. The motive for this 
lobbying policy was that officials had incentives to listen to interest groups when they 
were imperfectly informed and interest groups possessed better information about the
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relevant policy (Neske, 1997). This related strongly to the concept of "bounded 
rationality" developed by Simon (1955). Officials faced uncertainty about the future 
policies and they could not incur costs in acquiring information. These two factors 
limited the extent to which officials could make a fully rational decision. Simon (1955) 
claimed, they had only "bounded rationality", so that they could only make decisions 
based on their previous beliefs and with the information they received from interest 
groups. Officials were forced to make decisions not by "maximisation"- which meant 
the best rational decision based on perfect information- but by "satisficing", based on 
imperfect information provided by the interest groups. The basic communication 
models were developed by Potters and van Winden (1992) and Ainsworth (1993). In 
these models the interest groups provided information to the official. The interest group 
guided the official in his/her policy by providing information. The official had to decide 
whether or not to trust the information received by the interest groups. Austen-Smith 
and Wright (1992) introduced counteractive lobbying by two interest groups. Lohmann 
(1993) added a model with multiple interest groups and the official had to decide which 
information to accept according to his/her preferred policy decision. Lagerlof (1997) 
introduced the concept that the interest group was imperfectly informed and that it had 
to acquire costly information if the official expected it. Lohmann (1995a) and Austen- 
Smith (1998) developed models regarding access buying where the interest groups 
made contributions in order to transmit the information. Most of authors wrote about 
one channel of influence or the other. The only model, that the researcher found, with a 
mixed approach was developed by Bennedsen and Feldmann (2001) where they 
assumed that an interest group might influence an official's decision in two independent 
ways. Firstly, the interest group acquired costly information and provided it to the 
official or secondly the interest group might engage in contribution payments to 
compensate the official for a deviation of the preferred policy. This model integrated the
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two channels of influence found in the meso-theory. The formal meso-theory of 
lobbying helped the researcher to identify how lobbying was performed by the 
pharmaceutical industry or by individual companies through its pharmacopolitics 
managers. The discussion of the meso-theory and the substantive theory permitted the 
researcher to develop a conceptual model of the pharmaceutical lobbying process, 
which is described in Chapter Six.
The formal micro-theory of lobbying described the application of lobbying in the 
pharmaceutical context. As mentioned previously, there was no relevant literature 
regarding pharmaceutical lobbying in Argentina so that the researcher decided to review 
the American literature. Vasallo (2002) mentioned that the American health system was 
the most similar to the Argentine one. Vincent (2003) compared the European and 
American health systems and also concluded that the American was the most similar to 
the Argentine. There was also a philosophical similarity in that health care in Argentina, 
as in the USA, is a private good that can be accessed by those who can pay for it. In 
Europe, by contrast, healthcare is a public good and the whole population is allowed 
some degree of health care for nothing. The American literature depicts how 
pharmaceutical lobbying exerted influence on congress and showed how the 
pharmaceutical industry implemented its lobbying strategy. The micro-theory have also 
included a description of the peculiar instruments and practices that were present in 
pharmaceutical lobbying so the reader has an understanding of the characteristics of the 
pharmaceutical market. Some of these instruments and practices are also present in the 
relationship between the British NHS and NICE, as an evaluation agency, and the 
pharmaceutical industry. Herxheimer (2003) stated that patronage of patients' 
organisations by pharmaceutical companies for lobbying NICE was commonly used. 
Quenell (2001) mentioned that pharmaceutical companies carried out lobbying of NICE
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and she also stated that a decision by NICE, regarding interferon, was overruled due to 
direct lobbying by the pharmaceutical industry of the Department of Health (Quenell, 
2003). Adams (2004) described that the Association of British Pharmaceutical Industry 
(ABPI) carried out cooperative lobbying regarding a price regulation scheme on behalf 
of its members. Corporate Watch (2003) stated that ABPI lobbied the Government to 
support the pharmaceutical and biotech industries on issues such as taxes, advertising to 
the public, parallel imports and drug prices. Rogers (2003) mentioned that the UK 
pharmaceutical industry contributed funding for NHS services and resources that would 
otherwise not be available, for example equipment or nurses' salaries. This issue was 
not common practice in the USA or Argentina.
As mentioned above, there had been no systematic review of how the lobbying process 
was undertaken by pharmaceutical companies in Argentina. The research findings from 
this study added to an existing body of knowledge of pharmaceutical lobbying relating 
to research in other countries. The findings contributed to the general knowledge of 
lobbying and provide a deeper understanding of how pharmaceutical lobbying was 
carried out in Argentina. The study made several contributions. Firstly, it positioned the 
pharmaceutical industry as an interest group in the pluralism-corporatism axis as a 
means to provide a framework for the understanding of its lobbying activities. 
Secondly, the study defined the lobbying style of the pharmaceutical industry in 
Argentina compared to that performed in the USA and the EU. Thirdly, it provided a 
pharmaceutical-industry lobbying-model for Argentina mat can be tested in other 
countries. Finally, it provided a model of cooperative or individual lobbying that stated 
when it was convenient to build coalitions. The models and substantive theory 
developed in this research could be tested in other industries within Argentina or in the 
same industry in other countries. This study recognised, from the perspective of the
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pharmaceutical industry, that lobbying occupied an important role within companies 
and that resources were allocated and continue to be allocated for this purpose.
7.5 Research Design
Data analysis followed the methodology of grounded theory based on the Strauss & 
Corbin (1998) model. The data was coded (open, process, axial, selective) in order to 
develop concepts, sub-categories and the core category and thus establish connections 
between the core category and its sub-categories which permitted the building of a 
theoretical framework. Sub-categories were integrated in a core category- 
pharmaceutical lobbying. The researcher compared the substantive theory to the 
formal theory in order to improve the construct definitions.
Four analytic (and not strictly sequential) phases of grounded theory building were 
identified: research design, data collection, data analysis and literature comparison. The 
researcher followed seven procedures or steps within these phases:
a) Review of the literature: This focused on the subject to be researched supporting 
the definition of the research questions.
b) Selecting cases: The researcher aimed at theoretical sampling and selected those 
cases that could maximise the opportunities for comparative analysis until 
achieving saturation of the categories.
c) Development of rigorous data collection protocol: The protocol permitted the 
creation of a database for the data gathered from interviews, participant 
observations and archival data. The protocol strengthened grounding of theory 
by triangulation of data from different sources.
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d) Field work: During the interviews there was an overlap of data collection and 
analysis which speeded analysis and revealed helpful adjustments to data 
collection procedures.
e) Analysis of data: The substantive theory was built using open coding, axial 
coding, coding for process and selective coding.
f) Saturation of sub-categories: process ended when marginal improvement was 
small.
g) Comparison of substantive theory with formal theory: This comparison helped 
to improve the emergent theory and the researcher could establish the domain to 
which the study's findings were analytically generalised. The researcher could 
corroborate or refute the existing theory based on the research findings.
The researcher evaluated these phases and steps against three research quality criteria 
(Yin, 1994): construct validity, internal validity and external validity. Reliability was 
not evaluated as the main research criteria was validity.
Construct validity was enhanced by establishing clearly specified operational 
procedures in the data-gathering phase and coding. Interviews were recorded, a consent 
form given to interviewees and a set of fixed questions were used. Transcription took 
place immediately after the interviews and explanations written when interpretative 
work was needed. Notes were taken as a participant observer and written in a diary 
during the research process. Coding followed the steps of grounded theory enumerated 
by Strauss and Corbin (1998).
By establishing causal relationships whereby certain conditions were shown to lead to 
other conditions, as distinguished from spurious relationships, it was possible to
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enhance internal validity. In this sense, internal validity addressed the credibility or 
"truth value" of the study's findings.
External validity required clearly establishing the domain to which the study's findings 
could be generalised. Here reference was made to analytic and not statistical 
generalisation and required generalising a particular set of findings to some broader 
theory and not a broader population.
Table 1 provides an overview of the phases, steps and tests that were taken. The initial 
table developed by the researcher began as a normative or prescriptive account of 
recommended activities and changed to a descriptive account of how these prescriptions 
were applied in the research. The research process table shows the activities that the 
researcher implemented to carry out the study. A more in-depth explanation of 
methodology and the research process is covered in the Methodology Chapter.






Review of lobbying 
literature
Selecting cases
Definition of research 
questions
Theoretical sampling
Focus on the subject to be researched
Focused efforts on theoretically useful cases 
aimed at saturation
DATA COLLECTION PHASE
Step 3 Develop rigorous data collection 
protocol





Strengthened grounding of theory by 
triangulation of evidence. Enhances 
internal validity
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and analysis
Speeded analysis and revealed













Developed concepts, sub-concepts, 
processes, and properties
Developed connections between concepts 
and sub-categories
Integrated sub-categories into the core 
category to build a theoretical framework
All forms of coding enhance internal 
validity
Ended process when marginal improvement
becomes small
LITERATURE COMPARISON PHASE






Improved construct definitions, and
therefore internal validity
Also improved external validity by
establishing the domain to which the study's
findings can be analytically generalised
1.6 Overview of the thesis
Chapter One presents the background to the research topic, namely pharmaceutical 
lobbying in Argentina. The profile of the author was described as well as his role as a 
practitioner in the research project. The researcher explained the aim and focus of the 
study. The objectives of the research were explicit, namely addressing the research
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questions of why and how the pharmaceutical industry carried out its lobbying process. 
The researcher noticed that there was no literature regarding pharmaceutical lobbying in 
Argentina so that the study aimed to fill a knowledge gap and make a contribution to 
lobbying theory. The researcher described briefly the theoretical perspectives and 
enumerated the contributions to knowledge of the research. The researcher also 
presented the research design and depicts the various phases and steps undertaken.
Chapter Two explores the current literature in the field of lobbying and deals with the 
theoretical perspectives of lobbying and its political context. The formal macro-theory 
of lobbying is discussed in part one. The different models of the political system in 
which interest groups were formed, mainly pluralism and corporatism, and how interest 
groups were incorporated within the process of decision-making have been described. 
The first section also provides an insight into interest group theory. Section two is 
dedicated to the formal meso-theory of lobbying. It explains the definition and the 
theory of lobbying based on the game theory. It describes the different models available 
and analysed two different approaches: contribution payments and transmission of 
information models. Section three explains the formal micro-theory of lobbying, that 
was the application of pharmaceutical lobbying in the USA. There was no literature on 
pharmaceutical lobbying in Argentina so the researcher chose the USA as it had the 
biggest pharmaceutical market (Quinones, 2002) in the world and secondly because it 
was the most similar to the Argentine market (Vasallo, 2002). The reason for 
considering the micro-theory of lobbying was to illustrate the peculiar instruments and 
practices that were present in pharmaceutical lobbying so that the reader had an 
understanding of the characteristics of this market. Section four discusses the issues of 
methodological choice and defines the researcher's position in the modernism and post­ 
modernism movements and the paradigms of inquiry. It also describes the different
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methodologies that the researcher considered for this study and reviewes the different 
phenomenological approaches to research. The researcher chose grounded theory 
methodology based on Strauss & Corbin (1998) model for this study.
Chapter Three outlines the aim and focus of the research and the research questions and 
sub-questions. This chapter describes the inductive-deductive stance of the researcher 
and the methodology choice, namely grounded theory. It identifies the reasons why a 
grounded theory approach was chosen and its application to the research area and the 
process of formulating the substantive theory. This chapter deals with the theoretical 
sensitivity and the reflexivity of the researcher in the study. The conditional matrix 
shows the relationship between the macro and micro conditions in the research process 
facilitating the analysis. The coding and theoretical sampling are briefly commented on.
Chapter Four portrays the research context, namely the job of pharmapolitics in 
multinational pharmaceutical companies in Argentina. It depicts the data collection 
strategies and the methods used in order to formulate the documentary evidence for the 
research. Details about the sampling and the criteria used are also documented. The 
researcher explains the data analysis process and how the concepts, sub-categories and 
core categoy were formed.
Chapter Five presents the substantive theory that arose from the process of open coding, 
coding for process, axial coding and selective coding. The seven sub-categories- Target, 
Motivations, Participants, Product, Building trust, Strategy and Cooperative lobbying - 
are explained and the core category identified: pharmaceutical lobbying. Quotations 
from respondents illustrate the findings. The substantive theory that emerged from the 
data is explained.
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Chapter Six compares the substantive theory with the formal theory of lobbying and 
demonstrates both the similarities and differences. This comparison provides the basis 
from which to develop four different models: the position of the pharmaceutical 
industry in the pluralism-corporatism scenario, the pharmaceutical lobbying style 
model, the pharmaceutical lobbying process and the cooperative and individual 
lobbying strategy. The first two models were based on the formal macro-theory of 
lobbying and the second two on the formal meso-theory of lobbying. The researcher 
also points out the limitations of the research and suggested an agenda for future 
research.
1.7 Conclusion
The main features of the research - the aim, focus of the study and the questions - have 
been presented. The researcher has also outlined the significance of the study and its 
contribution to knowledge. The research design and the steps followed by the researcher 
have been explained. The overview of the thesis provided in this chapter was intended 
to give the reader a glimpse of the whole document. The next chapter deals with the 
theoretical perspectives of lobbying. It also explores the different methodologies 
considered by the researcher and defines the researcher's position in the modernism and 
post-modernism movements and the paradigms of inquiry.
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
2.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the formal theory of lobbying and the research methodologies 
considered by the researcher. Diesing (1972, p.31) stated that "A formal theory is 
composed of a model plus an indefinite number of interpretations and there is a sharp 
distinction between model and interpretation. A model is not affected by any of its 
interpretations, but can be understood and studied in abstraction from all of them". 
Howell (2000) stated that substantive theory should be verified against a formal theory 
and if changes to formal theory are to be made, there must be references to empiricism. 
The researcher investigated the lobbying literature from three different levels: macro, 
meso and micro-theory. Formal macro-theory approached the different group formation 
theories such as pluralism, corporatism and its variations. The importance of these 
theories was that they contained the basis on which interest groups were formed and 
show the different motivations for interest group formation. The theory of interest 
groups was important as those groups were the participants in the lobbying process.
The formal meso-theory considered the theory of lobbying based on academic 
mathematical models, mainly the game theory. The meso-theory of lobbying provided a 
logical framework with clear definitions that enabled the researcher to identify the 
different stages in the lobbying process. One of the research questions was how 
pharmaceutical companies in Argentina carried out lobbying and, thus, the theory of 
lobbying based on the game theory provided the foundation to understand how the 
lobbying process was carried out.
The formal micro-theory of lobbying explained the application of pharmaceutical
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lobbying in the USA. There was no literature on pharmaceutical lobbying in Argentina 
so the researcher chose the USA for two reasons; it was the biggest pharmaceutical 
market in the world (Quinones, 2002) and secondly because it was the most similar to 
the Argentine market (Vasallo, 2002). This research considered the micro-theory of 
lobbying in order to illustrate the peculiar instruments and practices that were present in 
pharmaceutical lobbying and to give the reader an understanding of the characteristics 
of this market.
The research methodologies for this study were also explored. The researcher described 
the methodologies available in qualitative research, described briefly phenomenology 
(as a methodology), action research, ethnography, case study and grounded theory and 
outlined the main characteristics of each. The researcher declared his position on the 
ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions related to inquiry 
paradigms and identifies why grounded theory was the most appropriate methodology 
for this research.
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2.2 Formal macro-theory: Political models and interest group theory
2.2. J Pluralism and Corporatism
Study of the theoretical models of pluralism and corporatism, with the variations of 
meso-corporatism and corporative pluralism, provided the basis for understanding how 
interest groups were incorporated within the process of authoritative decision-making as 
co-responsible partners in governance societal guidance (Schmitter, 1981). Jordan and 
Richardson (1987) confirmed that interest or pressure group writings stemmed from 
empirical studies of the policy process. Johnson (2005) defined the pressure group as an 
interest group that existed primarily for exerting political influence as a means of 
affecting government policies or legislation but he remarked that the distinction 
between the two terms had become less significant in ordinary language. Kavanagh and 
Jones (1991, p. 224) stated "Interest or pressure groups are formed by people to protect 
or advance a shared interest" making no distinction between both terms. For the purpose 
of this study, the researcher will use the terms interchangeable. The researcher explored 
next the different models of pluralism and corporatism based on how they approached 
group formation.
2.2.1:1 Pluralism
Although Latham (1952) and Connoly (1969) looked for the roots of pluralism in 
classical literature, the theory of pluralism was born in the '50s and '60s with Dahl 
(1956). The pluralist image of a complex political process with multiple participants and 
uncertain outcomes was itself a denial of elite Marxist corporatist theories. Grant (1989) 
defined pluralism as the most influential and resilient account of the role of interest 
groups in a democratic society. Its resilience was due to the variety of positions held by
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the different authors. Dahl (1956) argued that power was not dominated by a minority 
but was spread throughout society with no particular sectional interest being 
predominant and with each power source being balanced by a countervailing force. 
Coakley and Gallagher (1999, p 273.) stated that the pluralist model "Maintains that 
individual interest groups apply pressure on political elites in a competitive manner and 
attribute power in policy making to individual groups operating in particular areas at 
particular times". Dahl (1956) presented this definition of pluralism in his early work 
but this definition lacked internal coherence as different groups have unequal resources. 
The proof of this was that Dahl (1984) separated himself from this notion of pluralism 
in modern political analysis and defended the notion of polyarchy: that is a set of 
interest groups with unequal resources to influence government or officials. For Dahl 
(1991), polyarchy was the term that defined pluralist society and American democracy; 
there were certain groups who could exert more influence on state decision making than 
others. This influence was dispersed because not all interest groups had the same power 
in the decision-making process (Dahl, 1991). Jordan (1993, p.51) listed the inequalities 
found in Dahl's polyarchy concept:
1) Different kinds of resources for influencing officials were available to different 
citizens and groups.
1) Resources were unequally distributed so that certain groups had more resources 
to influence officials.
2) Groups that had access to one resource often had limited access to other 
resources.
3) No one resource dominated in all, or even in most, key decisions.
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4) A resource was effective in some issues, or in some specific decisions, but not in 
all.
5) No group was lacking some influence resources.
The essence of Dahl's (1991) pluralism was that the group resources for influencing 
were dispersed and that they were not equal. Dahl's theory also abstracted the figure of 
the state in interest group competition and placed the state as a neutral observer, which 
was not necessarily the case; he validated, nevertheless, group struggling (Dahl, 1984) 
related to the state as the means of influencing government actions; interest groups 
competed for access to the government in order to influence state decisions. Another 
incongruence in Dahl's perspective was that he recognised that all groups had the ability 
to influence irrespective of their resources. He did not recognise that certain groups had 
de facto a better position to influence government and that there were others with no 
influence (Jordan, 1993). Moloney (1996) confirmed this issue stating that the pluralist 
perspective offered no powerful explanation for asymmetrical distribution of power 
between groups.
Truman (1951) was the other major figure in the development of pluralism. Although he 
did not identify himself as a pluralist he could be considered a 'subconscious' pluralist 
(Jordan, 1993). Truman (1951) validated the existence of interest groups and he 
considered them a form of democratic expression. Truman (1951) called attention to the 
many types of resources available to interest groups in gaining the access needed to 
exercise influence (Browne, 1990). Within those groups, organised business groups 
competed with each other to obtain a better standing in governing circles (Moloney, 
1996). Truman (1951) did not believe in the equality of groups because any system 
tended to discriminate in favour of established groups and interests and new groups
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were denied access to points of decision. Wilson (1973), and Tilly (1978) also 
confirmed this inequality of interest representation. Truman (1951) also declared that 
when an interest appeared in the political system a potential interest group would form 
and occupy this position. This potential group statement could not be verified in reality 
therefore converting it into an issue of faith for Truman (Jordan & Richardson, 1987). 
Truman's additional contribution was perhaps his proposition that the overlap of 
interests held by interest groups mediated and moderated conflict (Jordan 1993). 
Truman (1951, p.520) said "Overlapping membership among organised interest groups 
and among these and potential groups is, as we have seen, the principal balancing force 
in the politics of a multigroup society such as the United States". Interest groups 
compromised because of the conflicting interests of their members. The validity of this 
assertion could be only true in a small community as the members of the interest groups 
were connected; in large national interest groups the leaders did not necessarily have 
overlapping membership and interests in common with other groups.
Polsby (1971, p. 118) viewed pluralism as "A society fractured into congeries of 
hundreds of small special interest groups, with incompletely overlapping memberships, 
widely differing power bases and a multitude of techniques for exercising influence on 
decisions salient to them". Polsby's pluralism was a methodology to discover who ruled 
in a community (Jordan, 1993). He recognised that certain groups would be more 
powerful or govern in certain communities but adhered to Dahl's proposition that no 
group dominated in all issues. Polsby's (1971) approach did not make a prior 
assumption that a certain interest group dominated but he could not rule out one group 
dominating and that not all interest groups had the power to influence (Jordan, 1993). 
Cox (1988) defined pluralism as a concept in which the question of which groups 
dominated was an open empirical one. The problem with Polsby, as with Dahl, was that
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they tried to differentiate themselves from the concept that given unequal resources 
there would be unequal influence on government by different interest groups (Browne, 
1990).
Lindblom (1965) differentiated himself from the previous writers and introduced the 
figure of the state as a participant in the competition between interests groups. Dahl's 
pluralism suffered from being a society-centred theory that failed to give sufficient 
weight to the state as an actor in its own right. For Lindblom (1965), government was 
often a major participant. Bentley (1967) defined government as a differentiated, 
representative group performing specified governing functions for the underlying 
groups of the population. Lindblom also noticed that the interaction between groups was 
not always beneficial and that inefficiency and irrationality lay in the competition 
between interest groups (Jordan, 1993). For Moloney (1996) business groups needed 
government involvement. Lindblom opposed Dahl (1961), who thought that dispersing 
power was always beneficial and that "those representing various private parties will in 
fact rationally mobilize their resources" (Browne, 1990, p.478). Another issue 
introduced by Lindblom & Braybrooke (1963) was the theory of incrementalism, which 
stated that there were multiple participants, each with some distinctive position and 
some political resources. In this theory, the players learnt from experience and 
increased their power in a certain sector or area. Nevertheless, the approach of 
Lindblom (1965) confirmed the inequality described by the previous authors: where 
there was no pure pluralism but a situation where certain interest groups or individuals 
had a dominant position in decision-making policies. Lindblom (1977) differentiated 
between interest groups and business in a polyarchy and stated that business had a 
privileged relationship with government. Business took a number of major decisions off 
the agenda of the government - for example jobs, prices, production, growth and
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standard of living - and as such had a role similar to the public official. Government 
needed business for the welfare of society and adapted public policy to the needs of 
business (Lindblom, 1977). Grant (2002) mentioned that New Labour declared itself a 
pro-business party and had a consultative relationship with business. Lindblom (1977) 
stated that this situation of inequality between interest and business groups was called 
neo-pluralism. Neo-pluralists recognised the structural constraints upon the participation 
of certain groups and the inequality between interest groups, especially when it came to 
economic issues (Lindblom, 1977). However, the neo-pluralists maintained that there 
was still a degree of plurality in other policy areas.
Dahl & Lindblom (1976) expressed their views about bargaining between interest 
groups. They did not like the effect of national bargaining, namely giving power to 
national organisations instead of the government. This bargaining, along with being 
heard (Dahl, 1956), fitted in with the pluralist perspective of lobbying executed by 
dispersed groups with unequal resources.
Jordan (1993) argued that pluralism was an anti-theory more than a theory. He referred 
to pluralism as a conceptual framework whose importance lay in what it rejected more 
than what it established. Bachrach & Baratz (1962) and Schattschneider (1960) 
criticised pluralism on the basis that government and bureaucracy were interested in 
interaction with interest groups and they were not neutral but an active participant. They 
rejected the image of government as a neutral arena in which interest groups fairly 
competed and policies neutrally emerged. They also noted that there were insider 
groups and outsider groups, the latter being excluded from influencing the decision 
process. Grant (1989) confirmed this when stating that insider groups were regarded as 
legitimate by government and were consulted on a regular basis; outsider groups either 
did not seek to be consulted by government on a regular basis or could not gain
33
recognition. Jordan (1993) pointed out that the pluralist theory was a collection of 
different author's views and that there had been no systematic development of the 
theory.
Nevertheless pluralism was the starting point of the interest group theory. Although 
some authors included in pluralism the work of Olson (1965) and Salisbury (1969), the 
researcher included these in the interest groups theory.
2.2.1:2 Corporatism
Historically the use of the term corporatism had a strong normative and ideological 
component. It was adopted by fascist and communist ideologies, showing an 
institutional relationship between systems of authoritative decision-making and interest 
representation. The term became synonymous with the structures of a strong and 
dominant state (Molina & Rhodes, 2002). Shonfield (1965) observed that, in order to 
attain a high level of macroeconomic performance within the Keynesian framework, 
modem economies had promoted processes, including state planning, in which the 
major interest groups were brought together and encouraged to conclude a series of 
bargains about their future behaviour. This had the effect of moving economic events 
along a desired plan. The plan indicated the general direction in which the interest 
groups, including the state in its various guises, agreed they wanted to go. The work of 
Schmitter (1974) marked an academic milestone in this conceptual evolution. He clearly 
defined neo-corporatism as a form of interest representation distinct from pluralism, 
statism and syndicalism (Molina & Rhodes, 2002). Though Schmitter (1974) saw 
similarities between the models, he sought to present a clear alternative to pluralism 
(Jordan, 1993). In the pluralist model, he suggested, there were a large number of 
competing groups but in a corporatist system there were few groups each in a specially
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privileged relationship with the state. Corporatism, according to Schmitter (1979, p. 13), 
could be defined as "A system of interest representation in which the constituent units 
are organised into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, 
hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognised or licensed 
by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective 
categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and 
articulation of demands and supports". The state was at the apex of the corporatist 
system and organised a hierarchy within which interests operated regarding both the 
government and other interests.
At around the same time, Lehmbruch (1977, 1979) put greater emphasis on neo- 
corporatism as a form of policy-making in which concerted action assumed central 
importance. Lehmbruch (1977) saw corporatism as an institutional pattern of policy 
formation in which large interest organisations cooperated with each other and public 
authorities not only in the articulation and intermediation of interests but also in the 
authoritative allocation of values and the implementation of policies.
The difference between Schmitter (1974) and Lehmbruch (1977) was that the former 
saw corporatism as a structure of interest representation and the latter saw it as a system 
of policy making. Despite these differences the common concern of both was in 
understanding the continuous and structured participation of interest organisations in 
policy-making and other stages of the policy process, especially policy implementation. 
Cawson (1985, p.38.) introduced a revised definition which tried to amalgamate both 
points of view- "Corporatism is a specific socio-political process in which organisations 
representing monopolistic functional interests engage in political exchange with state 
agencies over public policy outputs which involves these organisations in a role that 
combines interest representation and policy implementation through delegated self
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enforcement". In short, Cawson (1985) brought together the views of Schmitter 
(corporatism 1) and the views of Lehmbruch (corporatism 2).
Lehmbruch (1982) accepted strong institutional links between government and 
organisations, such as having between them regular consultations and group 
representations in advisory bodies. In addition, Schmitter reviewed his initial definition 
of corporatism and considered that for "definitional purposes it may be preferable to 
define concepts in terms of polar opposites... but the real world is located somewhere in 
between" (Schmitter, 1982, p.265.).
Crouch (1983) located the difference between pluralism and corporatism in the nature of 
the actors involved and in their internal organisation, rather than in their role in the 
policy machinery. Insider groups were incorporated in corporatism so that favoured 
groups played a structured and significant role in policymaking. Martin (1983) argued 
that the distinction between pluralism and corporatism was the extent to which 
organised groups were integrated in the policy-making arena of the state. Interest groups 
operated as integral parts of, rather than external influences on, government activity. 
This issue, which was essential to the corporatism theory, was downplayed in the 
pluralist literature.
Lehmbruch (1982) defined corporatism as a pluri-dimensional concept and applied it to 
different forms of arrangement. Most prominent was the tripartite arrangement between 
government, unions and business (the iron triangle). But corporatism has been 
established in many more policy fields (e.g. health) and on different levels as local 
corporatism (Molina & Rhodes, 2002). The common characteristic was that interest 
groups acted as equal partners of the state. It was a specific structure of exchange in 
which interest groups not only represented the interest of their members towards the
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state but also the state's interest towards their members. Thus corporatism was not one­ 
way-route but a transaction structure designed to act out commonly defined policies 
effectively (Wessels, 1997). Competition among groups was much more limited than in 
the pluralist systems while the state role was more assertive and sustained.
Schmitter (1974) in his attempt to differentiate his thinking from pluralism did not make 
a realistic effort to engage in debate with the existent interest group theory (Jordan, 
1993, Almond, 1983), and presented corporatism as a novel theory. The consequence of 
presenting corporatism as a new theory was to create debate on whether it was totally 
novel. The central corporatist purpose was to replace the pluralist model, building an 
alternative to the paradigm of interest politics (Jordan and Richardson, 1987). Grant 
(1989) wrote that corporatist theories were insufficiently distinct from the pluralist 
theories that they sought to replace; at best, they might be described as a subtype of 
pluralism (Almond, 1983, Grant, 1989). The corporatist model was seldom or never 
found in practice but Schmitter (1979) used it to underline empirically observable traits. 
Empirical examples of corporatism were much more difficult to find than had been 
claimed (Grant, 1989). Jordan and Richardson (1987) also found it difficult to 
implement the corporatist criteria because ambiguity on many of the key features of 
these criteria was the necessity of practical politics. Williamson (1985) noticed another 
issue not present in the work of Schmitter namely the bargaining between the different 
interest groups, which was a fundamental issue in relations between groups. Other 
corporatist writers such as Crouch (1983), Lehmbruch (1979) and Cawson (1985) did 
not address bargaining in a clear perspective.
2.2.1:3 Mesocorvoratism
Wassenberg (1982) developed a new sub-concept: meso-corporatism. He examined the
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role of collective actors not as peak class associations as in corporatist literature but as 
organisations that clustered around and defended the specific interests of sectors and 
professions (Molina & Rhodes, 2002). Their relationship of power dependence with 
state agencies could be exclusive but not necessarily tripartite in the manner of, say, 
peak employers and labour organisations (Cawson, 1985). Wassenberg (1982, p.85.) 
argued that corporatism could exist at three levels, according to the specialisation of the 
actors involved: macrocorporatism ("The peak institutions of the body politico- 
economic, like parliament, cabinet and the establishment of private peak associations") 
which represented the perspectives of Schmitter (1974); mesocorporatism ("The more 
or less institutionalised entity of complete industries, regional public authorities and the 
industry-wide and regional managerial machines of trade associations and labour 
unions") which was closer to the pharmaceutical industry and its chambers; and 
microcorporatism ("Individual corporate entities and establishments, local 
representatives of the trade unions and chambers of commerce and so forth, as well as to 
the lowest unit of politico administrative bodies") which represented the individual 
company. Traxler (1991) described three distinctive characteristics of meso­ 
corporatism: first, the focus was on regions or economic sectors, rather than on the 
national economy as a whole; secondly, the policy targets were supply rather than 
demand of factors of production and consequently trade unions were less involved than 
in traditional corporatist agreements; thirdly, there was a significant gain in the 
relevance of entrepreneurs as actors within this mode of governance. Evans & Taylor 
(2001) confirmed that meso-corporatism was dominated by producer/provider interests 
as they had a propensity to engage in collective action which enabled them to participate 
in political exchange. The mesocorporatism perspective had a less ambitious 
understanding of corporatism as a sectional limited form with an empirical approach. 
The introduction of the meso- and micro-concept was vital in finally letting go of class
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integration and cooperation as necessary aspects of the corporatist concept (Kalnes, 
2001).
2.2.1:4 Corporate pluralism
Stein Rokkan (1966,) first used the term corporate pluralism. Kvavik (1976) and Heisler 
and Kvavik (1974) described it as a process of co-optation whereby groups were offered 
representation in policy-making circles in exchange for supporting the resulting policies 
even if the policy was not exactly close, or even very close, to what the group desired. 
In this model, pluralism was fuelled by the wishes of the groups to maintain their 
position within policy-making circles. This term was used to differentiate itself from 
'competitive pluralism' where groups competed or to 'state pluralism' in which the state 
essentially imposed the public interest. Kelso (1978) reinforced this concept, opposing it 
to laissez-faire pluralism. He stressed the importance of cooperation between private 
groups and the government and them building networks to make decisions on policy 
between interest groups and government agencies. Kelso's (1978) model comprised of a 
political system broken in to a series of autonomous fiefdoms presided over by small 
coteries of interest groups that cooperated with the government in having an important 
role in decision making. The corporate pluralist model considered that there was interest 
group cooperation with the state but that there was no competition among interest 
groups. Jordan (1993) considered that in certain situations interest group competition 
did exist. Another concept similar to corporate pluralism was societal corporatism. For 
Jordan (1993), societal corporatism was a re-labelling of the corporate pluralist concept. 
Martin (1983) introduced in societal corporatism a new perspective where he stated that 
under societal corporatism the government and groups were in a bargaining relationship 
varying only in degree from pluralist forms.
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2.2.2 Interest Groups theory
Under the different models of corporatism and pluralism, the formation of interest 
groups might be regarded as a result of a complex interaction between a number of 
specific social and political conditions; nevertheless internal conditions of the groups 
also played a role in the formation. Olson (1965) and Salisbury (1969) changed the 
perspective of interest group theory by bringing attention from external to internal 
interest group problems. Olson (1965), in the "Logic of Collective Action", criticised 
the pluralist assumption that groups automatically emerged to reflect and defend 
common interests. Olson's (1965, p.24) key proposition was that "rational, self- 
interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests". Olson 
(1965) declared that rational individuals would decline to contribute to the costs of 
collective action and thus would free-ride unless there was coercion to force them to do 
otherwise (Maloney & Jordan, 1997). These organisations should have the authority and 
capacity to be coercive or have a source of positive inducements that they can offer the 
individuals in a latent group (Olson, 1965, Kavanagh and Jones, 1991). The rational 
potential member would allow others to bear the financial and time costs involved 
(Jordan and Richardson, 1987). Olson (1965, p.34) differentiated two types of 
incentive- selective and collective- and stressed that "Only a separate and selective 
incentive will stimulate a rational individual in a latent group to act in a group oriented 
way". Members became active in groups not in pursuit of some collective good, which 
would be available to them irrespective of membership, but because of selective 
incentives of immediate and personal benefit (Jordan and Richardson, 1987). Olson 
(1965) focused on two factors, namely group size and social pressure. His idea was that 
the benefits of lobbying diluted with an increasing number of group members. It was 
more likely that small groups were able to overcome the free-riding problem if group
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formation was to be expected at all (Becker, 1983). Moreover, social pressure or 
coercion might be a means of inhibiting free-riding. As it was more easily exerted in 
small groups, this aspect also tended to increase the likelihood that if interest groups 
emerged then they were small. Lobbying, for Olson (1965), was a by-product of large 
economic groups that obtained their strength and support because they performed some 
function in addition to lobbying for collective goods. This assumed that the provision of 
selective incentives was central to membership decisions and that this sort of 
membership incidentally provided the resources for lobbying for collective purposes. 
Walker (1991) disagreed with Olson's view as he declared that for groups pursuing 
broad public goods then selective material incentives were not likely to be available. 
Maloney & Jordan (1997) were also critical of Olson's view as they observed the 
proliferation of public interest groups. The by-product explanation was unconvincing; 
though material and selective incentives were found in this area it seemed unlikely that 
they were central to the joining decision. Kimber (1981) pointed out that the rational 
choice for a member of a group was not whether he/she should pay or free-ride, as 
Olson (1965) proposed, but if there was a certainty or uncertainty regarding the supply 
of the good. If the supply of the good was uncertain, the individual member should join 
the group. If the supply of the good was certain, free ride was the best option. 
Rothenberg (1992) noted that potential group members did not have perfect information 
and so, believing the supply of the good to be uncertain, would participate.
Salisbury (1969) presented another perspective where he demonstrated that 
organisational entrepreneurs marketed group membership on the basis of selective non- 
policy goods rather than just collective policy benefits (Browne, 1990). The group 
emergence/maintenance issue was regarded as an exchange situation in which 
entrepreneurs invested in a set of benefits which they offered to members at a price,
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namely membership (Jordan & Richardson, 1987). Salisbury (1969) suggested that 
lobbying behaviour by group leaders was related to the leaders' personal choice and 
values and not to the members' demands. Walker (1983) introduced the concept of 
patronage as means of maintaining the groups, a concept that was not considered by 
Olson's (1965) approach. Groups were funded from public or private resources. The 
pharmaceutical industry in the USA funded advocacy groups as lobbying instruments 
(Public Citizen, 2001). Jordan and Richardson (1987) found the patronage concept 
empirically relevant but considered that it had been neglected. Moe (1980) applied 
Olson's approach to economically interested groups where it fitted better than in other 
sectors such as religion or social. Moe (1980) in his research also confirmed Olson's 
proposition that lobbying was a by-product and that selective incentives were the 
services supplied to members. Moe (1980) was less deterministic than Olson about what 
was individual logical behaviour as the individual might have imperfect information 
about the issue. The individual would choose according to the degree of information 
acquired and his/her values (Jordan and Richardson, 1987). Group leaders could play an 
active role guiding individuals in their decision to become a member by providing 
biased information (Maloney and Jordan, 1997).
Salisbury (1984) made a fundamental amendment to the pressure group literature by 
arguing that interest representation was dominated by institutions such as corporations 
and local government. He outlined that the classic view of the interest group omitted 
individual corporations, state and local governments, universities, think tanks and most 
other institutions of the private sector (Jordan and Richardson, 1987). As Salisbury 
(1984) recognised, the nature of these non-membership-based interest groups was 
important in the lobbying of Washington. Lindblom (1977) emphasised that a huge 
amount of corporate funds go to lobbying and other forms of corporate communication
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with public officials. Scholzman (1984) commented over the disproportionate presence 
of business interests in Washington. Grant (2002) noted that business interests could 
have a significant input on the decision-making process. Moloney and Jordan (1996) 
also noted the interaction of corporations with government decision circles. Howell 
(2004) referred to this issue saying that they were the type of organisation whose 
political task was to reflect the interests of the economic or occupational section that 
they represented. Kirchner (1980) added that they were organisations that tried to 
influence the policy of public bodies towards their own chosen direction and they 
represented a number of similar groupings or both national groupings. Hudson (2002) 
stated that, for corporations, lobbying politicians was a worthwhile activity. 
Richardson's (1993, p.l) broad definition of pressure groups would also apply to 
corporations and the pharmaceutical industry. An interest group was "Any group which 
articulates demands that the political authorities in the political system or sub-system 
should make an authoritative allocation. These groups do not seek to occupy the 
position of authority". Woll (2006) noticed that the term 'interest groups' excluded 
firms and their political influence. As this research studied lobbying by pharmaceutical 
companies, the approach of Woll (2006, p.465.) was followed: "Lobbying is all the 
activities by private actors aimed at influencing political decision-makers", including 
firms as 'actors' but not as 'interest groups'. Pharmaceutical companies and the 
pharmacopolitics managers were considered lobying actors. Coen (1997) showed that 
individual firms were important political actors and studies focused increasingly on new 
groups and ad hoc alliances rather than on traditional interest groups. Woll (2006) 
stated that different authors tried to study who was in position of influencing the policy 
process. Crombez (2002), tried to identify the phases of the policy process where 
lobbying would be effective. Eising (2004) studied the reasons for using different 
channels or representation and Bouwen (2002) researched the conditions that enabled
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private actors to gain access. Grant (1989) studied the insider/outsider lobbying 
strategies. He remarked that insider groups had a better chance of influencing 
government policy. Grant (1989) classified 'insider' types dependent on their 
relationship to government and their lobbying strategy. He also classified outsider 
groups and emphasised the strategy of ideological outsider groups that did not accept 
the possibility of achieving change through the existing political system. They do not 
abide by the rules and were excluded from the consultative process.
However, in spite of these studies mentioned above, lobbying cannot be understood 
without looking at the context in which interest groups were trying to act. US lobbying 
differed from EU lobbying at the supranational level on political philosophies (Howell, 
2004). Moloney (1996) stated that American lobbying practices were inappropriate in 
the UK and Europe. Woll (2006) presented a table that depicts the different styles of 
lobbying in the USA and in the EU at a supranational level.
Table 2 Trends in US and EU lobbying
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As pharmaceutical lobbying in Argentina existed in another context the main issues 
indicated by Woll (2006) in the table above have, in the conclusions chapter, been 
compared to the substantive theory.
The formal macro-theory of lobbying described the different political theories of 
interest group participation in the political process and provided the basis for the 
development of interest group formation theory. Within this framework, the theories of 
pluralism, corporatism and its variations provided the basis to understand how interest 
groups acted in a democracy. The researcher explored these theories to identify which 
model was predominant in the pharmaceutical industry scenario in Argentina. Interest 
group theory was discussed to address the perspective of the lobbying activites of the
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pharmaceutical industry as an interest/pressure group and of individual companies as 
lobbying actors. The different lobbying styles were also addressed.
One of the aims of this project was to address the question of how pharmaceutical 
lobbying was carried out. To analyse the process of pharmaceutical lobbying and 
answer this question, the researcher explored the formal meso-theory of lobbying and 
this provided a logical framework of how lobbying was exerted. The researcher has 
described this theory in the following section.
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2.3 Formal meso-theory of lobbying: lobbying models
2.3.1 Introduction
This section includes the theory of lobbying based on academic mathematical models, 
most of them based on the game theory and Hash's equilibrium. The meso-theory of 
lobbying provided a logical framework with clear definitions so that the researcher was 
able to identify the different stages in the lobbying process. As one of the research 
questions was 'How pharmaceutical companies in Argentina carry out lobbying', the 
theory of lobbying based on the game theory provided the foundation to compare the 
formal theory with the substantive. The review of the literature showed first the reduced 
form lobbying models and then the two main channels of influence described by 
Bennedsen and Feldmann (2001) which exist in parallel: contribution payments and the 
transmission of information through lobbying. Both approaches were the origin of 
different models by different authors and they were analysed.
2.3.2 Different models of the theory of lobbying
For this research, the researcher considered the lobbying conceptual models based on 
the game theory. Election lobbying models were not the subjects of this research so they 
were not included.
2.3.3 Reduced form lobbying models
The reduced form lobbying models were simple and they did not consider certain 
aspects of individual behaviour in the process of lobbying.
The regulatory approach, first proposed by Stigler (1971) and formalised by Peltzman
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(1976), assumed that the politician set a policy in order to maximise the weighted sum 
of special interest's utility and aggregate welfare. There was an underlying lobbying 
process that was not explicitly analysed. Hence, the regulatory approach focused on the 
determination of the policy outcome given that some kinds of special interest activity 
led to a policy bias in favour of a certain group. Peltzman (1976) applied this model to 
price regulation in which the interest group increased prices and yet the consumers 
preferred low prices. Hillman (1982) used it for trade policy in an import competing 
industry - the world market price of the good decreased and the official increased the 
tariff to protect the producer lobby in its own country.
The policy formation approach by Becker (1983): This model chose contribution 
payments by two opposing interest groups as the central issue. It focused on the 
lobbying process, but did not consider the decision problem of the politician. Instead, it 
introduced an "influence function" which stated how realised policies depended on the 
interest groups' contribution payments. The approach determined the lobbying efforts 
endogenously and derived comparative results for the two interest groups. Groups chose 
their contribution levels non-cooperatively (Becker, 1985). The political decision had 
only redistributive effects. One lobby gained from redistribution via subsidies and the 
other lobby lost because subsidy payments were financed through taxes. It also analysed 
the size of interest groups following Olson's (1965) approach that, in larger groups, 
members had a greater incentive to free-ride. Pecorino (1997) applied this model in the 
context of international trade policy and stated that lobbying expenditures increased in 
the short run if industries faced an exogenous decline, for instance the decrease of the 
world prices. Lobbying caused tariff increases and the lobby had higher profits and the 
sector expanded.
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2.3.4 Contribution payments to an incumbent government
This section focused on the incentive motive of lobbying. Contributions provided 
incentives for the politician to deviate from the best policy choice. In contrast to the 
reduced form models, these models fully specified the objective function of both the 
politician and the interest groups. This allowed for an analysis of strategic interaction 
between interest groups and the politician. Moreover, interest groups' objective 
functions resulted from a fully specified microeconomic general equilibrium model and 
were not made ad hoc. This allowed further insight concerning the resulting equilibrium 
policies. The models of this section made use of theoretical results from common 
agency theory, which comprised situations in which a set of principals influenced the 
decision of a common agent (Bernheim and Whinston 1986a).
2.3.4:1 Common agency theory
Beginning with the contributions of Bernheim and Whinston (1986a), the common 
agency theory developed an analytical framework with which to tackle a variety of 
important problems such as menu auctions (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986a), public 
good provisions through voluntary contributions (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986b), or 
policy formation under the influence of competing lobbying groups (Grossman & 
Helpman 1994). Lately, other applications had been introduced in the context of 
environmental regulation such as Aidt (1998), where interest groups lobbied for tariffs 
on pollution.
The common agency framework was characterised by an agent and a set of principals 
(Bernheim and Whinston 1986a). The agent chose an action among a feasible set of 
actions which affected his/her own utility and that of the principals. As the individual 
utility level of all principals depended on the action of the agent, the principals faced an
49
incentive to influence the agent's choice. Each principal made a contingent contribution 
offer, an individual payment function, which established money rewards to the agent for 
each possible action he/she might choose. Common agency models were based on the 
fact that several principals designed non-cooperative contribution schedules for a 
common agent.
2.3.4:2 Common Agency Lobbying Model
The first application of the common agency framework to a lobbying game was by 
Grossman and Helpman (1994). Lobbying applications fitted well into the framework of 
the common agency theory. Rodrik (1995) pointed out that the great advantage of this 
model was that it provided clear-cut micro foundations for lobbying and its effects in a 
tractable and fairly general setting. The politician (the agent) decided about a policy 
which affected the payoffs to the principals (the interest groups) who in turn tried to 
influence his/her choice. In the first stage of the game each lobby decided on a non- 
negative contribution function, that was a contribution offer to the politician, stating 
how much money would be paid for each alternative policy realisation. In the second 
stage, the politician observed these offers, determined the policy and collected the 
respective money offers. The politician might well have preferences about the policy. 
For instance, a benevolent politician would prefer the policy that maximised aggregate 
welfare. Any deviation then reduced aggregate welfare and thereby his/her utility level. 
Contribution offers by special interest groups served to compensate the agent for any 
deviation from the welfare maximising policy. On the other hand, if the politician was 
completely opportunistic he/she cared only about contributions and not about the policy 
itself.
The common agency lobbying model introduced by Grossman and Helpman (1994)
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failed to consider important elements that cannot be disregarded. Mitra (1999) and 
Rama & Tabellini (1998) found that this model ignored the fact that interest groups 
faced incentives to organise and cooperate if they had a common interest. Grossman and 
Helpman's (1994) model always assumed a non-cooperative game between interest 
groups. Maggi and Rodriguez Clare (2000) and Dixit (1996) considered that the 
politician had only a single policy instrument and did not have a wide choice of policy 
instruments. The model considered only one agent, which meant one government, and 
abstracted from the possibility of the interaction with another government (Grossman 
and Helpman, 2005).
2.3.4:3 Common agency lobbying model with cooperation between interest groups
Rama and Tabellini (1998) analysed the incentives of labour and capitalist interest 
groups to cooperate. Tariffs and minimum wages made up the available policy. The 
authors derived conditions such as cooperative lobbying leading to higher payoffs than 
non-cooperative lobbying. Howell (2004) confirmed this statement saying that to ensure 
effective lobbying it was necessary to build coalitions. This tended to be the case if the 
sum of the joint payoffs between the government and any of the interest groups was 
high compared to the payoff to a coalition consisting of all interest groups and the 
government. Intuitively, if the government achieved a high joint payoff with any of the 
two interest groups alone it would be able to play the interest groups off against each 
other and benefit from a firm conflict of interests between interest groups (Rama & 
Tabellini, 1998). In contrast if the joint payoff to a coalition of all players, that is the 
government and both interest groups, was high then there was an interest to include all 
relevant groups in the political process even if interest groups behaved non- 
cooperatively (Laussel and Le Breton, 2001). Aidt (1997) also analysed cooperation 
between interest groups and stated that there was always scope for cooperation because
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otherwise interest groups engaged in costly counteractive lobbying. Graziano (2001), 
Hula (1999) and Hojnacki (1997) remarked that interest groups often entered into 
coalitions to reduce the cost of lobbying for a certain purpose. However, cooperative 
lobbying violated the autonomy to which groups aspired (Hula, 1999) and there was the 
possibility of members defecting as a result of working with other interest groups. 
Therefore, as Almeida (2005) noted, interest groups would prefer to enter into coalitions 
with ideologically similar groups. Maggi and Rodriguez Clare (2000) and Dixit (1996) 
considered that in this model of cooperation between two interest groups, the official 
did not have a wide choice of policy instruments and it abstracted from the possibility of 
the interaction with another government (Grossman and Helpman, 1995). Building 
coalitions to carry out lobbying was an important issue in this research as 
pharmaceutical companies faced incentives to perform cooperative lobbying when the 
target was the goverment.
2.3.4:4 Common agency lobbying model with two agents
The common agency lobbying model presented by Grossman and Helpman (1994) 
assumed a small country. Grossman and Helpman (1995) in another paper extended the 
basic lobbying model regarding this aspect and considered strategic interaction between 
two governments. This extension was relevant to the common agency model more 
generally: the government now constituted two agents that faced influence from distinct 
sets of principals (the interest groups) in their home countries. Countries traded with 
each other, which established the link between domestic tariff structures. As a 
consequence governments could no longer independently respond to lobbying activities 
but needed to take strategic interactions with the other government into account. The 
model assumed that interest groups influenced only their domestic governments but not 
the government of the foreign country. Each lobby's payoff now depended on the trade
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policies of both countries and not only on the domestic country. Accordingly, a 
contribution schedule mapped each domestic tariff structure into money offers for any 
given trade structure of the foreign country. The lack of a choice of policy instruments 
problematic in this model (Maggi and Rodriguez Clare, 2000 and Dixit, 1996).was
2.3.4:5 Common agency lobbying model with choice of different policy instruments
Several authors extended the common agency lobbying model to the choice between 
various policy instruments. Rama and Tabellini (1998) analysed two interest groups that 
competed with respect to one policy variable and coincided with respect to another. The 
economy consisted of two sectors. The unorganised sector produced only with labour. 
The import competing organised sector produced with labour and capital. Factor owners 
of the latter sector organised along factor lines, i.e. there was a lobby of workers and a 
lobby of capitalists. The available policies were a price increasing tariff, which 
benefited the workers and the capitalist alike, and a minimum wage in the import 
competing sector, which increased the payoff to the workers at the expense of capital 
owners. The authors showed that a tariff redistributed income towards capitalists and 
led to allocation inefficiencies. Other contributors included Dixit (1996), who 
incorporated production and consumption subsidies/taxes and heterogeneous group 
sizes into the model. Maggi and Rodriguez Clare (2000) analysed the choice between 
voluntary export restraints, import taxes and import quotas in a trade model and derived 
conditions for the use of each instrument. All these authors failed to discuss the 
relationship between the degree of competition and policy efficiency. If competition 
among interest groups was weak then the ability to lobby was a benefit and instruments 
that were more efficient decreased compensation payments. In contrast, if competition 
among interest groups was severe then the ability to lobby was a necessary duty in order 
not remain unheard in the political process. In this case interest groups preferred
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inefficient means because this reduced obligatory compensation payments (Baldwin & 
Robert-Nicoud, 2002).
2.3.4:6 Common agency lobbying model with entry decision
Mitra (1999) abstracted from incentives to free-ride within interest groups and presented 
another model. He extended the basic lobbying model and analysed the entry decision 
of interest groups and not the exit decision. These decisions determined the equilibrium 
number of interest groups and the degree of lobbying competition. Those interest groups 
that decided not to enter anticipated that the cost of organisation exceeded its net 
benefits whereas those who entered anticipated that the degree of lobbying competition 
was small enough so that the benefit of entry exceeded its costs.
2.3.4:7 Incentives to free ride and to cooperate
Olson (1965) was the first author to indicate that interest groups had an incentive to free 
ride and assumed that free-riding was more likely to happen in large groups. Kimber 
(1981) made an addition to the work of Olson and stated that interest groups would free- 
ride when the supply of the collective good was certain. Hence incentives to free-ride 
within interest groups might result and the question arose under which conditions it 
might emerge. Damania and Fredriksson (2000) focused on incentives to free-ride in a 
setup where two interest groups followed a common interest. Pharmaceutical companies 
might free-ride and not incur the costs of lobbying when other companies lobbied a 
common interest. Damania and Fredriksson (2000) stated that each group might abstain 
from lobbying, lobby alone, or form a coalition with the other lobby. The authors stated 
conditions whereby free-riding on the other firm's lobbying activities, joint lobbying, or 
unilateral lobbying occurred in the state game. If the game was repeated infinitely, 
cooperation might result even if free-riding was the optimal behaviour in the state game.
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Cooperation was implemented through trigger strategies that let each firm cooperate as 
long as the other one did so too. Cooperation was more likely if the short term benefit of 
defection was small relative to the discounted future benefits of cooperation.
2.3.5 Transmission of information
Politicians had an incentive to listen to interest groups when they were imperfectly 
informed and interest groups possessed better information about the relevant policy 
(Neske, 1997). Interest groups might be better informed either because they had specific 
expertise in certain policy fields or because they had investigated and acquired the 
relevant information about the subject (Koeppl, 2001). This situation created the 
information motive for lobbying. Lobbying gave politicians a chance to improve their 
decisions in this context. This situation was strongly related to the "bounded rationality" 
concept developed by Simon (1955, 1956) against the rational paradigm concept in 
neoclassical economic theory. The rational paradigm assumed that economic agents 
(e.g. households) were decision makers who were fully rational in choosing their 
actions given their perceived feasibility constraints (e.g. a budget set) in order to 
optimise some objective function. The implications of this assumption surfaced when 
the hypothesis of rationality was extended to a dynamic economic environment where 
agents had to form expectations about the future realisation of certain economic 
variables (Aumann, 1997). The term bounded rationality (Simon, 1955) was used to 
designate rational choice that took into account the cognitive limitations of both 
knowledge and capacity. It was concerned with the ways in which the actual decision- 
making process influenced decisions (Sent, 2005). Adapting bounded rationality to 
lobbying we saw officials faced with uncertainty about the future policies and an 
inability to incur costs in acquiring information. These two factors, thus, limited the 
extent to which officials could make a fully rational decision. Simon (1955) claimed
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they had only "bounded rationality" and officials were forced to make decisions not by 
"maximisation" but by "satisficing" based on the information provided by the interest 
groups. Rotheli (2005) added that the tendency of individuals, in this case officials, to 
under-invest in information in situations where they had to pay for it could lead to 
significant welfare losses. Simon (1972) stated that individuals were content with a 
certain level of achievement and indifferent to gains beyond that. That is, they did not 
attempt to optimise beyond a personal level of satisfaction. Aumann (1997) criticised 
Simon for leaving bounded rationality in what he considered to be a state of distress; 
much of Simon's work was more conceptual than formal and thus impeded its progress. 
Sargent (1993) and Aumann (1997) tried to use bounded rationality in neoclassical 
economic game models against Simon's intentions (Sent, 2005). Arrow (2004), 
Kahneman & Tversky (1974) used bounded rationality in the field of behavioural 
economics regarding the question of how people made judgments on the basis of 
incomplete and imperfect information. However, these authors differed from the 
original approach of Simon as they departed from the rational paradigm and then 
analysed variations of it - the opposite of Simon's framework that departed from the 
concept of bounded rationality to analyse the individual decision-making process (Sent, 
2005).
For the purpose of the study the researcher has addressed the models of transmitting 
information as communication models.
2.3.5:1 The basic communication model
The models of Potters and van Winden (1992), and Ainsworth (1993) were basic 
communication models. There existed two states in the world whose realisation was not 
known to the politician but was known to the lobbying group. The politician had prior
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beliefs about the probability that a certain state occurred. Furthermore he/she 
implemented one of the policy alternatives. The payoff to the politician was high if 
he/she implemented the correct policy in each state and low if he/she implemented the 
wrong one. Hence, the task of the politician was to choose a correct policy under 
uncertainty. A single lobbying group guided the politician in his/her choice. This 
lobbying group observed the realised state of the world and had perfect information (at 
least in the model). It could inform the politician about the realised state by sending 
information. The politician, who observed only the information but not the true state of 
the world, anticipated that sending information was only worthwhile for certain types of 
interest groups. He/she updated his/her beliefs accordingly. The payoff to the lobby 
depended on the realised state of the world and might conflict with the interests of the 
politician. The politician had to decide whether or not to trust the information received 
by the lobby group. The model incorporated the previous belief of the politician about 
the correct policy and the classification by the politician of the interest groups into good 
and bad types.
This model abstracted from the issue that sometimes 'good' and 'bad' type interest 
groups cooperated so that the pay off to the politician was negative and he/she deviated 
from the decision that maximised welfare. Another issue that this model introduced was 
the subjective element of the moral classification of determining lobby types- the 
politician being responsible for deciding which were good and which were bad.
2.3.5/2 The communication model -with lobbying competition
Austen-Smith and Wright (1992) focused on the aspect of counteractive lobbying of 
two interest groups with opposing interests. The politician decided between two policy 
alternatives. Based on his/her prior belief he/she chose the policy of the benefited group.
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This gave the opposing group incentives to induce a policy deviation through 
communication which in turn might lead to counteractive lobbying of the benefited 
group aimed at preventing any policy deviation. The occurrence of lobbying depended 
on the extent of verification costs for the politician and the cost of information 
acquisition for the interest groups (Rasmusen, 1993). If costs of verification were low 
then the politician was always capable of verifying the truth. In the case that verification 
costs were high the politician would only verify when he/she received conflicting 
information. If the opposing lobbying group had the opportunity to send information to 
deviate the policy decision of the politician the benefited group could send contrasting 
information depending on the investigation costs and the effect of the policy deviation 
on its own interests.
Austen-Smith and Wright's (1992) model introduced verification costs for the politician 
and investigation costs for the interest groups. It simplified reality as there were only 
two opposing interest groups, not a number of interest groups, and it did not consider a 
situation when interest groups cooperated.
2.3.5:3 Models of mass movements
The analysis of Lohmann (1993) deviated from the basic communication model and 
yielded some interesting new insights concerning interest groups' incentives to free-ride 
and the effect of preference dispersion on the formation of mass movements. Again the 
politician decided between two given policy alternatives which were now elements of a 
continuous policy interval. There were a finite number of lobby groups that were 
distributed along this interval. They were characterised by single peaked preferences 
about the policy in question and each group preferred the policy alternative which was 
closer to its ideal point. The distribution of the groups along the interval was known to
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the politician. He/she was benevolent and sought to maximise welfare through 
implementation of the median policy.
Each group (but not the policy maker) received imperfect information about the state of 
the world so that it decided to send costly information to the politician, which was 
interpreted as a vote for a certain policy alternative. The politician observed the amount 
of information received by the different groups, updated his/her belief concerning the 
preferred policy of the median voter and decided accordingly. Each group compared the 
lobbying costs with the expected benefit, which depended on the utility difference 
between the policy alternatives weighted by the probability that the lobbying effort was 
essential for the politician's choice.
Lohmann (1995b) introduced the concept of extremists and moderates in her model. 
Extremists were defined as groups that preferred a policy alternative independent of the 
received signal. Extremists who preferred a certain policy always had an incentive to 
lobby, whereas extremists preferring the policy alternative did not. Lobbying by 
extremists conveyed no information if the politician knew that it was from extremists. 
In contrast, the preferred policy of "moderates" critically depended on the received 
signal. Those who received a signal in favour of the policy faced incentives to lobby 
whereas the others did not. Hence, only lobbying by moderates conveyed information to 
the politician because their decision to lobby revealed information about the received 
signal. But not every group facing incentives to lobby in fact did so because incentives 
to free-ride existed. Lobbying costs increased the moderates' incentive to free-ride. If 
lobbying costs were high then only some moderates facing incentives found it 
worthwhile to incur those costs. Therefore some moderates sent messages while some 
would free ride.
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Lagerlof (1997) extended this model and assumed that the interest group was 
imperfectly informed. Investigation by the lobby implied that it learnt the true state of 
the world with an exogenously given probability. The lobby might be forced to acquire 
information if the politician expected it to do so; so that the lobby might be trapped in 
information acquisition which reduced its expected payoff but increased expected 
aggregate welfare.
This model assumed that the politician had precise information about the interest 
groups' preferences in the continuous policy interval. It did not accept that the lobby 
lied about its preferences. It also forced the politician to make a judgement about which 
interest groups should be categorised as extremists and which as moderates.
2.3.5:4 The communication model with access buying
Communication costs served as an access device which informed the politician about 
the benefit of granting access to certain groups. Lohmann (1995a) used a slightly 
modified set-up of her model of mass movement to focus on contributions as an access 
device. In this modification, each lobby either sent one or two costless messages, 
indicating which policy alternative it preferred, or no message at all. Lying was 
possible. The politician listened only to those messages that were accompanied by 
access contributions paid for by 'those who have something to say'. Austen-Smith 
(1998) presented a similar model where only one interest group gained access to the 
politician although all interest groups made contributions to have access. This model 
gave power to the politician who selected the interest groups that he/she wanted to listen 
to.
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2.3.6 Lobbying model with a mixed approach
The literature on lobbying divided into two broad strands as the preceding sections 
indicated: lobbying was analysed either as contribution payments or as a means of 
transmitting information. Bennedsen and Feldmann (2001) introduced the first mixed 
approach with both components. Their new model focused on the instrument choice of 
lobbying. They assumed that an interest group might influence a political decision in 
two independent ways. Firstly, it might engage in costly information acquisition and 
transfer the result truthfully, as was known from the communication literature. Second, 
the lobby determined contribution payments that compensated the politician for a 
deviation towards its preferred policy choice. The question that arose was which type of 
lobbying the interest group preferred and how these instruments affected each other. 
Bennedsen and Feldmann (2001) showed that interest groups with intense preferences 
and high stakes in their preferred policy also preferred to offer contributions rather than 
the acquisition and provision of useful information. In these cases, information played a 
subordinate role.
The formal meso-theory of lobbying has been explored in this section. The theory 
provided two main channels of influence to explain how lobbying was carried out: 
contribution payments and transmission of information. In the first one, interest groups 
or lobbying actors based their lobbying on contribution payments. These contributions 
aimed to influence the decisions of officials so that they deviated from the best policy 
and chose the option that most benefitted the interest group/ lobbying actor. The second 
channel of influence relied on the concept of asymmetric information. Politicians faced 
capacity constraints that gave them informational disadvantages compared to interest 
groups/lobbying actors - they had to rely on the information provided to them in order 
to take a decision. Bennedsen and Feldmann (2001) presented a model that integrated
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both channels of influence- transmission of information and contribution payments. 
Building coalitions proved to be useful when interest groups/lobbying actors joined to 
lobby the government. Companies might also have preferred to free-ride on the others' 
lobbying efforts when they had a common interest so that they did not have to incur in 
the costs of lobbying.
The next section focuses on the formal micro-theory of lobbying which explains the 
application of lobbying carried out by the pharmaceutical industry in the USA. There 
was no literature on pharmaceutical lobbying in Argentina so the researcher chose the 
USA because the market was the most similar to the Argentine one.
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2.4 Formal micro-theory: Pharmapolitics, pharmaceutical industry's 
influence on politicians and managed care settings
2.4.1 Introduction
The micro-theory of lobbying was considered in order to illustrate the peculiarities of 
pharmaceutical marketing and pharmaceutical lobbying so that the reader had an 
understanding of the characteristics in these markets. The formal micro-theory of 
lobbying explained the application of pharmaceutical lobbying in concrete situations. 
The micro-theory of lobbying has been used to review the two main activities of 
pharmacopolitics (Quinones, 2002):
a) Lobbying congress and public officials.
b) Lobbying HMO officials.
The literature research was focused on the how the pharmaceutical industry applied 
lobbying in the two main activities mentioned above. There was no literature on 
pharmaceutical lobbying in Argentina so the researcher chose to look at the USA 
because it was most similar to the Argentine (Vasallo, 2002).
Vincent (2003) wrote a comparative work on the major pharmaceutical markets and 
compared them to Argentina. In this work the researcher identified the distinctive 
features of each market and designed the following table for analysis:
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The first important difference between the European health care systems and the 
Argentine and American is the philosophical conception of health care (Vasallo 2002). 
Health care in Europe is a social good where the whole population has the right to 
access to this social good (Saltman, 2002). In the other two systems that was not the
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case; health care was a private good and those who could pay could have access. 
Vazquez (2002) emphasised that access to health care in Argentina was dependent on 
employment status (employee/employer contributions) or the ability to pay. People 
without coverage depended on public hospitals with long waiting lists and improper 
conditions (Neri, 2002). For Puig Junoy (2005) the big difference between the two 
models- the European and the American- was the degree of price control. European 
countries tended to control the prices of new and existing products by various 
mechanisms; reimbursement, reference prices or direct price control. In the USA and in 
Argentina companies had freedom to set prices. Vincent (2003) made another 
distinction. In European countries, except for the UK, there were no restricted 
formularies. A formulary lists the drug or products for which reimbursement will be 
paid (Dranove, 2003). The use of formularies has been explained later in this section. 
Vincent (2003) noted that in the USA, as in Argentina, all HMOs had formularies. In 
Argentina there was additionally a national formulary that indicated the drugs that 
should be covered by all HMOs. This national formulary, called Programa Medico 
Obligatorio (PMO), was restrictive. Nevertheless, each HMO could decide whether to 
include more than these drugs in its formulary if it considered it necessary (Tobar, 
2002). These main differences between Europe and Argentina prompted the researcher 
to use the US approach and literature for this study.
In this section, the researcher first explained the significance of pharmacopolitics as it 
was the term used in Argentina for the pharmaceutical industry's lobbying activities. 
Secondly, the researcher described how lobbying of public officials and legislators was 
carried out in the USA. The researcher showed the different lobbying strategies and 
tactics that were used by pharmaceutical companies in the USA and depicted the 
motivations for this lobbying. This section also showed how the pharmaceutical
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industry carried out cooperative lobbying through the American Chamber (PhRMA). 
Thirdly, the researcher described the lobbying exerted on HMO officials by 
pharmaceutical company managers. The researcher explained the managed care system 
and the development and use of formularies for cost containment purposes. This 
explanation was very important in order to illustrate for the reader the different 
components of pharmaceutical lobbying and so that it was easier to understand the 
substantive theory when the different elements were mentioned.
2.4.1:1 Pharmacopolitics
The term pharmacopolitics or pharmapolitics has been defined as the activities 
performed by the pharmaceutical industry aimed at influencing government, public 
officials and Health Management Organisations (HMOs) in order to get a competitive 
advantage in the market (Quinones, 2002). There was no research on this topic in 
Argentina and the first mention of this term in the literature was by Cerasale (2001), 
who claimed that it had become a popular word together with pharmaeconomics but 
instead of explaining its significance he continued the paragraph describing the 
advantages of pharmaeconomics. The second mention in the literature was by Tobar 
(2002) referring to pharmacopolitics as the twin sister of pharmaeconomics but again 
there was no explanation of its significance and scope.
Redwood (1997) referred to pharmacopolitics as the policy implemented by the 
pharmaceutical industry according to the political environment, regarding innovation, 
location (Redwood, 2002) and cost-containment procedures. Redwood focused on the 
cost-containment policies implemented by the health bureaucracies and described its 
flaws. This definition of pharmacopolitics did not correlate with the definition of 
pharmacopolitics accepted in Argentina (Quinones, 2002); Redwood's (2002) definition
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described the influence of the political scenario in the decisions taken by the 
pharmaceutical industry.
2.4.2 Lobbying of Congress and Public Officials in the USA
2.4.2:1 The perspective of the pharmaceutical industry
No paper had been written by the pharmaceutical industry about its lobbying activities 
in the USA. The only written information was the speeches given by Holmer (2002, 
2004), President of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 
(PhRMA), at its annual meetings (2002, 2004). PhRMA is the Pharmaceutical 
Companies Chamber in the USA; generic companies are not members of PhRMA. 
Generic companies being those that manufacture and sell copies of the products at a 
lower price when patent life has expired.
Holmer stated that the PhRMA strategy consisted of two different tactics:
1. Advocacy programs: Holmer's objective was to make PhRMA the premier 
advocacy organisation in the world. To achieve this objective advocacy 
programs were run from PhRMA's eight regional offices and PhRMA was 
represented in 50 state capitals by people from the Republican and Democrat 
parties. "These are representatives of local citizens, know the legislators well, 
and understand how our issues will be considered in their states" (Holmer, 
20002, p.l). PhRMA also had six development people in the regional offices 
that contacted labour leaders, small business owners, physicians, nurses, 
pharmacists, minority groups, patients and patients' advocates. Alliances had 
been made with these groups aimed at achieving common goals.
2. Federal lobbying: The federal lobbying team of PhRMA amounted to 17 people.
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These were the in-house lobbyists. Some former congressional staff were 
included in PhRMA's payroll eg Rodger Currie (Common Cause, 2001) 
appointed as one of the leaders of the PhRMA team of lobbyists (Holmer, 2002). 
Holmer (2004) stated that the team achieved outstanding results on the issuing 
of the new Medicare Law in December 2003. For the issuing of the law 952 
lobbyists were hired by PhRMA, pharmaceutical companies and HMOs to do 
their bidding on Capitol Hill and the White House (Congress Watch, 2004).
In all his assertions Holmer (2002, 2004) denoted triumphalism with sentences like "But 
one organisation never loses and that organisation has hundreds of victories to its credit 
and zero defeats in the United States Congress and that is the pharmaceutical 
industry"(Holmer, 2002, p.l). Holmer showed the corporatist position of the 
pharmaceutical industry in a privileged relationship with the decision-makers in 
congress. The speech given by Holmer (2002), did not describe how lobbying is 
implemented or financed in Washington or on a regional basis but these topics have 
been well documented by several interest and pressure groups.
2.4.2:2 Research undertaken by Interest Groups
Common Cause (2001) and especially Public Citizen (2001, 2004) engaged in an 
extensive and thorough research describing the strategy, the resources used and the 
achievements of the pharmaceutical industry in Washington. Those two groups were 
mentioned by Richardson and Jordan (1987) as important public interest groups. Grant 
(1989) considered these groups as ideological outsider groups. It should be pointed out 
that even if the information was based on reliable data (since 1995 company 
expenditure on lobbying legally needed to be disclosed (Public Citizen, 2001)), the 
opinions of these groups were biased towards the objectives they defended. Sentiments
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such as "This industry, however, racked up its successes at the expense of the American 
public" (Common Cause, 2001, p.4), or "Public Citizen believes that no bribes should 
be given to the drug industry" (Congress Watch, 2002, p.63. ) were common so the 
researcher focused on the data presented rather than on the opinions enunciated. In the 
introduction of its report "America's Other Drug Problem: A Briefing Book on the Rx 
Drug Debate" Public Citizen Congress Watch (2002, p.4.) stated, "Some readers may 
see a pro-consumer bias in the selection of facts. That bias may well exist". 
Nevertheless, in the creation of the report, it stated, "We have used credible, 
independent sources and the most current data that we know of for each and every point 
we make" (Congress Watch, 2002, p.4.). These two groups fitted the pluralism model of 
democracy in which interest groups had access and were heard by government.
According to Public Citizen Congress Watch (2004), the pharmaceutical industry was 
one of the most potent political forces when it came to influencing legislation in 
Washington, confirming the corporatist privileged relationship of the industry in 
decision-making circles. The industry largely got what it wanted from politicians in 
Washington through lobbying by former congressional staff, campaign contributions, 
issue advertising, funding front groups and conducting grassroots lobbying. Common 
Cause - a citizen's grassroots lobby dedicated to making government more open, honest 
and accountable at the national, state and local levels- declared in its report "Democracy 
on Drugs" (Common Cause, 2004) that according to federal lobbying reports PhRMA 
and its member companies spent at least $72.6 million on lobbying congress, the White 
House and federal regulators in 2003. This information did not tally with the estimate of 
$108.6 million spent in 2003 mentioned in Public Citizen Congress Watch Report 
(2004). Public Citizen Congress Watch reports had a sound methodology and a 
complete list of references. Common Cause reports had very few references and the
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methodology of obtaining the information was not described. For that reason Public 
Citizen was considered for raw data and Common Cause information and other sources 
were used to complement this information.
2.4.2:3 Structure of the industry's lobbying
Public Citizen Congress Watch (2004) stated that in 2004 the industry hired 824 
lobbyists. Of those 405 were 'revolving door lobbyists' as they were previous members 
of congress, staff or executive branch employees and had special access to the current 
members of congress. Moloney (1996) commented that UK lobbyists had the same 
background. Of the remaining 419 lobbyists, (Public Citizen Congress Watch, 2004) 
136 were in-house lobbyists for PhRMA. In 2003, in terms of lobbying expenditure, the 
top 20 companies all spent more than $lm and eight of the top ten were American. This 
demonstrated the acceptance of American companies towards the activities of lobbying 
Congress and the government.
During the 2003 election cycle the prescription pharmaceutical industry gave $3.4 
million towards the Bush campaign. Democrat hopeful Kerry also turned to two top 
fundraisers who worked for the drug industry: David Leiter and Mac Bernstein 
collected funds for his campaign (Congress Watch, 2004). The industry increasingly 
allied itself with the Republican Party, which it perceived as more supportive of its 
goals and which took control of Congress in 1995. Nevertheless, the pharmaceutical 
industry continued to cultivate some key Democrats such as Senator Joseph Lieberman 
and Senator Robert Torricelli of New Jersey, a state that had a high concentration of 
pharmaceutical companies. Contribution payments, as described by Grossman and 
Helpman (1994), were an important instrument used by the pharmaceutical industry in 
its lobbying of Congress.
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2.4.2:4 Methods of lobbying
The methods of executing lobbying demonstrated a high degree of sophistication. The 
traditional method was to donate campaign contributions in the election cycle and since 
1999 pharmaceutical manufacturers and HMDs have contributed some $84.6 million 
(Congress Watch, 2004) to Bush's political campaigns. There was also an increase in 
unlimited donations, also known as soft money, to PACs (Political Action Committees) 
controlled by Party leaders. Forty one million dollars was devoted to four stealth PACs 
in 2002 to help elect a Congress sympathetic to the pharmaceutical industry's interests 
(Public Citizen Congress Watch, 2004). The pharmaceutical industry also contributed 
$625,000 to the inauguration committee of President George W. Bush and thus 
established a relationship that later collected its rewards as Mitch Daniels (Eli Lilly) ran 
the Office of Management and Budget, Donald Rumsfeld (Searle) sat in Bush's Cabinet 
and a one time pharmaceutical industry lobbyist, Nick Calio, was Bush's chief liaison to 
Congress (Public Citizen Congress Watch, 2001).
Other vehicles that supported the pharmaceutical industry's lobbying efforts were the 
United Seniors Association, 60 Plus Association, the Seniors Coalition and America 21. 
According to Congress Watch (Public Citizen Congress Watch, 2004) they were sham 
interest groups sponsored since 2002 to oppose drug policies against the industry. 
Walker (1983) mentioned the use of these types of group and introduced the concept of 
patronage, which stated that there were some groups funded by the government or 
private interests to advocate specific interests. The objective of these stealth PACs, as 
enunciated in their websites, was to pursue basic consumer fairness in health care. 
Using these groups the pharmaceutical industry spent $41 million in 2002 on 
advertising aimed at supporting or attacking candidates that might help or hinder the 
interests of the pharmaceutical industry. Citizens for Better Medicare, another PAC that
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was replaced in 2002 by the previously mentioned groups, was the first PAC used by 
PhRMA. Its initial wave of advertising was the Harry and Louise campaign aimed at 
opposing the Clinton health care plan on Medicare in 1993-1994 (Public Citizen 
Congress Watch, 2002). The advantage for the pharmaceutical industry was that 
Citizens for Better Medicare spending was kept secret under Section 527 of the federal 
tax code, which covered groups whose purpose was to influence or attempt to influence 
elections. Shortly after Congress closed the 527 loophole, Citizens for Better Medicare 
became a different kind of tax-exempt group- a 501(c)(4) non-profit, which also 
permitted keeping spending secret. The four new stealth PACs now used by the 
pharmaceutical industry were classified under this category. They did not have to 
disclose contributors or spending details; PhRMA and the pharmaceutical companies 
however had to disclose spending on lobbying activities (Public Citizen Congress 
Watch, 2002, 2004). These kinds of tricks helped to preserve the anonymity of the 
pharmaceutical industry, although there were indications that showed the relationship 
between both parties.
In addition to the four stealth PACs the pharmaceutical industry also had close ties to 
the US Chamber of Commerce (Public Citizen Congress Watch, 2002) and the 
Department of Health and Human Services (Common Cause, 2004). The Secretary of 
the Department of Health and Human Services, Tommy Thompson, made an "unusual 
appearance" at Congress the night of the final vote for the new Medicare Law was 
taking place. According to National Journal's Congress Daily, secretary Thompson 




The pharmaceutical companies' strategy regarding lobbying was concentrated on three 
issues: protect themselves against competition, preserve freedom in establishing prices 
and introduce tax breaks that improved the bottom line.
Protect themselves against competition
The most influential way of protecting themselves was through the growth of patent life 
for drugs, as patents created a monopoly for pharmaceutical companies (Congress 
Watch, 2002). Vasallo & Sellanes (2002) referred to patent protection as the most 
serious adverse effect for consumers due to the limitation of new suppliers in the 
market. It was, paradoxically, protected by the government that had the power of 
issuing and enforcing anti-trust regulations and also the power to create these drug 
monopolies. This issue was critical for those new drugs aimed at terminal diseases as 
such as cancer. Common Cause (2001, p.13.) claimed: "Even though Bristol Myers 
Squibb and other companies have compassionate care programs to give these expensive 
life-saving drugs to some impoverished patients, critics claim that the high cost of these 
drugs has continued to pose terrible financial burdens on many cancer victims. There 
are people with second, third, and fourth mortgages on their houses to pay for this". 
Jeffrey Kraws, a pharmaceutical analyst for Gruntal & Co., told the Miami Herald "This 
isn't cough medicine. People are dying"(Common Cause, 2001, p. 13.). These stories 
could be heard all over the world and fostered consumer prejudice against the 
pharmaceutical industry. This issue was contested by Holmer (2002) as he transferred 
the responsibility to the government as patients asked politicians "Am I still sick 
because there is no cure, or because my government has just said 'no new medicines for 
me1?". It was the eternal fight between the payers (government, HMDs) and the
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pharmaceutical industry with each blaming each other for the imperfections of the 
health system as it was. Even then, patents were necessary for the pharmaceutical 
industry to be able to invest million of dollars in research and development to find new 
products.
The effective patent life of a drug in the USA averaged 13.9 to 15.4 years (National 
Institute for Health Care Management, 2000). Since the mid-1980s, the federal 
government has adopted a number of laws that extended the effective lives of drug 
patent by 4.4 to 5.9 years. The most significant laws, and the years they have added to 
the patent life of drugs, are below (Congress Watch, 2002):
1) The Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 added, on average, 2.3 years to the 
patent life.
2) The prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992 increased the efficiency of 
PDA drug review and approval and knocked 1.2 years off the review and approval 
process.
3) The Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, an international trade 
agreement, added 1 year to the effective patent life.
4) The Food and Drug Modernisation Act of 1997 reduced the average 
number of years for clinical study by 1 year; FDAMA also gave six months of 
market exclusivity to a patented drug if a manufacturer tested the safety of the drug 
in children.
Those modifications were achieved due to lobbying by pharmaceutical companies 
(Common Cause, 2001), in order to protect their profits. It has been estimated that the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act cost consumers more than $6 billion due to delayed
74
access to generic drugs (Congress Watch, 2002) and a great part of this sum returned to 
the pharmaceutical industry.
Pharmaceutical companies lose billions from expiring patents when generics are 
introduced into the market. It has been estimated that the projected sales of drugs 
coming off patents between 2000 and 2004 were $25.5 billion (Congress Watch, 2002). 
Claritin, a product of Schering Plough, received a lot of lobbying efforts to prolong its 
patent life. Claritin sold $2.3 billion in 1999. Claritin's patent was extended two years 
by the Hatch-Waxman Act, 22 months under the Uruguay Round Agreements Act and 
six additional months because the manufacturer tested the safety of the drug for children 
(Congress Watch, 2002). Schering Plough pushed to extend its patent beyond 2002, 
basing its request on the fact that the approval of the antihistamine took an unusually 
long time, nearly 6 Vi years (Manning et al, 2001) compared to the normal 2.6 years. 
Schering Plough spent $4.3 million on lobbying to achieve this objective but failed in 
the last session of Congress (Manning et al., 2001). Common Cause (2001, p.12) 
referred that "Consumer outrage and bad publicity over these patent extension attempts 
have so far stymied these congressional efforts". The Prime Institute of the College of 
Pharmacy (Manning et al, 2001) estimated that a three-year extension of the Claritin 
patent would have cost consumers more than $5.3 billion.
Lobbying has had an effect on patent life growth in the USA by ensuring additional 
profits for brand-name products during their patent life. The result for the 
pharmaceutical industry of the six additional months of patent protection given for 
testing the safety of drugs for children represented additional profits of $592 million per 
year (Congress Watch, 2002).
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Preserve the freedom of establishing prices of products
Prescription prices rose at more than six times the rate of inflation in 2001 in the USA; 
the average price per prescription increased 10% while the rate of inflation was only 
1.6% (National Institute for Health Care Management, 2002). This increase in prices 
was due to several factors (Congress Watch, 2002): more utilisation of popular drugs 
with above average prices, drugs aimed at seniors were far more expensive, and lack of 
price controls in the USA. Canada, the UK and Continental Europe did have price 
controls and patients paid between 35% and 50% less than the USA. These benefits in 
price freedom had been preserved by the industry so as to boost profits. USA sales, 
according to Public Citizen Congress Watch (2004), accounted for about 60% of global 
industry profits. In other words, Americans paid on average 60 cents of every $1 that 
any pharmaceutical company in the world earned in profits.
Public Citizen Congress Watch (2002) stated that at the top of the industry's agenda 
was opposition to prescription drug coverage under Medicare and hostility to measures 
that would moderate rising drug prices. "Worried that the bulk buying power of 
Medicare would lead to discounted prices in the lucrative senior citizen market, the 
pharmaceutical industry launched an unprecedented blitz of lobbying, campaign 
contributions, and so-called issue ads to help its political allies and attack its 
enemies"(Congress Watch, 2001, p. I). The industry's political investments paid off as 
congress agreed to provide Medicare prescription drug coverage (Congress Watch, 
2004) following the industry's interests. Republican leaders promoted the Medicare 
Reform bill that would encourage seniors to get drug coverage through private 
insurance companies and HMOs, preventing the states and the government from 
negotiating substantial price cuts (Congress Watch, 2004). Holmer (2004, p.2) 
confirmed that PhRMA highest priority was to focus all the lobbying resources on
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"Enacting a high-quality Medicare drug benefit for seniors, delivered through the 
private sector". This reform would have left prices unaltered but increased the demand 
for medicines as seniors got some kind of reimbursement. Public Citizen (2002) 
conducted studies in 13 states and major metropolitan areas that showed that the top 10 
drugs used by seniors cost Medicare beneficiaries, who were without prescription drug 
insurance, nearly twice as much as pharmaceutical companies' most favoured customers 
such as the Department of Veterans. It was also important to note that seniors 
represented 13% of the population but accounted for 34% of all prescriptions dispensed.
Tax breaks that improved the bottom line
Public Citizen Congress Watch (2002) referred to tax rates for the pharmaceutical 
industry that were much lower than other industries; the effective tax rate averaged 16% 
from 1993 through 1996 compared to 27% for all major industries over the same period. 
The pharmaceutical industry used tax credits to cut its taxes by almost $28 billion 
between 1990 and 1996 (Public Citizen Congress Watch, 2002). The savings came from 
five federal tax provisions: the foreign tax credit, the possessions tax credit, the research 
and experimentation tax credit, the orphan drug tax credit and the expensing of research 
expenditures (Public Citizen Congress Watch, 2002). The research and experimentation 
tax credit, originally, enacted in 1981 as a temporary measure, had been extended 10 
times, most recently in 2000 when Congress gave it a five year reprieve. The 20-percent 
credit rewarded research spending above a certain base level (Common Cause, 2001). 
The pharmaceutical industry had also taken advantage of a tax break for companies that 
built factories in Puerto Rico. From 1980 to 1990, the General Accounting Office 
(Public Citizen Congress Watch, 2002) estimated that 26 pharmaceutical companies 
enjoyed tax savings of $10.1 billion thanks to the Puerto Rico facilities. There were 
several attempts to eliminate this particular tax break named Section 936. "The fight to
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retain the section 936 credit consumed more lobbying and more political capital than all 
but the biggest ticket items in the proposed deficit reduction bill according to The 
Washington Post" (Common Cause, 2001, p. 14.). In 1996 Congress did vote to 
eliminate this particular tax break but members did so following the drugs companies' 
terms. The tax break did not apply to any future investments in Puerto Rico and current 
investments would have 10 years until the tax break was eliminated. That gradual 
phase-in represented a victory for the pharmaceutical lobby (Common Cause, 2001). 
Lobbying for tax breaks gave the pharmaceutical industry a sustained competitive 
advantage over other industries.
2.4.2:6 Economic impact of lobbying
Lobbying performed in Washington and in the regional legislation gave the 
pharmaceutical industry an extraordinary competitive advantage in the USA. According 
to the Fortune Magazine (Fortune Magazine, 2001) the pharmaceutical industry was the 
most profitable industry in America in year 2001. Fortune Magazine also stated that the 
10 biggest US pharmaceutical companies saw their gross profits increase by 33% in 
2001 in spite of the American economic slowdown. From the literature review, it could 
be concluded that pharmaceutical lobbying had been extremely effective during the last 
years in the USA. It is cited by Holmer (2002, p.l), CEO of PhRMA with its "and zero 
defeats in the United States Congress", and also by consumer interest group Congress 
Watch (2002), that referred that the industry largely got what they wanted from 
politicians in Washington. In the corporatism/pluralism models, the pharmaceutical 
industry established a corporatist privileged relationship with congress, which permitted 
favourable legislation that improved the industry's profit. In the literature there were 
some figures of how much a certain tax break or the extension of a patent life costs 
consumers but there had been no research analysing how much of the lobbying
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performed by PhRMA, or by pharmaceutical companies, correlated to company sales, 
profits or market share. There were special cases such as the patent extension of Claritin 
where $5.3 billion was estimated as the expected burden to consumers on the enacting 
of the extension of the patent life for 3 years (Manning et al, 2001). Also, the Medicare 
reform bill secured for drug makers $200 billion in additional prescription spending 
(Congress Watch, 2004). There was no clear evidence in the literature whether those 
companies with in-house lobbyists had a better performance than those without.
There was also the consideration of Suranovic (2001) about the nature of lobbying and 
its distributive characteristic- transferring resources from consumers or from the 
government, in the case of tax breaks, to the pharmaceutical industry. There existed an 
opportunity cost because those resources could be used for the other needs of patients or 
society. This issue was one that the consumers or interest groups protested about. It 
could be concluded that consumers were being punished for the benefit of the 
pharmaceutical industry. The latter claimed that it needed these resources to research 
new products- that research was risky and that they needed high profits to fuel new 
research. However, evidence showed that the pharmaceutical industry had been very 
profitable for decades (Public Citizen Congress Watch, 2002), and therefore research 
cannot have been that risky. According to Fortune Magazine (2001) the top 500 
pharmaceutical companies devoted 12.5% of their revenue to R&D compared to 18.5% 
profits and 30.4% to marketing and administration. Even then there was one key player 
missing in the analysis: the HMOs or Managed Care Organisations who actually paid 
for part of those medicines. There was also a distributive effect that transferred the 
resources of these organisations to the pharmaceutical industry. Those extra resources 
could have been used in improving the quality of health care or giving additional 
services to their affiliates.
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Lobbying in Washington created additional value and an improvement of the economic 
environment for the pharmaceutical companies. Redwood (2002) argued that as 
industrial policy on pharmaceuticals was progressively abandoned in the European 
Union the focus of pharmaceuticals and biotech investment shifted towards the USA 
away from Europe. "The most visible symptom of this is the gradual emigration of new 
investment in activities and qualities that determine industrial competitiveness in the 
long run: research, development, advanced skills and an entrepreneurial approach to 
new ideas"(Redwood, 2002, p.7.). There have been many developments in this direction 
in the past years: Pharmacia (now owned by Pfizer) moved its corporate headquarters 
from the UK to the USA; Bayer moved its headquarters of its consumer medicines from 
Leverkusen to New Jersey; GSK after its merger moved its headquarters to the USA; 
Schering AG moved the management of its therapeutic division from Germany to New 
Jersey and Novartis was transferring its world-wide discovery and research activities to 
the USA (Redwood, 2002). What was noticeable is that these companies moved from 
countries- such as the UK, Germany and Switzerland- that were supposed to enjoy the 
best economic climate in Europe. In this case, although lobbying normally has a 
distributive effect, it created value for the American economy as it improved the 
economic environment by attracting industrial investments of foreign companies.
2.4.3 Lobbying of Managed care organisations
2.4.3:1 Managed Care Organisations
Pilnick, Dingwall and Starkey (2001) described managed care as a generic term for a 
variety of attempts to alter or restrict the treatment behaviours of health care 
professionals in order to produce both clinically effective and cost effective outcomes; 
at its simplest managed care is the management of medicines and treatment aimed at
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containing costs and promoting effectiveness. Bengoa (1998) referred to managed care 
as a net of organisations that provide co-ordinated health services to a certain population 
and as accepting the responsibility of the clinical and economic outcomes of the health 
in this population. Although Bengoa cited this definition as managed care he meant a 
Health Management Organisation (HMO), which is an organisation or group of them 
that contracts and supplies medical care on the basis of a fixed periodic payment.
In the USA physicians were traditionally paid a fee per item of service; this created 
incentives for over-treatment and cost inflation and presented payers with an open- 
ended financial commitment (Pilnick et al., 2001). Managed Care Organisations 
(MCOs), the majority of which in the USA were either health maintenance 
organisations (HMOs) or preferred provider organisations (PPOs), changed these 
incentives by "eliminating fee for service in favour of delivery systems that encourage 
providers to control the costs" (Varney, 1995, p.l.) or by limiting the financial 
commitment of payers by paying clinicians a periodic fee for life covered (capitation) 
and making them share the risks of costs for excessive or expensive treatment. 
Employers, insurers, the state, or, more rarely, individual clients pay the Managed Care 
Organisations (MCOs). For the purpose of this research, MCOs are referred to as HMOs 
(Health Management Organisations) as these are the predominant type of MCO in 
Argentina.
In practice HMO organisational models vary considerably in detail and fee-for service 
providers have also adopted some features, such as the use of restricted drug formularies 
that blur the distinction between the various types (Pilnick et al, 2001). A formulary is a 
list of PDA-approved drug products by therapeutic category, along with relative cost 
information; these formularies were made available to pharmacies, physicians, third- 
party payers and or other persons involved in the health care industry in order to guide
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in the prescribing and dispensing of pharmaceuticals. A restricted or closed formulary 
limits reimbursement to the specific drugs listed (Dranove, 2003). Pilnick, Dingwall & 
Starkey (2001, p.756.) pointed out "However, the HMDs' economic incentives are 
usually reinforced by a range of direct interventions. These typically include controls on 
clinical autonomy, controls on patient choice and a degree of vertical integration. 
Controls on clinical autonomy include restricting the physicians' choice of drugs to 
those included in a formulary or requiring disease treatment to follow specified 
protocols. Those controls were intended to change doctor's prescribing behaviour in 
line with measures of efficacy and cost efficiency. They may be enforced either by 
individual case reviews or profiling, where doctors' performance indicators are 
compared with a standard and deviations from it are investigated or sanctioned". The 
principal objective of formularies was to bring down costs by selecting a narrower 
choice of drugs and adopting generics to replace the high-price brand-name products 
(Dranove, 2003). Motheral (2000) concluded that formularies can significantly reduce 
pharmaceutical utilisation in a non-continuously eligible population. However, this 
diminishing of costs is controversial as Redwood (1997, p.3.) described- "Cost 
containment pure-and-simple can be counter productive, as large-scale pioneering study 
of integrated health costs and outcomes has recently demonstrated. After analysing 
240,000 prescriptions and 99,000 office visits by nearly 13,000 patients in six health 
HMO organisations across the US for one year, the study concluded that the most 
restrictive formularies had consistently caused the highest overall medical costs to 
HMDs and also caused patients greater inconvenience and longer periods of illness and 
discomfort". Redwood made a point about the effectiveness of HMOs as the general 
focus was only on cost-containment of medicines and not on outcomes and overall costs 
especially, remarked Studin (2002), in those diseases as diabetes, congestive heart 
failure, asthma and depression where the system has pronounced deficiencies. But
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Studin (2002) and Dranove (2003) noticed that the failure might lay not in the 
formularies but in the imperfections of the whole system of managed care such as lack 
of staff or capital in the HMOs to systematically adopt the practices of disease 
management or clinical-quality improvement, insufficient training of staff in such 
important areas as disease management, data analysis, patient and provider education 
and the poor relationship with the physicians which undermines the health plan 
credibility. HMOs could also benefit from collaborative activities with the 
pharmaceutical industry in order to measure the effectiveness of the disease 
management programs.
Pilnick et al, (2001) described another characteristic of managed care as restricting the 
providers to only consulting those employed by or holding contracts with the HMD in 
question. As a result of such restriction and standardisation, whereby patients relinquish 
some freedom of choice, HMOs could offer care more cheaply than traditional fee-for- 
service schemes.
The evolution of managed care practices looking for cost containment paved the way 
for the arrival of a new entity called Pharmacy Benefit Management (PBM). According 
to Dranove (2003), PBMs selected participating pharmacists, drug manufacturers, 
suppliers, administered point of sale claims processing systems, negotiated quantity 
discounts with pharmaceutical companies, administered plan record keeping and 
payment systems as well as maintaining quality control. PBMs also controlled costs by 
negotiating discounts from manufactures, usually in the form of rebates, in return for 
placing the manufacturer's drug on the PBM formulary. Consequently PBMs were 
intermediaries between the pharmaceutical industry, the HMOs and the pharmacies. 
PBMs were contracted by HMOs to handle their prescriptions and formularies. PBMs 
processed the information of prescriptions from their selected pharmacies and generated
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information for the:
• Pharmaceutical company: In return for the inclusion of its products in a closed 
formulary, the pharmaceutical company paid the PBM a rebate related to the 
usage of its products by that HMD. In the model of Grossman and Helpman 
(1994), a contribution payment was paid to secure the company's product in a 
closed formulary.
• Health Management Organisations: The PBM, with the approval of the HMO, 
designed the formulary and provided the information to the HMO in return for a 
fee that could be fixed on a capitation or per-service basis. Controls could be 
implemented on protocols and adherence to the formulary.
• Pharmacies: PBMs paid pharmacies the amount equivalent to the 
reimbursements for patients.
2.4.3:2 Managed Care Account Managers
There was not a description of the activities of in-house lobbyists for obvious reasons - 
they were chosen on a one to one basis- but there were some descriptions of the 
activities that a managed care account manager of the pharmaceutical industry should 
perform regarding the relationship to the HMOs. The sources of this information were 
organisations that provided training for the pharmaceutical industry. Romar Consulting 
Associates (2002) referred to the managed care account managers as being responsible 
for building and maintaining strong positions for their companies in the HMO. For ASI 
Solutions (2002), another consulting company, the role of the managed care manager 
revolved around developing and managing contracts with HMOs. Romar added other 
activities such as conducting an account portfolio analysis, establishing objectives,
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strategies, tactics and working with headquarter personnel to support strategic account 
plans. These definitions were vague and none of them permitted the clarification of the 
job description but they confirmed the existence of pharmaceutical managed care 
account managers who worked with the HMDs. Studin (2004) explained that manager 
account executives were hired to foster long-term relationships with managed care 
payers as pharmaceutical companies realised that the sales function could no longer just 
focus on physicians and hospitals but that selling had an institutional requirement on 
non-physician decision makers. Pharmaceutical managed care divisions were driven by 
their own contracting function, centred on the need to secure formulary positions. 
Collateral activities involved product pull-through. Standards for determining how 
pharmaceutical managed care divisions performed reverted to product sales.
2.4.3:3 Pharmaceutical industry and the introduction of products in formularies
"Health plans (HMOs) as a general rule distrust Pharma due to a perceived conflict of 
interest: financial support implies formulary positions are being sold, while partnerships 
compromise objective pharmacy and therapeutic (P&T) committee deliberations" 
(Studin, 2002, p.46.). There was certainly an influence by the managed care account 
executives on the inclusion of products in formularies although this was denied by the 
HMOs. Dranove (2003) concluded in his study that pharmaceutical companies whose 
representatives made more visits to the HMOS had a 77% higher chance to have their 
products included in the formulary. Some HMOs prohibited medical and pharmacy 
directors from having meetings with pharmaceutical account executives. Other national 
HMOs prohibited program, grant participation or another types of hospitality with 
pharmaceutical companies. Some HMOs stated that all dialogue with pharmaceutical 
companies had to be at a corporate level. A conflict of interest arose as the objectives of 
managed care organisations were opposite to the those of the managed care teams of the
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pharmaceutical industry. The pharmaceutical company's objective was to maximise 
sales in a formulary and that of the HMO was to contain costs and provide a better 
service to their affiliates. But the true influence of pharmaceutical companies was at the 
PBM level where most formularies were done. In some exceptional cases the HMO 
contracted a PBM while preserving the right to decide which products were eligible for 
their formulary (Carroll, 2002) but most of the time the PBM decided about the 
formulary and the products included.
In the USA three PBMs- AdvancePCS, Medco Health Solutions and Express Scripts- 
covered 180 million people (Carroll, 2002), figures that showed a big concentration. 
Medco was owned by Merck Sharp & Dohme and it had one third of the PBM Market, 
a market estimated to cover 71% of the volume of outpatient medications covered by 
third-party payers (Lenzer, 2001). The Federal Trade Commission obliged Medco to 
create an independent Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committee aimed at deciding which 
products should be included in the Formulary. Merck Sharp & Dohme was also 
compelled to maintain a firewall between the two businesses with respect to other drug 
manufacturers' proposals, bids, contracts, discounts, etc. (Lenzer, 2001). Critics claimed 
that Merck's compliance with the consent decree was not perfect as it had its core 
products in the formularies of Medco (Lenzer, 2001).
Vertical integration was an effective way to secure positions in the formularies (Fons, 
2002) but the other way in which the pharmaceutical industry influenced the design of 
formularies at the PBM level was through rebates. Those rebates represented 
contribution payments in the model of Grossman and Helpman (1994).
Carroll (2002) described two typical types of rebate offered to PBMs: the standard 
access rebate that gets a drug on the formulary and the market-share rebate. The market
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share rebate was a special deal between pharmaceutical companies and the PBMs; an 
advantage in a therapeutic category may lead to a bigger market share in that category 
and result in an improvement in the bottom line and in stock prices.
Glabman (2004) explained that as PBMs were forced to cut pricing for handling 
prescriptions in order to compete for customers (HMOs), they implemented aggressive 
deals with pharmaceutical companies over rebates and discounts and had been 
requested, in return, to push more expensive branded medications. The Henry J. Kaiser 
Family Foundation conducted a study in year 2000 which concluded that saving through 
PBMs cannot be automatically ensured (Lenzer, 2001). Clients of the Merck-Medco 
PBM saw their prescription drug costs climb from $18 billion in 1999 to $23 billion in 
2000. As some of these formularies were tied to a consumption rate the PBMs 
maintained their profits and the rebates and discounts were kept secret (Carroll, 2002). 
Halbert, CEO of Advance PCS, claimed that the bulk of the rebates and discounts were 
passed on to clients but Glabman (2004) stated that this was in fact not true as PBMs 
passed between only 5 and 8 percent onto reimbursement plans and received between 6 
to 25 percent from pharmaceutical companies. The rebates should help to keep the costs 
low for HMOs and help the maximum utilisation of the drugs of the formulary. There 
was also secrecy regarding the different agreements between the PBMs and 
pharmaceutical companies. It was a common occurrence that representatives of the 
PBM urged physicians to use certain drugs, including branded medications. These 
agreements were paid separately under the terms of administrative fees or educational 
fees. States as Maine, South Dakota and Washington DC were litigating to obtain full 
disclosure of the rebate deals (Cross, 2005).
Critics claimed that the big money of the pharmaceutical companies was tied to the 
most expensive medications on the market (Glabman, 2004) and that PBMs pushed
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higher-priced branded medications. Medco paid $29.3 million to settle claims that it 
switched prescriptions to drugs that had increased costs for payers. Pharmaceutical 
companies also used a tactic called "bundling" in which the company conditioned its 
participation at the negotiation table with PBMs to the introduction onto the formularies 
of its high-priced name brands. The PBMs needed to complete the formulary with some 
of the products of this company, as well as the rebates, and so conceded to introduce the 
requested products. Bundling was also used for blocking competitors from being 
introduced onto the formulary. Duramed Pharmaceuticals (Carroll, 2002) sued and 
accused Wyeth of using bundling methods to block Duramed from a dozen different 
formularies. Hence, the inclusion of products in formularies was a controversial issue in 
the managed care setting. Although there should be an independent Pharmacy and 
Therapeutics Committee to decide which products were included in a formulary, with 
checks that none of the decision makers "inappropriately curry favour" (Studin, 2002, 
p.49.) with the pharmaceutical companies, the reality was that managed care account 
executives exerted influence in the inclusion decisions on HMOs or PBMs (Dranove, 
2003) through rebates, special agreements or another means such as hospitality, grants 
or programs with key decision makers.
2.5 Conclusions
The formal macro-theory of lobbying described the different political theories of 
interest group participation in the political process and building the basis to the 
development of interest group formation theory. Within this framework, the theories of 
pluralism and corporatism provided the basis to understand how interest groups acted in 
a democracy. The pluralists (Dahl 1956) argued that power was spread throughout 
society with no sectional interest being dominant so that all interest groups were equal
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in their access to influence political decisions. Several authors, Truman (1951), Polsby 
(1971), Cox (1988) Lindblom (1965) and Dahl (1991) added to this model.
On the other side, corporatism was developed by Schmitter (1974) as the extreme 
opposite to pluralism by looking to replace it. In corporatism, there were few interest 
groups that had privileged relationships with the state. Interest groups in corporatism 
were non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and recognised by the State. Lehmbruch 
(1977), Crouch (1983), Martin (1983) and Cawson (1985) extended the model. Both 
pluralism and corporatism, although different in their perspectives, stressed the 
important role of interest groups within the process of authoritative decision-making. 
The development of those two theories led to subdivisions such as the meso- 
corporatism (Wassenberg, 1982) and corporate pluralism (Kvavik and Heissler, 1974 
and Kelso, 1978) aimed at introducing new functional perspectives in the original 
models.
Interest group theory was discussed based on the approach of Olson (1965) and 
extended by Salisbury (1969), Moe (1980), Kimber (1981) and Walker (1983). The 
critical views of Walker (1991), Maloney & Jordan (1997) and Rothenberg (1992) to 
Olson's approach were also explored. Salisbury's (1984) perspective that institutions 
were actors in the process of lobbying provided the understanding to include firms and 
corporations as actors in this process. Scholzman (1984), Moloney and Jordan (1996), 
Howell (2004), Kichner (1980), Coen (1997) and Woll (2006), confirmed this fact 
emphasising the importance of firms or corporations in the influence in decision-making 
circles.
The second section concentrated on the meso-theory of lobbying and presented the 
process of lobbying executed by interest groups from a game theory perspective. There
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were two main channels of influence: the first one was that contribution payments 
influence the decisions of officials (Grossman & Helpman, 1994/1995, Rama & 
Tabellini, 1998, Mitra, 1999 and Damania & Fredriksson, 2000) deviating from 
maximisation of aggregate welfare. Interest groups looked to influence the decision- 
maker in order to benefit from the policy deviation; the second relied on the concept of 
asymmetric information (Potters & van Winden, 1992, Ainsworth, 1993, Austen-Smith 
& Wright, 1992/1998, Lohmann, 1993/1995 and Lagerlof, 1997). Politicians faced 
capacity constraints that gave them informational disadvantages compared to interest 
groups. Companies or groups of companies often possessed private information that 
was important for political decisions and, for instance, data about costs and demand or 
technological expertise that was valuable for the official to make the right decision. 
Interest groups transmitted information trying to influence the officials' decision. The 
Bennedsen and Feldmann (2001) model was also discussed as it was the only model 
that integrated both channels of influence, transmission of information and contribution 
payments.
The micro-theory discussed the characteristics of pharmaceutical lobbying in concrete 
situations. The American market was taken as a model, due to a lack of alternative 
literature, as it had the most similarities to the Argentine Market (Vasallo, 2002 and 
Vincent, 2003). The micro-theory of lobbying was divided in two parts: firstly, the 
lobbying carried out with congress officials and secondly the setting of HMOs and its 
instruments and the lobbying carried out with HMOs officials.
The lobbying of congress officials was performed by the companies themselves or by 
PhRMA, the chamber that represented the research companies (Public Citizen, 
2001/2002). The pharmaceutical industry showed a privileged relationship to congress, 
fitting in as an interest group in the corporatism model. The pharmaceutical industry's
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strategy focused on three issues: protect themselves against competitors through 
extension of patents, preserve price freedom and obtain advantageous tax breaks (Public 
Citizen, 2001). The achievements from this focus have successfully protected the 
bottom line of the pharmaceutical companies and made this industry one of the most 
profitable over the last decade.
The concept of managed care was explained and its elements such as Health 
Management Organisations (HMOs), Managed Care Organisations (MCOs), Pharmacy 
Benefits Management (PBM), closed formularies and rebates (Picknic et al, 2001, 
Motheral, 2000, Dranove, 2003). Managed care managers lobbied HMOs officials to 
secure formulary positions so that the companies' products achieved a larger share of 
the market (Studin, 2002).
Before addressing the research questions of 'why' and 'how' lobbying was carried out 
by the pharmaceutical industry, the researcher focused on the formal macro-theory of 
lobbying to be able to identify the characteristics of the pharmaceutical industry as a 
pressure group within the group formation theory. It was important to define whether 
the pharmaceutical industry fitted better on the corporatist or pluralist model to 
determine how it interacted with the government and officials. This type of interaction 
would determined how lobbying was carried out. The researcher could also identify, 
based on the macro-theory of lobbying, that the pharmaceutical industry was an 
interest/pressure group and that pharmaceutical companies and their pharmacopolitics 
managers were lobbying actors. This distinction was valuable to identify when the 
pharmaceutical industry was lobbying as a group on behalf of its members or an 
individual company, through its pharmacopolitics managers, was earring out lobbying 
in pursuit of its individual interests. The formal theory was also explicit that different 
contexts would influence how lobbying was carried out and that lobbying style was
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affected by the culture of where the lobbying was taking place.
The formal meso-theory of lobbying related to the research question 'how' lobbying 
was exerted. This theory provided two instruments of influencing the officials: 
contribution payments and transmission of information. The theory provided clear 
models of how those instruments were used. The researcher considered those 
instruments when he carried out the interviews and tried to define how they were used 
in lobbying in Argentina. The formal theory also stated that building of coalitions could 
prove useful when interest groups/lobbying actors joined to lobby the government. This 
related to the question of how lobbying was exerted whether by an individual company 
or a coalition. The theory also stated that companies would prefer to free-ride on others' 
lobbying efforts when they had a common interest so that they did not have to incur the 
costs of lobbying. The issue of free-riding related also to how lobbying was performed - 
free-riding meant that on certain occasions the individual company decided not to 
lobby.
The micro-theory of lobbying related to both research questions, 'why' and 'how', in 
concrete situations. The research question 'why' was answered as the literature review 
stated the key motivations for pharmaceutical companies as protection against 
competition, preserve the freedom of prices, obtain tax breaks and secure formulary 
positions. The research question 'how' was addressed and found a predominant attitude 
of companies towards carrying out a contribution payments strategy; in the case of 
lobbying congress, through contribution to political parties or lobbying through 
advocacy groups which contribute with politicians. In the case of HMOs, the 
contribution payments strategy was executed through the rebates offered to HMOs and 
PBMs to secure the company's products in the formularies. The researcher analysed the 
theory of lobbying from three different perspectives. The research questions of 'how'
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and 'why' lobbying was carried out was explicit within these three perspectives. The 
researcher used the literature review to develop a fixed set of question for the 
interviews, which were the main source of data of this research.
In the next chapter the researcher discusses the methodology adopted for the research, 
namely grounded theory, and defines his position regarding the modernism and post­ 
modernism movements and the paradigms of inquiry. The researcher also describes the 
different methodologies considered for this study and reviews the different 
phenomenological approaches to research. The researcher explains why he identified 
grounded theory as the most appropriate methodology for this study and describes how 
grounded theory was used in the research process.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY: GROUNDED THEORY
3.1 Methodology
For this study the researcher followed the Strauss & Corbin (1998) model of grounded 
theory. The researcher's philosophical attitude was post-modernist and had the aim of 
interpreting and reflecting over the data gathered in the interviews. The researcher 
aimed to provide a better understanding of the research object: pharmaceutical lobbying. 
This understanding was limited by the subjective interpretation of the researcher. The 
methodological approach adopted was phenomenological which led to an inductive- 
deductive interpretation of the data in the open coding stage and later, through the axial 
coding, comparison making and sub-category building. This inductive-deductive 
process was a characteristic of grounded theory, in which the researcher "makes 
comparisons and secondly asks questions" (Howell, 2000, p. 129). Regarding the 
paradigms of inquiry the researcher opted for the classification of Guba and Lincoln 
(2001) that identified two paradigms of inquiry that fitted in with the research: post- 
positivism and constructivism. The researcher was part of what was investigated and 
there cannot be separation between the investigator and the research object. Reality was 
locally constructed and was based on the experiences of the researcher and the 
interviewees. The results were constructions of the researcher based on his reflections of 
the data collected.
3.2 Issues of methodological choice
3.2.1 Modernism and Post-Modernism
Modern models of inquiry were developed in movements that originated in the
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philosophy, literature and culture of the last two centuries. Modernism was 
characterised as looking for the new, the rationalism of the mind and a scientific method 
by which to explain an external reality. Postmodernism was largely a reaction to the 
assumed certainty of scientific or objective efforts to explain reality. In essence, it 
stemmed from recognition that reality was not simply a mirror of human understanding 
of it but, rather, was constructed as the mind tried to understand its own particular and 
personal reality (Kelly, 1997). When Nietzsche, in the nineteenth century, said there 
were no facts only interpretations he was both summing up the legacy of eighteenth- 
century critical philosophy and pointing towards the tasks and promises of the 
twentieth-century post-modernism movement (Tarnas, 1993). For this reason 
postmodernism was highly sceptical of explanations which claimed to be valid for all 
groups, cultures, traditions and races but instead focused on the relative truth for each 
person (Kelly, 1997). For the post-modernist, interpretation was everything; reality only 
came into being through individual interpretation of what the world meant to us as 
individuals. Postmodernism relied on concrete experience over abstract principles, 
knowing always that the outcome of one's own experience will necessarily be fallible 
and relative, rather than certain and universal (Tarnas, 1993 ).
In philosophy and epistemology, this change from modernism to post-modernism took 
place in a dramatic series of intellectual advances that began with Descartes and 
culminated in Kant (Field, 2001). It has been argued that Descartes (1637) and Kant 
were both essential in the development of the modern perspective. It was Descartes 
(1637) who first fully grasped and articulated the experience of the emerging 
autonomous modern self as fundamentally distinct and separate from an objective 
external world that it sought to understand. Descartes (1637) drew out and expressed in 
philosophical terms the experiential consequence of the new Copernican cosmological
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context, starting from a position of fundamental doubt vis-a-vis the world and ending in 
the cogito (Tarnas, 1993) in which he asserted thinking was the first item of knowledge. 
In doing this he set into motion a train of philosophical events- leading from Locke to 
Berkeley and Hume (Field, 2001) and culminating in Kant- that eventually produced a 
great epistemological crisis. Descartes was in this sense the crucial midpoint between 
the Copernican revolution in cosmology and the Kantian revolution in epistemology.
Tarnas (1993) stated that Kant, built on his empiricist predecessors, drew out the 
epistemological consequences of the Cartesian cogito. Of course, Kant himself set forth 
cognitive principles and subjective structures that he thought were absolute e.g., forms 
and categories on which were based the apparent certainties of Newtonian physics 
(Brown, 2001). As time passed, however, Kant's legacy was not the specifics of his 
solution but rather the profound problems he articulated. Instead, Kant had drawn 
attention to the crucial fact that all human knowledge was interpretive. Field (2001) 
added that the human mind can claim no direct mirror like knowledge of the objective 
world, for the object it experiences has already been structured by the subject's own 
internal organisation. The human being knows not the world-in-itself but rather the 
world-as-rendered-by-the-human-mind. Thus Descartes ontological schism was both 
made more absolute and superseded by Kant's epistemological schism. The gap between 
subject and object could not be certifiably bridged. From the Cartesian premise came 
the Kantian result. (Tarnas, 1993).
The cosmological estrangement of modern consciousness initiated by Copernicus and 
the ontological estrangement initiated by Descartes were completed by the 
epistemological estrangement initiated by Kant: a threefold mutually enforced prison of 
modern alienation. And with the third of this trinity of modern alienation, the great
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schism established by Kant, we see the pivot of the shift from the modern to the post­ 
modern.
3.2.2 Paradigms ofInquuy
It was important to define a paradigm. Recalling the Greek paradeigma would remind us 
that paradigm was derived from model, pattern and example (Trafford, 2001). Kuhn 
(1962, p. 10) suggested that scientific paradigms were "Accepted examples of actual 
scientific practice, examples which include law, theory, application and instrumentation 
together.... (to) provide models from which spring particular coherent traditions of 
scientific research". According to Kuhn (1962), paradigms were also the source of the 
methods, problem-fields and standards of solution accepted by any mature scientific 
field at any given time. Kuhn (1962) pointed out that each paradigm tended to create its 
own data and its own way of interpreting those data in a manner that was 
comprehensive and self-validating. Barker (1992) took the notion of the Kuhnian 
paradigm and applied it to everyday issues. By his definition a paradigm was a set of 
rules and regulations (written or unwritten) that did two things: 1) established or defined 
boundaries; and 2) indicated how to behave inside the boundaries in order to be 
successful. His reason for aligning paradigms with notions of success was on the basis 
that if individuals found that operating within a prevailing orthodoxy inhibited their 
achievement of success, then they would seek ways to overcome that problem. When a 
new way of working was discovered, it would replace the previous paradigm.
Hussey and Hussey (1997) identified two main research paradigms: positivism and 
phenomenology. Hussey and Hussey (1997, p.52) explained that "Positivist laws 
provide the basis of explanation, permitting the anticipation of phenomena, predict the 
occurrence and therefore allow them to be controlled". Explanation consisted of
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establishing causal relationships between the variables and linking them in a deductive 
or integrated theory. This approach related to the natural sciences where the scientific 
method was modelled on controlled experiments aimed at the development of a general 
theory. But social sciences could not be regarded as being bound by certain fixed laws 
in the sequence of cause and effect. The phenomenology paradigm argued that social 
sciences cannot be compared to physical sciences and social reality was within the 
human mind. This paradigm stressed the subjective aspects of human activity by 
focusing on the meaning rather than the measurement of social phenomena (Hussey and 
Hussey,1997)). Researchers sought to understand the nature of society through personal 
experience and gain insight into social phenomena from the perceptions and values of 
respondents as well as analysing the meaning of certain social actions. The typology 
enunciated by Hussey and Hussey established the two main research paradigms; other 
authors have made a more specific classification which could better help the researcher 
to link his or her paradigms of research and research methodology.
Guba and Lincoln (2001) analysed the issue further and identified a number of different 
paradigms of inquiry. These involved positivism, post-positivism, critical theory, 
constructivism and participatory. Positivism and post-positivism entailed aspects of 
modernism while the others identified different gradients of post-modernism.








Positivism: Positivism was identified by Comte and St. Simon, during the mid 19th 
Century, and they tried to copy the methodological approaches followed by the natural 
sciences. It was normative and descriptive: it described how human thought had evolved 
and prescribed the norms of how it should develop (Howell, 2004). Positivism 
considered that an external reality existed, which could be discovered and totally 
understood. If the investigator and the external world (or that which could be 
discovered) were totally separate and objectivity sought through scientific procedure, 
truth could be found (epistemology) (Cuba and Lincoln, 2001). Trafford (2001) stated 
that this could be achieved by tests and attempting to prove hypotheses, through 
scientific experiments and the manipulation of confounding conditions (methodology). 
This paradigm allowed a distinct understanding of theory in that theory provided 
immutable laws, which enabled prediction. It is difficult or almost impossible to find 
immutable laws and prediction in social sciences and thus this paradigm was heavily 
criticised by post-positivists, who argued that truth exists but can only be understood 
imperfectly. Positivists claimed that science should establish laws that were beyond 
challenge. This undermined the critical aspect of positivism and in many instances 
began to hold up scientific discovery. If laws could not be challenged then progress was 
restrained. Indeed, positivism omitted and alienated many approaches to generating 
knowledge and was eventually challenged by post-positivism.
Post-Positivism: Post-positivism perceived reality as external to humanity but 
considered that through our intellectual capabilities we are unable to understand the real 
world. Epistemologically speaking, post-positivism abandoned the total separation 
between the investigated and investigator. However, objectivity and separation were 
still pursued. This led to a methodology that dealt with multiple scientific 
experimentation and hypothesis falsification (Howell, 2004). Theory was about
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approximations to the truth. Popper was the main representative of this paradigm. 
Popper argued that instead of constantly seeking proof, researchers should rather seek 
evidence that might refute a hypothesis or theory (Trafford, 2001). He argued that if a 
theory was developed from empirical evidence then it should also be possible to refute 
that theory from a base of relevant and contradictory evidence. The more tests for 
falsification a theory passed, the more it gained in corroboration. Theories that 
withstood refutation tests without being falsified were seen as corroborated hypothesis 
and were held to be provisionally true as the best available theory. Popper's critics 
insisted that corroboration is a form of induction. Popper was blamed for internal 
inconsistencies insofar as his methodology relied on implicit and unrecognized elements 
of induction and for paralyzing rationalism insofar as rationality demanded justification 
of some sort.
Critical Theory: Post-positivism generated problems for those social scientists who 
sought to identify and challenge what was taking place in institutions from historical 
and mainly qualitative perspectives. This led to the emergence of critical theory 
(Howell, 2004). The epistemological aspect of the critical theory paradigm considered 
that findings and theoretical perspectives were discovered because the investigator and 
investigated were intrinsically linked through historical values, which must influence 
the inquiry. A specific understanding of reality was shaped by social, political, cultural, 
economic and gender values and crystallised over time. This led to a specific 
methodology which identified a dialogic and dialectical approach (Guba & Lincoln, 
2001). Dialogue was needed between the researcher and the subject and between past 
and present. Theory was developed subjectively in a historical context.
Constructivism: Constructivism understood reality as locally constructed and based on 
shared experiences even though groups and individuals are changeable; ontologically,
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this identifies relativist realism" (Howell, 2004). Epistemologically, constructivism was 
similar to critical theory except that it considered that findings were created and 
developed as the investigation progressed. This meant that results were created through 
consensus and individual constructions, including the constructions of the investigator. 
Theory in this paradigm was relative and changeable, reliability and prediction almost 
impossible, and cause and effect difficult to identify (Guba & Lincoln, 2001).
Participatory: This paradigm ontology perceived reality as participative with an 
interaction between subjective and objective perspectives. Indeed, reality was co- 
created through mind and cosmos or external world (Guba & Lincoln, 2001). The 
epistemology involved critical subjectivity of the self in participatory transactions with 
the cosmos or other. Findings were co-created through practitioner attributes such as 
experience and practical knowledge. The methodology in this paradigm of inquiry 
involved collaborative action and political participation through the primacy of practice 
and language grounded in shared experience and situational context.
The following chart differentiates between the ontology, epistemology and 
methodology of the five paradigms. Trafford (2001) stated that ontology was concerned 
with the very essence of the phenomena under investigation. The question that the 
researcher was expected to consider was whether reality was external to the individual 
or was it the product of human consciousness. An associated question was whether 
reality was objective or the product of human cognition. Epistemology was concerned 
with the very basis of knowledge. The question that the researcher was expected to 
consider was whether knowledge was true or false, hard, real and transferable or soft, 
subjective and only found in personal experience (Trafford, 2001). Methodology was 
concerned with the ways that the investigation was conducted to obtain evidence from, 
and about, the social world. Here, the researcher had to be clear whether his/her
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research was concerned with searching for universal laws that explained and governed 
the nature of society, or whether it concerned understanding the way in which 
individuals created, modified and interpreted the world in which they found themselves.
Table 5 Cuba & Lincoln Basic beliefs of Alternative Inquiry Paradigms(2001)
Issue Positivism Post- Critical Constructivism Participatory
positivism Theory
Ontology Naive realism - Critical realism - Historical
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Hussey and Hussey (1997) maintained that paradigms were widely used to differentiate 
the ontological, epistemological and methodology issues in research. Guba & Lincoln's 
(2001) positivism and post-positivism paradigms corresponded to Hussey and Hussey's 
(1997) positivism. The paradigms constructivism, critical theory and participatory 
corresponded to Hussey and Hussey's phenomenology paradigm.
3.2.3 Methodologies for research
The research methodologies used were determined by the paradigm chosen, or assumed, 
by the researcher. There were two different types of research methodologies: positivistic 
methodologies (cross-sectional studies, experimental studies, longitudinal studies and 
surveys) and phenomenological methodologies (Hussey& Hussey 1997). For the 
purpose of the study the focus was on phenomenological methodologies. 
Phenomenology itself was regarded as a paradigm of inquiry but has also been 
identified as a methodology of research by some authors.
Phenomenology: Husserl is acknowledged as the founding father of phenomenology as 
a systematic study of social behaviour and its evolution can be traced from the work of 
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Husserl developed a phenomenological methodology as a 
descriptive procedure for examining conscious experience that was called descriptive 
phenomenology (Natasan, 1973). Heidegger developed hermeneutic (interpretive) 
phenomenology, or existential phenomenology, pointing out that the basic problem of 
philosophy was to discover the nature of being (Goulding, 1999). Schutz, during the 
1960s, combined Husserl's phenomenology with a social phenomenology and called for 
the use of bracketing. This implied setting aside one's taken-for-granted assumptions in 
order to focus on the ways in which members of the real world interpretively produce 
the recognisable, intelligible forms they treat as real (Goulding, 1999). Merleau-Ponty
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(1962) expressed a similar point of view and understood phenomenology as the study of 
essences and that all problems amounted to finding definitions to the essence of 
consciousness or perceptions. Thompson et al. (1990) discussed the application of 
phenomenology to the research process. The basic assumption was that a person's life 
was a socially constructed totality in which experiences interrelate coherently and 
meaningfully. The researcher found that phenomenology as a methodology was of 
limited use in this study because of a need to limit his reflections to his own conscious 
mental process and lived experiences. Consequently reflection would be carried away 
by a unavoidable subjectivity.
Action Research: Action research differed from phenomenology as the researcher's 
objective, in action research, was not to interpret but to bring change to the research 
object. Action research was closely linked to participative inquiry and was designed to 
find an effective way of bringing about a conscious change in a partly controlled 
environment. In other words, the main aim of action research was to enter a situation 
and to attempt to bring about change and monitor the results. Some action research 
might not be different from a consultancy project (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). 
Gummesson (2000) suggested that a program of several research projects and 
researchers provided a better opportunity to combine the roles of academic researcher 
and management consultant. In this light, the interrelationship between the researcher 
and consultant roles occured over time as well as between different researchers within 
the framework of a larger program. . For the purpose of this study the researcher took an 
exploratory approach with the aim of having a deep understanding of the 
pharmaceutical lobbying process. Therefore, action research was not appropriate as the 
researcher did not wish to bring about any changes to the research setting.
Ethnography: Ethnography was based on anthropology and was an approach in which
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the researcher used socially acquired and shared knowledge to understand the observed 
patterns of human activity (Atkinson & Hammersley, 1998). The main method was 
participatory observation in which the researcher became a full working member of the 
group being studied. It normally took place over a long period and in a clearly defined 
location. As such, ethnographic research was essentially phenomenological in nature 
and was not replicable (Trafford, 2001). Ethnographers sought to capture and then to 
understand the detailed aspects of their subject's life-activities. This type of research 
involved building trust, becoming involved with the phenomenon researched, 
developing strong contacts with the key informants, gathering data from multiple 
sources, writing notes and trying to be analytical of the whole process. Ethnographers 
have to balance the consequences of close contact against professional detachment 
towards their subjects (Atkinson & Hammersley, 1998). Although the researcher was 
immersed in his own culture, and ethnography as a methodology was a possibility, the 
researcher broadened the scope of research to the whole pharmaceutical industry in 
Argentina and thus other methodologies were more suitable.
Case Study: The case study methodology was developed by Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin 
(1994). Eisenhardt (1989, p.534.) referred to the case study as "a research study which 
focuses on understanding the dynamics present within single settings". A case study 
was the examination of a single phenomenon. Yin (1994) organised and standardised 
the case study research methodology. Yin's (1994) purpose was to give reliability and 
validity to the case study research within academic opinion. Yin (1994) broadened 
Eisenhardt's (1989 approach from the single case study research to a multiple case 
study research, whose objective was to find patterns across similar cases, constructing 
an emergent theory. Yin's (1994) aim was to reach saturation of the findings across the 
cases. He defined this saturation as literal replication. However, Yin's (1994)
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methodology was aimed not only at literal replication but also at theoretical replication. 
Theoretical replication meant that the emergent theory was confronted with a study of 
non-similar cases which should show non-correspondence to the findings obtained in 
the literal replication. Theoretical replication made the findings construct more valid. In 
case study research, multiple sources could be considered, either qualitatively or 
quantitatively. Case studies were often described as exploratory research and were used 
in areas where there were few theories or a deficient body of knowledge. At first the 
researcher considered case study methodology to be appropriate for the study. On 
reflection he realised that an a priori conceptual framework and predetermined 
propositions could introduce more bias in the interview process and so decided to 
follow a more inductive methodology.
Grounded Theory: Glaser and Strauss first proposed grounded theory in 1967 in their 
book "The discovery of Grounded Theory" (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Glaser's 
definition of grounded theory was "a general methodology of analysis linked with data 
collection that uses a systematically applied set of methods to generate an inductive 
theory about a substantive area" (Glaser, 1992, p. 16). Grounded theory emphasised the 
systematic approach to data collection, handling and analysis and was aimed at building 
a substantive theory that explains the area under investigation. Glaser's and Strauss's 
personal differences that emerged over the years following their joint publication in 
1967 saw Glaser (1992) emphasising the necessity for the researcher to be more creative 
and less procedural in methodology. Glaser's approach was more inductive and 
followed the constructivism paradigm. Strauss (Strauss & Corbin, 1990), conversely, 
conveyed a more linear method. The latter approach could be considered to be within 
the post-positivism/contructivism paradigms of inquiry. Glaser (1992) selected an area 
(or organisation or activity) for study and allowed issues to emerge in the course of the
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research process. Strauss and Corbin (1990) were more specific and preferred to 
identify a phenomenon or issue for study. Thus Glaser's (1992) approach, to the 
identification and specification of the research issue to be addressed, was entirely 
dependent upon the perceptions of actors and researcher. Strauss and Corbin (1998) 
permitted the researcher to predetermine the general subject of enquiry before entering 
the research site. Glaser (1992) also preferred an analytical method that was more 
general in its frame of reference, while Strauss and Corbin (1998) opted for a somewhat 
more structured set of analytical steps. Glaser (1992) regarded Strauss and Corbin's 
analytical method as forcing, rather than allowing emergence of theory. In this respect 
Glaser's methodological approach relied primarily upon the constant comparison of 
different incidents, perceptions, relationships and issues. Glaser's aim was to identify 
inconsistencies, contradictions, gaps in data and emerging consensus on key concepts 
and relationships- "in grounded theory we do not know, until it emerges "(Glaser, 1992, 
p.95). Strauss and Corbin (1998) were significantly more prescriptive in specifying the 
steps to be taken by a researcher in coding and analysing phenomena.
In essence, the process of grounded theory required that joint collection, coding and 
analysis of data were the underlying operations. "The generation of theory, coupled with 
the notion of theory as process...should blur and intertwine continually, from the 
beginning of an investigation to its end" (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p.43). In grounded 
theory the methodological emphasis was on actors' own emergent interpretations and 
meanings with minimal researcher intervention. The theory that was grounded in these 
data emerges through constant comparison, coding and analysis of interview and 
observational data. Van Maanen (1979) stated that what was pertinent to social research, 
through grounded theory was that it sought to approximate to the context of that being 
studied, for example: an organisation, its managers and the interactions and
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interrelationships between them, thus conveying a conceptual understanding of issues 
that make up their world (Van Maanen, 1979). The main problem that the researcher 
found with grounded theory was the issue of bias and subjectivity of the findings as the 
researcher was himself coding and interpreting the relationships between the different 
concepts, sub-concepts, properties and conditions.
3.2.4 Ontological. epistemological, and methodological assumptions related to 
in' varadigms
An investigator's assumptions and beliefs about society influence his/her choices 
regarding the research methodologies. He may use a deductive methodology that 
requires starting with general ideas and developing a theory with testable hypotheses, 
which can be tested by data collection. Alternatively, he may prefer to use an inductive 
approach, which begins with observations and builds up ideas and more general 
statements and testable hypotheses or propositions from them for further testing based 
on additional observations. These two approaches can be defined or categorised as 
positivism and phenomenology. Creswell (1994) defined positivist or quantitative 
approaches as based on testing a theory composed of variables, measured with numbers, 
and analysed with statistical procedures, in order to determine whether the predictive 
generalisations of the theory. Easteby-Smith et al made assumptions of independence:
"The observer is independent of what is being observed; value-freedom: the choice of 
what to study, and how to study it, can be determined by objective criteria rather than 
by human beliefs and interests;[and] causality: the aim of social sciences should be to 
identify causal explanations and fundamental laws that explain regularities in human 
social behaviour" (Easterby-Smith et al, 1991, p.28.).
The range of approaches, which were summarised as qualitative, in contrast, assert that
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"Many subjects of interest to social scientists cannot be meaningful formulations in 
ways that permit statistical testing of hypotheses with quantitative data" (Trafford, 
2001, p.20). Qualitative or phenomenological research aims to develop understanding of 
social or human problems through a process which is based on building a complex, 
holistic picture , formed with words, reporting detailed view of informants (Creswell, 
1994). Such an approach was held to be more useful for hearing data and understanding 
meaning in context, than positivism, which denied the significance of context and 
standardises questions and answers (Rubin and Rubin 1995). The general perspective of 
the researcher in this study was phenomenology. The phenomenological paradigm fitted 
the research as it was concerned with generating theory from small samples where the 
data was rich and subjective. However, the researcher found that the classification of 
Guba & Lincoln was more appropriate for the research. Considering the paradigm of 
inquiry related to the Guba & Lincoln (2001) classification, the researcher opted for a 
post-positivist and constructivist approach. The ontological assumption of this research 
was that reality was imperfectly apprehendable, relative, local and specifically 
constructed. The epimestological assumption was that findings arose form the 
interaction of the researcher with that being researched. The methodological assumption 
was aimed at understanding the way in which pharmaceutical lobbying was exerted 
through an inductive-deductive process. The black boxes in the following table show 
the researcher's approach to the research object.
















The researcher's philosophical attitude was post-modernist, with a phenomenological 
research approach and the paradigm of inquiry was post-positivist and construedvist.. 
This mixed approach of the paradigms of inquiry led to the adoption of grounded theory 
as the methodology used. The researcher followed the model of Strauss and Corbin 
(1998), which made the approach more post-positivistic following certain procedure in 
the development of the substantive theory. If the researcher had followed Glaser's 
(1992) approach the paradigm of inquiry would have been only constructivist.
3.3 The research questions
The research addressed the question of how multinational pharmaceutical companies in 
Argentina lobby the government, public and HMO officials by using pharmacopolitics 
managers and departments. The research also looked at the expected outcomes and 
motivations of the pharmacopolitics activities. In order to accomplish the aims of this 
study, the following research questions were used:
Why do multinational pharmaceutical companies in Argentina lobby officials? 
How do multinational pharmaceutical companies carry out lobbying activities?
These research questions were exploratory and they were aimed at understanding the 
pharmaceutical lobbying process in Argentina.
3.4 The research domain
The study was placed within the context of the multinational pharmaceutical industry in 
Argentina where the function of pharmacopolitics is clearly outlined in company 
hierarchy. A pharmapolitics manager's job is to lobby the government and influence 
HMO officials. National companies also undertake lobbying but as there was not
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usually a clear job description covering this responsibility within the organisation it was 
difficult to research. It was also very difficult for the researcher to gain access to 
national companies.
3.5 Deciding on research methodology
The formal meso-theory of lobbying was mostly based on the game theory; formulating 
mathematical models with contribution payments or information communication. 
Initially the idea was to develop a quantitative Bayesian approach, which changed 
gradually to one that tallied with the game theory. However, after reading Miles and 
Huberman (1994) the researcher realised that he was taking an analytic approach to 
understand a few controlled variables and for a deeper understanding of the interaction 
of variables in a complex environment a systemic approach was needed. Consequently 
the approach turned out to be phenomenological with the aim of developing a deep 
understanding of the process of lobbying by multinationals in Argentina. The researcher 
analysed the different possible methodologies available. Action research was 
disregarded because the aim of the research was not to solve a particular problem but to 
develop theory about a phenomenon. Ethnography was considered but the researcher's 
interest was to understand pharmaceutical lobbying not only from the perspective of his 
own organisation but also from the multinational industry. After disregarding other 
methodologies (phenomenology, participative inquiry) the researcher realised that the 
two methodologies that best fitted the research process were case study research and 
grounded theory. The researcher first opted for a case study research looking for literal 
and theoretical replication across the cases. However, later, the researcher decided to 
use grounded theory as a methodology due to the distinctive advantages that it 
commenced from specific 'grounded in reality' situation (a pharmaceutical company)
with the intent of understanding the nature and rationale of observed incidents.
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Inductive theory generation was embedded in the explanation of pharmaceutical 
lobbying, rather than generalities or broad statements. The explanatory power of 
grounded theory was to develop predictive ability - to explain what happens in the 
context of pharmaceutical lobbying. Grounded theory was considered to be particularly 
appropriate when little was known about a topic and there were few existing theories to 
explain a particular phenomenon (Hutchinson, 1988) as happened with pharmaceutical 
lobbying in Argentina.
By choosing grounded theory the implication was that the conceptual framework would 
be developed after the coding and analysis; no theoretical framework was to be 
developed a priori. The theoretical framework was to be developed by alternating 
between inductive and deductive thought. The researcher inductively gained 
information that was apparent in the data collected. Next, deductive thought allowed the 
researcher to turn away from the data and establish the relationships between the sub- 
categories. Substantive theory emerged from the analysis of data through the 
relationships between sub-categories, properties and concepts.
3.5.1 Grounded Theory: Closer or Strauss?
The first decision was to decide between the different approaches in using grounded 
theory. As noted in the literature review Glaser and Strauss (1967) disagreed on the 
rationale/basis of how Grounded Theory should be implemented. Glaser (1992) 
followed a more constructivist approach and Strauss and Corbin (1990) a more post- 
positivistic approach. The researcher opted for the Strauss and Corbin (1998) approach 
because this permitted a predetermination of the general subject of enquiry before 
entering the research site and allowed the adoption of a structured set of analytical steps
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to be taken in coding and analysing phenomena. Nevertheless, some elements of 
Glaser's (1992) approach, such as theoretical sensitivity, were used.
By following the Strauss and Corbin (1998) approach the researcher elected in advance 
to focus observation, interviews and archival data gathering on a particular issue such as 
lobbying by the pharmaceutical industry. Coding was then oriented around this issue 
and a central concept sought to represent the interplay of subjects' and the researcher's 
perceptions of the nature and dimensions of the issue being studied. The generation of 
grounded theory involved data being systematically collected through field 
observations, interviews, meetings and the inspection of documentation where possible. 
In the field of pharmaceutical lobbying, due to the sensitivity of the topic, written 
documentation was scarce or non existent. The only written documentation that the 
researcher could collect was the output i.e. legislation achieved through lobbying. The 
researcher, as a participant observer, could notice first the lobbying implemented by the 
pharmaceutical companies aimed at a specific interest and later saw the outputs of this 
lobbying activities.
Grounded theory aims to build substantive theory through coding data. The intention 
was to develop core categories that accounted for most of the variance by closely 
scrutinising the data. The aim of coding was to arrive at systematically derived core 
categories that become the focal concepts that contribute towards theoretical 
development. Theory generation was established within seven sub-categories and one 
core category. Categories were coded with a view to rendering them 'dense' and 
'saturated' with theoretical meaning.
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3.6 Th eoretical Sensitivity
Theoretical sensitivity refers to the researcher's capacity to reflect on the data in 
theoretical terms. It required the researcher to interact continually with the data 
collection and analysis and reflect on the data while suspending judgement on possible 
outcomes. The researcher came to the research situation with a high degree of 
sensitivity as he worked as a pharmapolitics manager and had experience relevant to the 
area. The research had to be aware during the whole research process of the impact that 
his "self could have in the outcomes of the study. The researcher's subjectivity and 
sensitivity might have influenced how the researcher conducted the interviews, analysed 
and interpreted the data. The researcher used the iterative and grounded processes of the 
constant comparison methodology to counteract, or at least diminish, subjectivity and 
bias. Reflexivity and the bias effect are dealt with further in this chapter.
3.7 Coding
Coding is the result of raising questions and giving provisional answers about categories 
and their relationship. Creating distinctions between codes produces dimensions and 
sub-dimensions. The researcher applied the coding paradigm originally articulated by 
Strauss (1987) and further refined by Strauss and Corbin (1990). It represented the 
operations by which data was broken down, conceptualised, and put back together in 
new ways (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Strauss and Corbin identified three types of 
coding: open coding, axial coding and selective coding. Through coding the researcher 
labelled fragments of data through the various developmental stages.
3.7.1 Open Coding
Open coding involved the analysis of data gathered in the interviews, by participant
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observation and to a lesser degree by archival information. Codes formed the basis for 
later aggregation into concepts. These were names, or labels, that the researcher gave to 
events, activities, functions, relationships, contexts, influences and outcomes. This 
initial coding involved close scrutiny of the data from the first interviews. The 
researcher transcribed and then analysed interviews, word for word, line-by-line and 
phrase-by-phrase. The aim of open coding was to begin the unrestricted labelling of all 
data and to assign representational and conceptual codes to each and every incident 
highlighted within the data. As the process moved forward then iterative reflection of 
that already coded was considered with the new data so that a gradual formation took 
place. Open coding allowed similar incidents and phenomena to be compared and 
contrasted. This initiated the tentative process of developing conceptual categories and 
their properties. The researcher bore in mind that it was not the data itself that 
developed conceptual categories and their properties but subsequent reflection on the 
data that built the emergent substantive theory. It was the theorisation of data and their 
phenomena, through an inductive-deductive process, that created grounded theory. The 
theory was literally grounded in the data, but was not the data itself.
3.7.2 Axial Coding
Axial coding followed open coding. After completing the initial open coding the 
researcher then regrouped the data. Through axial coding the researcher identified 
relationships between concepts, properties, dimensions, phenomenon and intervening 
conditions for the purpose of developing categories. Sub-categories emerged as 
aggregates of the most closely interrelated elements for which supporting evidence was 
strong (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Initially the researcher identified 10 sub-categories, 
28 concepts and 30 sub-concepts. Through the process of refining the categories and 
delving into the data the researcher identified four new sub-categories. It was during this
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process of moving from the transcript of one respondent to that of another, and on 
towards the final categories, that tentative relationships emerged. Finally, the 15 sub- 
categories were merged into seven sub-categories. Axial coding is extensively described 
in the data analysis chapter.
3.7.3 Selective Coding
"Selective coding is the process by which all categories are unified around a core 
category" (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 15). Selective coding required the selection of the 
focal core code, the central phenomenon that emerges from the axial coding process. 
The focal core code for this research was pharmaceutical lobbying. All the other seven 
sub-categories derived from the axial coding process were related in some way to this 
focal core code. The researcher classified these sub-categories as representing context, 
conditions, actions, interactions and outcomes. In this way a theoretical framework of 
interrelated concepts developed. This showed possible relationships between 
pharmaceutical lobbying that represented the central phenomenon identified in answer 
to the questions: what was the central activity occurring here, what were the 
conditioning or influencing concepts, what were the observable outcomes and any 
intervening concepts and variables being represented by the other sub-categories 
identified (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). The selective coding stage focused on what 
emerged as the core category. The core category represented pharmaceutical lobbying, 
thus the main theme of the research. "A central category has analytical power. What 
gives it that power is its ability to pull the other categories together to form an 
explanatory whole" (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 146.).
3.7.4 Coding for process
"Processes are sequences of evolving action/interaction, changes in which they can be
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traced to changes in structural conditions" (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 163). Coding for 
process was used specifically to analyse the process of lobbying as well as the sub- 
processes such as negotiation. For this purpose the researcher changed the analytical 
focus; instead of analyzing data for properties and dimensions the researcher was 
"purposely looking at action/interaction and noting movement and change as well as 
how it evolved (changes or remains the same) in response to changes in context or 
conditions" (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 167.). In the case of the research subject, 
pharmaceutical lobbying, the analysis of the process was essential for the building of 
substantive theory. The process of lobbying was broken down into sub processes for 
analysis:
Figure 1 Time — Structural Conditions
Health Care System
Preliminary ( Obtain access ( Preparation
Pharmaceutical Lobbying
Arrow: evolving inter/action 
Circles: Sub-processes
Overlaps in circles: intersection of conditions and consequences leading to change of 
variation in context and adjustments made in interaction to keep it flowing.
Adapted from Strauss & Corbin, 1998
The preliminary review, obtaining access, preparation and negotiation were sub- 
processes in the main pharmaceutical lobbying process. These sub-processes have been 
explained in the findings of this research. Process was always inextricably linked to 
structure which creates the context for action and interaction. Structure represented the
context and conditions in which action/interaction took place. The structure in this
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research was the pharmacopolitics arena in Argentina, which created the context for 
action and interaction between the pharmapolitics managers and HMOs and public 
officials.
3.8 The conditional matrix
According to Strauss and Corbin (1998, p. 181.) the "conditional/consequential matrix is 
an analytical device to stimulate an analysts' thinking about the relationship between 
macro and micro conditions/consequences both to each other and to process". The 
researcher could trace better the relationships of actions and interactions through the 
analysis of the full range of macro and micro conditions in which pharmaceutical 
lobbying was embedded. In the conditional matrix of this study the researcher was in 
the centre of the matrix; a fact that could pose subjectivity or bias in the analysis of the 
substantive theory. Reflexivity (Cuba & Lincoln, 2001) was an important tool for the 
researcher in identifying the effect of self in the relationships of actions and interactions. 
The effect of self could affect what was researched and the substantive theory 
developed. Within the research project the researcher tried to maintain theoretical 
sensitivity and checked against the data gathered in the process of constant comparative 
analysis. In this way the researcher remained focused on the data and the development 
of the substantive theory of pharmaceutical lobbying rather than an analysis of himself 
or allowing the analysis to be derailed by preconceived ideas. The objective of the 
researcher was to be detached from his high degree of sensitivity to the topic and, 
through the iterative and constant comparison, focus on the data and the relationship of 
the different concepts, conditions, dimensions, properties, actions and interactions. 
Nevertheless, there is always a degree of subjectivity in the interpretation of the data, 
reflecting the "self of the researcher.
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In the case of this research, the conditional matrix considered the following elements: 
First, the conditional matrix helped to direct the theoretical sampling and with the
design of the interview plan. Within the interviews it also helped to establish the 
relationships between the different elements present in pharmaceutical lobbying. It 
helped the researcher through the process of open coding and axial coding and to 
understand the relationship between conditions and consequences. Element one (ELI) 
was the researcher in his analysis of the whole process of lobbying. The companies 
(EL2) (structure) together with the chambers (EL3) (structure) carried out the lobbying 
process. Chambers (ELS) influenced companies (EL2) when they acted in a cooperative 
way. The other elements- HMO & public officials (EL4), health policies (ELS),
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legislation (EL6), government (EL7) and international lobbies (EL8)- represented 
structural conditions that interacted in the process of lobbying. Regarding the paths of 
connectivity the arrows show a simplification of the different patterns of 
action/interaction over time. Companies (EL2) and chambers (EL3) influenced HMDs 
& public officials (EL4) with their lobbying to obtain favourable health policies. HMO 
and public officials (EL4) created the health policies. Public officials (EL4) also had a 
degree of influence on legislation enacted by the congress, as congress consulted the 
public officials on health issues. The government (EL7) implemented legislation 
affecting health policies. The government (EL7) also intervened in the creation of 
legislation presenting law projects to the congress. International lobbies (ELS) (e.g. 
PhRMA- the Pharmaceutical Manufactures Association USA) also pressured the 
government through the American Embassy to obtain favourable policies. The 
conditional matrix helped the researcher at the start of the research process by providing 
a framework that was possible to refer to. Through analysis the researcher was also able 
to see the links between the different elements of the research and established the 
relationships between concepts, sub-categories and the core category.
3.9 Theoretical Sampling
Unlike sampling done in quantitative investigations, theoretical sampling cannot be 
planned before embarking on grounded theory research. The aim of theoretical sampling 
in the research was to look for cases that would maximise opportunities for comparative 
analysis. In this research, the initial case was a pharmapolitics manager from a 
multinational company selected for his representativeness and experience in the area. 
The data analysis (open coding) pertaining to this case was taken as a basis. Additional 
cases were selected based on the possibilities of obtaining substantive information. The
researcher used triangulation to support the findings and to gather new information
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about the research subject. At all stages the researcher sought alternative explanations 
and tested for confirmation/rejection of the concepts developed by thorough analysis of 
the categories found in order to reduce the conceptual inadequacy of a theory (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1998). The researcher continued to sample until no new or relevant data 
appeared and thus achieved sub-categories and theoretical saturation. Not all sub- 
categories were equally relevant and so major sub-categories were saturated as 
completely as possible. The emergent theory was saturated, solid in the face of new data 
and rich in detail.
3.10 Substantive and Formal Theory: Identifying Issues
The aim of this research was first to generate substantive theory that emerged from the 
conceptual categories but that was grounded on the data. This substantive theory was 
developed for pharmaceutical lobbying that was the substantive area of inquiry 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Throughout the research process the researcher adopted "the 
flexibility and freedom to explore a phenomenon in depth" (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, 
p.40.). Underpinning conceptual sub-categories to the core category (pharmaceutical 
lobbying) supported the emergence of a substantive theory. These emergent categories 
were the building blocks of substantive theory generation in the field of pharmaceutical 
lobbying. The researcher always had in mind the guidance of Glaser and Strauss (1967, 
p.237.) to evaluate the empirical grounding of grounded theory. This can be summarised 
as follows:
(1) Fit - does the theory fit the substantive area in which it will be used?
(2) Comprehension - will non-professionals concerned with the substantive area 
understand the theory?
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(3) Ability to generalise - does the theory apply to a wide range of situations in the 
substantive area?
(4) Control - does the theory allow the user some control over the "Structure and 
process of daily situations as they change through time?"
To address those questions, the researcher compared the substantive theory with the 
formal theory using the formal theory as secondary data. This comparison showed the 
similarities of the substantive theory to the formal theory improving the construct 
definitions and therefore the validity of the findings. The researcher could also identify 
the conflicting issues establishing the domain to which the study's findings could be 
analytically generalised. This comparison enabled the researcher to abstract from the 
substantive theory and through a deductive and intellectual process, developed the 
conceptual findings of this research which are explained in the Conclusions chapter.
3.11 Conclusion
This chapter depicts the methodology used in this research, namely grounded theory. 
The researcher chose the Strauss & Corbin (1998) approach which permitted him to 
predetermine the general subject of enquiry before entering the research site so that the 
he could also opt for a structured set of analytical steps to be taken in coding and 
analysing phenomena. Nevertheless, some elements of Glaser's (1992) approach, such 
as theoretical sensitivity together with reflexivity, were used. The researcher decided to 
use grounded theory because he could commence from a specific 'grounded in reality' 
event, pharmaceutical lobbying, with the intent of understanding the nature and 
rationale of observed incidents. The conditional matrix showed the relationship between 
the macro and micro conditions in the research process facilitating the analysis. The
coding and theoretical sampling were briefly commented. The researcher commented
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the discussion between the substantive and formal theory aimed at developing the 
conceptual findings. In the next chapter, the data collection strategies, the data analysis 
process and the building of concepts, sub-categories and the core category are 
explained.
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CHAPTER 4: DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the researcher described the context for the research which is the 
pharmacopolitics job in the multinational pharmaceutical industry in Argentina. He 
explained the data gathering strategies used (interviews, participant observation and 
archival data) and discussed researcher bias, reflexivity and ethical considerations. The 
interviews questions and the theoretical sampling were described. The researcher 
explained how the data were analysed and coded and how the sub-categories and the 
core category emerged.
4.2 Description of the research site and context for the research
When the researcher undertook this research the Argentine pharmaceutical market 
amounted to $2.1 billion (IMS November 2005) and was the fourth largest market in 
Latin America. IMS, an international company that audits the sales of pharmaceutical 
companies as Nielsen does for consumer companies, estimates that there are more than 
152 companies present in the Argentine market but there is a high concentration of sales 
within the top fifty companies. The research area is multinational pharmaceutical 
companies in Argentina and they account for a 46% of share of the prescription 
products market (the ethical market). There are 34 multinational pharmaceutical 
companies in Argentina. Eighteen of those had, within the last ten years, created the 
position of pharmapolitics manager. They accounted for 34% of the ethical 
pharmaceutical market in Argentina (IMS November 05). Seven companies had a 
manager performing the job of pharmacopolitics on a part time basis. Nine companies
did not have a pharmapolitics manager.
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The following graph shows the breakdown by company:














































































These companies were affiliates to CAEMe, the multinational company's chamber. 
CAEMe was, according to Salisbury (1984), a corporation that carries out lobbying for 
all the multinational companies. The Chamber carried out the lobbying in a cooperative 
way and Chapter Five examines this process.
125
It is remarkable to note that, on analysing the profile of the pharmacopolitics managers 
from the 18 companies, there was a low turnover rate and that the managers have been 
in the same job for a long period of time; most of them since the creation of the position 
ten years ago. Building long-term relationships was a key issue for the success of 
lobbying and this is explained later in Chapter Five. Only Sanofi-Aventis had a 
pharmapolitics manager with less than three years in the position and the reason being 
that restructuring took place when the two companies merged. Another variable was 
that individuals appointed came from within the company.
The following breakdown shows the length of time the managers have held the job. 











































American companies were the first to appoint pharmacopolitics managers and were 
more willing to do this because they had a similar position called managed care. The 
difference between the pharmapolitics manager in Argentina and the managed care
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manager in the USA was that in the US a separate body undertook the lobbying of 
legislators through hiring professional lobbyists. Once large American companies 
started hiring pharmacopolitics managers there was a domino effect and European 
companies followed this trend.
4.3 Data Gathering Strategies
As noted in the previous chapter, there are three main categories of data in grounded 
theory research: field data (observational notes), interview data (notes, recordings, 
transcripts) and any existing literature that may be useful to the research. It should be 
remarked on that due to the characteristics of lobbying almost all communication was 
verbal and there were almost no written memos or mails between managers and/or 
officials. The only existing (or visible) outputs of the process were the favourable 
published legislation that arose as a result of said lobbying. Neri (2002), deputy of the 
Parliament and ex-Minister of Health, confirmed the issue in saying that the 
pharmaceutical industry had received no media attention or interest groups in their 
lobbying activities; the financial industry was for Neri (2002) at the top of the scale. 
The researcher studied the directory of all Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in 
Argentina and there was only one focused on governmental issues: Centre Integral de 
Politicas Publicas para la equidad y el Crecimiento. On its website, no mention was 
made of pharmaceutical lobbying in congress or in the Ministry of Health and its 
dependencies. Felicio (2002) said that the only time that the industry was in the media, 
attacking or being attacked, was because a pharmaceutical company had paid for the 
campaign. Tobar (2002) stated that pharmaceutical company lobbying was always 
concealed. Lobbying was only noticed by insiders or by word of mouth and the 
legislation issued was noticed only by the pharmapolitics managers.
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Notes and detailed tape recording transcripts were taken for the research. The researcher 
examined this data from a variety of perspectives in order to develop the most rigorous 
explanations of the phenomenon being studied. Interviews were the predominant source 
of data followed by participant observation. The overall consideration was the 
generation of primary data that captured the thoughts and explanations of the 
respondents. The researcher considered previous existing literature as secondary data 
and used this to confront the emergent theory with previous existing theory to improve 
internal and external validity.
The researcher obtained data through a combination of three independent methods:
a) In depth interviews with pharmapolitics managers, marketing & sales managers, 
public and HMOs officials and external lobbyists.
b) Participant observation of pharmapolitics manager's behaviour.
c) Analysis of relevant documents. 
These three data collection strategies have been described below.
4.3.1 Researcher bias
Grounded theory involved the subjective interpretation of interviewees' views and 
actions in order to generate theory. The researcher's interpretation relied on an 
experiential and values framework that defined the meaning assigned to the 
observations. This included the interpretation of any data whether observed, heard or 
read. To clarify, this related to interviews conducted, behaviours observed and 
documents read.
Reflexivity was the process of reflecting critically on the 'self as a researcher (Cuba &
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Lincoln, 2001) within the research process. Because this thesis reflected the researcher's 
interpretation of complex interactions it was important to guard against the possible 
effects of his own subjectivity during the research process. Locke et al (1987) stressed 
the importance of the researcher being sensitive to his/her own biases, values, 
experiences and judgment. One way to deal with this bias is for researchers to elevate 
themselves to the centre stage through conscious recognition and explicit statement in 
their research reports (Cuba and Lincoln, 1981). According to Bailey (1994) the 
identification and recording of researcher bias served two purposes. First, the explicit 
acknowledgment of bias ameliorated the potential effect of that bias. Second, recording 
biases in the research write-up made it easier for those evaluating the research to assess 
its objectivity.
The researcher had a deep interest in pharmaceutical lobbying and was working as a 
pharmapolitics manager for Alcon Laboratories in Buenos Aires and thus had a high 
degree of sensitivity to the research area. The researcher became aware of reflexivity 
(Guba & Lincoln, 2001), where the perspectives of the researcher could affect the 
research and the substantive theory being developed. Being the inquirer in all the cases, 
the researcher came to terms not only with those with whom he engaged in the 
interviews but with his own position in the research setting. Within the study the 
researcher tried to maintain theoretical sensitivity and checked out against the data 
gathered by the process of constant comparative analysis. In this way, the researcher 
remained focused on the data and the development of the substantive theory of 
pharmaceutical lobbying rather than an analysis of himself or allowing preconceived 
ideas to derail the analysis. The objective of the researcher was to be detached from his 
high degree of sensitivity to the topic and, through the iterative and constant 
comparison, focus on the data and the relationship between the different concepts,
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conditions, dimensions, properties, actions and interactions. The main and most 
important issue was to diminish bias and for the researcher to remain aware of the effect 
of potential bias on the research process. The researcher tried to protect this work from 
any unwanted bias however, at the same time, recognising that subjectivity would 
always be present.
4.3.2 Ethical considerations
Within the terms of this research project ethical issues arose particularly in the conduct 
of field research. In relation to the university's policy on ethical issues the autonomy of 
individuals was respected through coding responses to provide anonymity and thus to 
protect them from harm. All participants received a code letter and the code letter was 
used in the transcriptions of all the interviews. The researcher kept the code key in a 
safe and the interview transcripts were stored in a computer room in a closed box 
without label. The researcher kept all notes taken in another closed box without label. 
The researcher wrote no e-mails concerning the transcripts of the interview tapes and all 
computer files were password protected. Confidentiality was granted and the researcher 
emphasised that no responses would be construed as representing either the particular 
respondent or their specific company. The idea was to eliminate respondents concerns 
about socially undesirable responses that might negatively reflect upon them or their 
companies.
All participants were thoroughly briefed on the nature and aims of the research project. 
The researcher gave a verbal and written description of the project (in Spanish) to the 
participants. The respondents also had a consent form and the right to withdraw at any 
moment. Consent was recorded in the written form signed by the participants and these 
were also kept in a closed box in the researcher's home.
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The process for conducting field research was drawn up to ensure consistency across 
subjects and fair treatment. Attention was paid to ensure that the project was carried out 
with integrity, ensuring that the research methods proposed were followed in a way that 
was consistent with the methodology adopted, regardless of any pressure from subjects 
to take certain alternative stances. The researcher's employer was not used as a subject. 
Resources provided by the university were maximised, along with any data resources 
that were provided by the subjects in support of this research.
4.3.3 lnte)~vie\vs
The researcher chose semi-structured interviews as the main data gathering strategy 
because of the possibility of getting information without the constraints of a 
questionnaire. In an interview the researcher was able to follow up the ideas, probe 
responses and investigate motives (apparent or hidden). The researcher was also able to 
introduce additional questions during the interview so that each idea was dealt with 
extensively and new ideas could also emerge.
The researcher, through his role as a pharmapolitics manager, was granted easy access 
to other managers as well as public and HMOs officials. Most interviews took place in 
offices of the respondents but in neutral locations (hotel lobbies) in two cases. The 
respondents received no fees for the interviews. Issues regarding current work were 
discussed at the beginning of the meeting so that the second part of the interview was 
devoted only to the research project. The researcher recorded the interviews after 
receiving the written consent of the respondents. Planning the interviews was time 
consuming as agendas were full and it took longer than expected for the interviews to 
take place.
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Six pilot interviews took place in June 2002 with two top officials at the Ministry of 
Health (Dr. Federico Tobar and Dr. Nestor Vazquez), one Deputy of Congress and ex- 
Minister of Health (Dr. Aldo Neri), one advisor to a deputy of Congress (Mr. Carlos 
Vasallo), the President of the Multinationals Chamber (Mr. Nestor Felicio) and the 
external affairs manager of the Multinationals Chamber (Dr. Victor Quinones). The 
interviews were semi-structured with a list of topics to be developed as the interview 
progressed.These interviews were useful in the design of the research proposal and 
defined the context in which pharmaceutical lobbying was taking place. These six 
interviews were the basis of the development of the research design.
The research interviews took place between May 2005 and January 2006. Data 
gathering and analysis was performed concomitantly with the process of interviewing. 
The researcher developed a fixed set of questions for the semi-structured interviews.
Preliminary sub-categories were built in the first three interviews and the later
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interviews focused on the discovery of additional data which could create new sub- 
categories or saturate the existing ones. Saturation of theory with the interviews of 
pharmacopolitics managers came after the sixth interview. The two additional 
interviews realised no additional information.
Triangulation with public and HMO officials was important as it gave additional depth 
to the theory and reinforced the concepts related to how pharmacopolitics managers 
performed their duties. The researcher decided to incorporate health care lobbyists that 
occasionally worked for the pharmaceutical industry as additional respondents. These 
additional respondents worked for distributors, wholesalers, chambers and other 
performers in the pharmaceutical industry. These interviewees were not in the original 
planning of the research but they proved to be extremely valuable to describe, from the 
perspective of outsiders, the lobbying performed by pharmacopolitics managers and the 
pharmaceutical industry. The information gathered from these people was also 
extremely useful in consolidating the emergent theory with another perspective. 
Lobbyists from the chamber, distributors and free-lancers enriched the research with 
new information that contributed to the saturation of the already found sub-categories 
and provided new concepts, sub-concepts, properties and dimensions. The following 
table shows the breakdown, by type, of interviewee in the second stage of the interview 
process:














The researcher interviewed all informants once and the first three respondents two 
times. The second interviews with pharmacopolitics managers enabled the verification, 
clarification and elaboration of information obtained during the first interview as well as 
the crosschecking of information acquired from other industry lobbyists. It also helped 
to resolve factual inconsistencies. Interviewing ceased when saturation of the major 
theoretical sub-categories had occurred.
The researcher contacted all interviewees personally, explained the research to them and 
invited them to participate. Respondents were advised that participation in the study was 
voluntary and that they could withdraw from the study at any time. In addition, the 
researcher explained that the report would maintain their anonymity and that no means 
of identification would be retained in the transcripts of the interviews. All of the people 
approached agreed to take part on this basis and all freely gave their permission for the 
interview to be recorded. The researcher gave the interviewees a consent form with the 
withdrawal clause. Interviews ranged from 30 minutes to a maximum of one hour.The 
interviewees were all very open, spoke freely and provided deep rich data. Nevertheless, 
in almost all interviews the researcher perceived a guarded reticence on the issue of 
contribution payments. All respondents explained the issue itself but the language used 
avoided the issue: that a corrupt act was taking place or that any inference of a bribe 
was occurring.
The researcher used theoretical sampling to look for cases that maximised opportunities 
for comparative analysis. The aim of the research was not reliability but the validity of
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the findings. No pilot sample was performed in this stage of the research as the total 
population of pharmacopolitics managers was very small and highly specific so the 
researcher could not afford to use up any part of the sample.
The interviewees were also chosen because of their representativeness and by their 
expertise in the job. All respondents had been more than 5 years in the job.














The educational qualifications of the pharmacopolitics managers were not an issue at 
the time of their appointment as they had been recruited from sales forces as 
experienced and trusted people. On the contrary, the other respondents had higher 
academic experiences that enabled them to go further in the ranks due to their technical 
qualifications.
















Interviewing ceased when saturation of the major theoretical sub-categories had 
occurred.
4.3.3:1 The Interview Questions
"Grounded Theory entails two basic analytical procedures. Firstly, one continually 
makes comparisons and secondly one asks questions" (Howell, 2000, p. 129). The 
research questions for this research were:
a) Why do multinational pharmaceutical companies in Argentina lobby officials?
b) How do multinational pharmaceutical companies carry out lobbying activities?
Additional basic questions such as "what" and "who" arose from the process of the 
development of the research but these were not issues a priori. The question "why" 
reflected the incentives of pharmaceutical companies to influence legislation. The 
question "how" reflected how the process was undertaken: whether it was alone or in a 
cooperative way, or through contribution payments or the transmission of information. 
These research questions were the basis, together with the previous existing literature, 
for the creation of a fixed set of questions for the interviews. The researcher modified 
the approach to these questions to adapt to the different perspectives, whether the 
interviewee was a pharmapolitics manager or 'other'. The questions helped to ensure 
same information was in all the interviews and facilitated the process of coding and 
building the categories. The questions were open and aimed at enhancing the richness of 
the data; they also permitted the researcher to probe in depth each of the responses. The 
interviews generated the most important data for this research. The questions were as
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follows:
Figure 2 Fixed Set of questions
a) Who are the officials that pharmaceutical companies choose as targets for 
lobbying?
b) What do you think are the key motivations for pharmaceutical companies to 
lobby public and HMO officials?
c) What are the objectives that you seek when you lobby officials?
d) Who are the participants in the process of pharmaceutical lobbying?
e) What do you think are the key issues for success when you engage in lobbying?
f) How would you describe the process of pharmaceutical lobbying?
g) Which strategy do you follow if you want to influence an official?
h) How much relevance do you give to scientific information in the process of
lobbying? 
i) Are there other non-scientific instruments that you use to achieve your
objective?
j) When a lobbying process is not successful, what do you do next? 
k) Is pharmaceutical lobbying carried out alone or in a cooperative way? 
1) Do you think that it is possible to free-ride?
Questions a), d), e), f), g), h), i), j), k) and 1) are aimed to answer the research question: 
How do multinational pharmaceutical companies carry out lobbying activities? 
Questions b) and c) look to answer the research question: Why do multinational 
pharmaceutical companies carry out lobbying activities? Formal lobbying theory was 
used initially to help formulate the fixed set of questions and the relationship of the 
interview questions to the formal theory is the following:
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Question a) Who are the officials that pharmaceutical companies choose as targets for 
lobbying? was not included by the researcher in the first three interviews. After the open 
coding of these interviews, the researcher realised that there was one element present in 
the interviews and missing in the questions. The researcher on reflection realised that 
the question "Who is the target for pharmaceutical lobbying?" was missing. The micro- 
theory of lobbying corroborated this issue pointing out that members of congress and 
the HMOs officials were the target for lobbying in the USA (Public Citizen Congress 
Watch ( 2002, 2004), Dranove (2003), Studin (2002)). The question was aimed at 
developing theory about which officials are the target of lobbying in Argentina. 
The questions b) What do you think are the key motivations for pharmaceutical 
companies to lobby public and HMO officials? and c) What are the objectives that you 
seek when you lobby officials? followed the macro, meso and micro-theory of lobbying 
in which interest groups or lobbying actors have a motivation to influence the officials 
(Olson (1965), Moe (1980), Salisbury (1984), Howell (2004), Kirchner (1980), Woll 
(2006), Grossman & Helpman (1994, 1995), Maggie and Rodriguez Clare (2000), 
Potters and van Winden (1992), Ainsworth (1993), Austen-Smith and Wright (1992), 
Lohmann (1993, 1995), Lagerlof (1997), Bennedsen and Feldmann (2001), Public 
Citizen, (2002, 2004), Studin (2002), Dranove (2003), Glabman (2004)). The micro- 
theory described specific reasons as a protection against competition, preservation of the 
freedom of prices, tax breaks and the introduction of products in formularies (Public 
Citizen, (2002, 2004), Studin (2002), Dranove (2003), Glabman (2004)). The two 
questions aimed to identify the motivations of the pharmaceutical industry. 
The question d) Who are the participants in the process of pharmaceutical lobbying?
was based on the macro-theory of lobbying in which Woll (2006) identified that 
lobbying is carried out by interest groups and other actors. The question tried to identify
the lobbying actors; either interests groups or companies in the process of
138
pharmaceutical lobbying.
The question e) What do you think are the key issues for success "when vou engage in 
lobbying? was based on the micro-theory of lobbying, in which the pharmaceutical 
industry in the USA had different elements to achieve success such as information, the 
lobby of the American Chamber, PACs, external lobbyists, the use of managed care 
account managers and rebates to HMOs (Public Citizen (2002, 2004), Studin (2002), 
Glabman (2004), Pilnick, Dingwall & Starkey (2001)). The question was aimed at 
identifying the key issues for success in Argentina.
Questions f) How would you describe the process of pharmaceutical lobbying? and g) 
Which strategy do you follow if you want to influence an official? were based on the 
meso-theory of lobbying that explains how lobbying is carried out and aimed at 
discovering how this lobbying process is in Argentina (Grossman & Helpman (1994, 
1995), Maggie and Rodriguez Clare (2000), Potters and van Winden (1992), Ainsworth 
(1993), Austen-Smith and Wright (1992), Lohmann (1993, 1995), Lagerlof (1997), 
Bennedsen and Feldmann (2001)). The two questions aimed at a spontaneous 
description by the interviewee about whether he/she uses transmission of information or 
contribution payments as a lobbying instrument.
Question h) How much relevance do you give to scientific information in the process of 
lobbying? was based on the meso-theory of lobbying and the transmission of 
information (Potters and van Winden (1992), Ainsworth (1993), Austen-Smith and 
Wright (1992), Lohmann (1993, 1995), Lagerlof (1997), Bennedsen and Feldmann 
(2001)). The researcher intended to establish the importance in the lobbying process 
given to the transmission of information.
Question i) Are there other non-scientific instruments that you use to achieve your 
objective? was an implicit way of asking about the issue of contribution payments as it
was one of the two channels of influence described in the meso-theory of lobbying
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(Grossman & Helpman (1994, 1995), Maggie and Rodriguez Clare (2000)). The aim of
this question was to explore the use of contribution payments in pharmaceutical
lobbying.
Question j) When a lobbying process is not successful, what do you do next? was based
on the meso-theory of lobbying in which the lobbyists had to carry out counteractive
lobbying when the decision of the official was not favourable to their interests (Aidt,
(1997) Austen-Smith and Wright (1992)). The question was designed to discover which
strategy was taken when there was initially no success.
Question k) Is pharmaceutical lobbying carried out alone or in a cooperative way? was
based on the meso-theory of lobbying in the building of coalitions to lobby (Rama and
Tabellini (1998), Howell (2004), Aidt (1997), Graziano (2001), Hula (1999), Hojnacki
(1997), Almeida (2005)). The researcher aimed at identifying when coalitions were
used.
Question 1) Do you think that it is possible to free-ride? was based on the Olson (1965) 
theory of free-ride in interest groups. The objective of this question was to find out 
whether it was possible to free-ride on the lobbying of other interest groups or lobbying 
actors.
4.3.4 Participant Observation
Participant observation was used as a significant additional means of data collection in 
the study. The researcher as a pharmapolitics manager interacted with most of the 
respondents on a regular basis through meetings in the Chamber of Multinational 
Pharmaceutical Companies or other meetings with topics related to pharmacopolitics. 
The researcher could also see the interaction of the managers with public officials and 
HMO officials and the way lobbying was performed in numerous cases. The researcher
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also saw how in a cooperative way lobbying was exerted by the Chamber or by groups 
of companies in order to achieve a certain objective favourable for the industry or for a 
group of companies. The researcher kept a diary and made field notes about relevant 
situations in which he was involved.
As Spradley (1980) noted, the participant observer's objective in entering as a 
researcher-participant in a social situation was essentially to engage in activities that 
were appropriate to the situation and, from this vantage point, to observe and interpret 
the activities, people, and physical aspects of the situation. The researcher decided to 
undertake the study during his current job at Alcon and was thus in an ideal position to 
collect data as a legitimate observer who was immersed in the culture of the system. 
Saville-Troike (1982) suggested that one of the advantages of studying one's own 
culture from the inside, so to speak, in an effort to make explicit what has not been 
stated and perhaps unconscious systems of understanding, was the researcher's ability 
to use himself as a direct source of information and interpretation. To use this method 
effectively the researcher was aware of the context, institutions and values that guide 
cultural behaviour in the community that was being studied. The researcher also had to 
be also aware of his 'self in the research process, to try to diminish subjectivity in the 
interpretation of the findings. Reflexivity was always taken into account by the 
researcher and through focus on the data and the iterative comparison process, the 
researcher tried to minimise subjectivity but at the same time, he recognised that 
subjectivity would always be present.
In the present study, the researcher was clearly accepted as a member of the 
establishment and as a genuine participant in the process of pharmaceutical lobbying. 
The researcher also believed that the fact of being a participant facilitated the gathering 
of the data as respondents did not appear to be constrained in their reactions or
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behaviour towards the researcher. The field notes that were described earlier played a 
vital role in the interpretation of the process as the research progressed.
4.3.5 Analysis of relevant documents
As mentioned before, almost all communication in pharmaceutical lobbying was verbal 
and there were almost no written memos or mails between managers and/or officials. 
Neither interest groups nor the media have dedicated their attention to pharmaceutical 
lobbying. The only existing (or visible) outputs of the process of lobbying were the 
favourable published legislation clauses that arose through the process of lobbying. This 
legislation was public and was published in the Boletin Oficial, a government 
publication where all laws, decrees and edicts must be published to be implemented. 
Respondent K (EX) stated that the most relevant issues in the last years have been 
modifications to the National Formulary prompted by multinational companies. This 
formulary was very restrictive and the lobbying of certain multinationals caused some 
drugs to be introduced. Another issue was the modifications introduced to the Reference 
Prices decree and to the Generics Law (Respondent B, PH) but this time the lobby was 
done by the whole industry (national and multinational). These modifications improved 
the competitive situation of established companies towards new generic companies. 
This additional information from the output of the lobby was cross-checked with the 
information provided by the respondents so that information could be validated and 
grounded in the data.
4.4 Data Analysis
This part focuses on how the data was analysed and how the grounded theory 
methodology was used to build a substantive theory. The emergent theory has been
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presented in chapter five.
When the research was first planned it was thought that there would be two areas of 
analysis:
1. pharmaceutical lobbying of the HMOs
2. pharmaceutical lobbying of public officials
There were two targets initially because there seemed to be differences in the way 
pharmacopolitics managers approached public and HMO officials. The data, after 
analysis and coding of the interviews and going through the inductive process of 
grounded theory, showed no great difference between the approaches of the 
pharmacopolitics managers towards either group of officials. Therefore both groups 
were treated as the sample and were integrated in one group referred to as "officials".
4.4.1 Initial Analysis
The first case chosen was interviewed in May 2005 following theoretical sampling. The 
interviewee was a pharmapolitics manager of a medium size company who had 
previously worked for a large company and was chosen because of his apparent 
expertise and understanding of the lobbying process. The researcher used the fixed set 
of questions for the interview. The interview was semi-structured and provided rich data 
for the analysis and coding. The interview was transcribed and analysed word-by-word, 
line-by-line and phrase-by-phrase. Not only did the researcher look for literal meaning 
but also for the hidden meanings and sub-texts that the interviewee expressed. Much 
interpretative work was undertaken to elucidate the meaning of certain phrases. The fact 
that the researcher was a pharmacopolitics manager certainly helped in this process. The 
researcher's familiarity with the research subject also enhanced the theoretical
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sensitivity and he carried out the open coding process giving labels to activities, 
contexts, functions, relationships, influences and outcomes. Those labels were 
integrated into conceptual codes to each incident highlighted within the data. The 
richness of the interview permitted the identification of an important quantity of 
concepts, properties, phenomenon, dimensions and intervening conditions. The constant 
interaction with the data and listening to what the data implied enabled a refinement of 
the initial concepts and properties.
The second and third interviews took place in July 2005 and transcribing and open 
coding of these interviews took place immediately afterwards. The responses were 
analysed meticulously and compared them constantly with the first in order to validate 
the concepts, sub-concepts and properties. The interviews confirmed concepts already 
found or add new concepts that arose from the data. Some concepts grew in relevance 
compared to the first interview and others lost significance.
The researcher reviewed the first interview again and realised that similar incidents and 
phenomena were present in different concepts and sub-concepts so that he assimilated 
them into broader concepts. The researcher reviewed the interviews looking for context, 
conditions, interactions and consequences to be able to identify the structure where the 
research was taking place. The researcher then began with the process of axial coding 
identifying relationships between concepts, sub-concepts and properties for the purpose 
of developing categories. Sub-categories emerged as aggregates of the most closely 
interrelated elements. As the researcher finished this stage of open-coding and axial 
coding it was possible to identify 10 sub-categories, 28 concepts and 30 sub-concepts,
144












These 10 sub-categories were so strongly supported over the duration of the research 
that they were found as sub-categories in their own right, or properties of other sub- 
categories at the conclusion of the research.
Three additional pharmacopolitics managers were interviewed during August 2005. The 
researcher carried out the open coding process looking for new concepts, properties or
dimensions. The researcher noticed that no additional information arose from the open
1 The labels included in the Appendix show only a selection of those identified in the process of open 
coding.
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coding process so that the researcher was not satisfied with the outcome. The results of 
the interviews, although rich in information, did not consider certain aspects that the 
researcher, as an observer, was able to identify. It seemed to the researcher that the 
pharmacopolitics managers did not consider the whole process and they were only 
considering the issues from a point of view that was based solely on their daily work. At 
this stage, the possibility of building new theory from the data seemed limited. Elements 
such as free-riding or cooperative lobbying were missing. The researcher decided to 
interview two additional pharmacopolitics managers in September 2005 however the 
results were not overly different to the previous interviews.
To deal with this problem the researcher changed tactics and decided not to continue 
with interviews before analysing two interviews carried out in July 2005; of a public 
official and an HMO official. The researcher reviewed the transcripts and carried out the 
open coding process and concluded that the information only validated the concepts 
already found.
At this stage, the researcher decided to follow a piece of advice given to him by his 
supervisor in April 2005: "If you have access to the people, just interview everyone who 
is related to the subject, do the transcription and coding and hopefully you will discover 
substantive theory".
The researcher decided to interview not only officials as planned in the research design 
but other participants in pharmaceutical lobbying. Interviews were carried out between 
October 2005 and December 2005. Officials were interviewed first because they were 
active participants in the pharmaceutical lobbying process. The relationship with 
pharmacopolitics managers and pharmaceutical companies was regularly discussed and 
some of them talked about the economic restraints of the HMOs or the government,
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emphasising the role of industry as a third payer through rebates. The researcher noticed 
a negative attitude towards the contributions of the industry aimed at alleviating the 
financial restraints of the HMDs; the general feeling was that the pharmaceutical 
industry was a necessary evil. The interviews were open coded and transcribed and they 
helped to consolidate the concepts already found.
Officials support the validity of the already existing concepts but important elements 
were missing. The researcher then decided to interview lobbyists not from the 
pharmaceutical companies but from companies related to them. Two were health care 
free-lance lobbyists who sometimes worked for the pharmaceutical industry; one was 
the general manager of a distribution company and the other a general manager of the 
multinational companies' chamber. These four people were external to the 
pharmacopolitics inner ring but acted as pharmaceutical industry lobbyists on certain 
occasions. Through the interviews the researcher was able to explore aspects that were 
absent in the other interviews. These interviewees were not participants of the lobbying 
process but outsider observers. This distance and lack of involvement in the 
pharmapolitics manager-official lobbying process gave them a wider perspective of 
"what was really happening" (Glaser, 1978, p.57). They provided a great deal of 
information which helped both to validate the existing concepts, sub-concepts and 
properties and provide new data for the open coding process. The researcher carried out 
the open coding of the external lobbyists interviews labelling concepts, sub-concepts, 
dimensions and properties. The researcher regrouped the data and began the process of 
axial coding again; at first he looked for the saturation of the existing sub-categories 
analysing the concepts, properties and dimensions. Secondly, he identified relationship 
between the new concepts, sub-concepts and properties developing new sub-categories 
and concepts. The researcher had, at this stage, 15 sub-categories 43 concepts and 44
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sub-concepts (Appendix 2)2. The sub-categories were the following:
Figure 3 Second set of sub- categories
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Following the research design, sales directors of companies with no pharmacopolitics 
managers were also interviewed. The researcher decided to leave them for last, as the
The labels included in the Appendix show only a selection of those identified in the process of open
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aim of interviewing them was to assess the free-rider effect. During December 2005 the 
researcher interviewed two sales directors and one marketing director from companies 
without pharmacopolitics managers to evaluate their perceptions about 
pharmacopolitics. All of them recognised that it was an important issue in the Argentine 
pharmaceutical market. Two respondents told the researcher that they relied on the 
Chamber for lobbying with the HMOs. The other one was evaluating the possibility of 
introducing the position in his company for the next year. Asked about free-riding, the 
researcher was told that they did not see it as a possibility as anyone free-riding is 
punished because of their attitude. The researcher coded these interviews and they 
provided some data for the saturation of the free-riding concept which was previously 
identified. No additional concepts arose from these interviews. The researcher dealt 
with this in detail in the substantive theory chapter.
4.4.2 Re-categorisinz the data
After having finished the planned interviews, the researcher decided to interview the 
first three pharmapolitics managers again with these new elements provided by external 
lobbyists. The interviews were aimed at assessing the perspectives outlined by the 
external lobbyists. That was done in January 2006. The researcher carried out the open 
coding of the interviews and he considered that the data gathering process was finished 
as the sub-categories were saturated.
At this stage, the researcher went back to the data and started to re-categorise labels and 
refined the sub-categories and concepts. As mentioned previously, the researcher had, at 
this stage, 15 sub-categories, 43 concepts and 44 sub-concepts. The researcher was
coding
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aware that for the selective coding, it was essential to refine the sub-categories and 
concepts. The researcher knew that with the information he had the main issue was to 
refine the sub-categories so that it would be possible to proceed to the selective coding 
stage. The researcher came back to the sub-categories and began again with the process 
of axial coding looking at the concepts, properties, dimensions and relationships 
between the sub-categories in order to refine further these categories. After this process 
seven sub-categories emerged which were rich in detail and supported by the data. The 
following chart depicts the integration of the categories.
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The linking together of these sub-categories now emerged as the main objective. The 
researcher began with the selective coding as Strauss and Corbin (1990, p. 15.) stated 
"Selective coding is the process by which all categories are unified around a core 
category". Selective coding required the selection of the seven sub-categories that 
emerged from the axial coding process. All other sub-categories or concepts were 
related in some way to these categories, either directly or indirectly. In this way a 
theoretical framework of interrelated concepts developed showing relationships between 
the concepts and the sub-categories. These concepts were identified in answer to the 
questions of 'what was the central activity occurring here, what were the conditioning or 
influencing concepts, what were the observable outcomes and were any intervening 
concepts and variables being represented. The selective coding stage focused in defining 
the core category. The seven categories (target for lobbying, motivations, participants, 
product, building trust, strategy and cooperative lobbying) derived from the core 
category, which in this research was pharmaceutical lobbying. This core category
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integrated the seven sub-categories and it represented the main theme of the research. 
Pharmaceutical lobbying as a category has analytical power. It has the power to pull the 
other sub-categories together to form an explanatory whole. The seven sub-categories 
interacted and thus created the core category of pharmaceutical lobbying. Selective 
coding integrated the research; it put the story straight, provided analysis, identified the 
core category and illustrated how major categories were related.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter described the research site and the context so that the reader can 
understand the context in which the research was carried out; the focus was the people 
who held the job of pharmacopolitics in the multinational pharmaceutical companies in 
Argentina. It depicts the data gathering strategies used: interviews, participant 
observation and relevant documents. Interviews were the main source of information for 
this research. The interviewees' practical knowledge was analysed and the theoretical 
frameworks constructed looking for saturation across cases. Six pilot interviews and 
twenty five in-depth semi-structured interviews were carried out. These interviews 
provided the basis for the data analysis and coding. Participant observation brought 
additional data for the validation of the data. Relevant documents were scarce and the 
only documents found were the legislation that arose from the lobbying process.
The data analysis process was also described in the analysis of the data and the 
consequent building of concepts, dimensions and sub-categories. Theoretical sampling 
looked for the richness of the data. Interviews were transcribed and analysed. Open 
coding was implemented to find concepts, properties and dimensions. The researcher 
followed the steps of Strauss and Corbin (1998) but realised that the process was not 
linear at all and had to emulate Donald Schon (1991) in the "Reflective Practitioner"
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when he changed a student's prototype of a building in order to adapt it to a slope. The 
researcher also decided to introduce changes to the research design as he realised that 
important information was missing. The analysis of the open coding stage indicated to 
the researcher that it was necessary to broaden the scope of interviewees by introducing 
external lobbyists. This additional data proved to be very important in the formulation 
of the sub-categories and the saturation of them. Axial coding was used to integrate the 
concepts, properties and dimensions in the sub-categories. This was an iterative process 
of refining the categories until in the end seven were found: target for lobbying, 
motivations, participants, product, building trust, strategy and cooperative lobbying. 
The researcher then went through the process of selective coding aimed at finding the 
core categories. The researcher found only one core category that relates to all of the 
others together and that is pharmaceutical lobbying. On the next chapter, the researcher 
describes how the substantive theory was developed.
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CHAPTER 5: DEVELOPING SUBSTANTIVE THEORY
5.1 Introduction
Goulding (2002) stated that there was no strict formula for the presentation of grounded 
theory. On the other hand Glaser and Strauss (1967, p.31) provide two ways to present 
grounded theory results: "Grounded theory can be presented either as a well-codified set 
of propositions or in a running theoretical discussion using conceptual categories and 
their properties".
The researcher presented the findings using a running theoretical discussion to develop 
the sub-categories, concepts and properties. The researcher outlined a substantive theory 
in such a way that it demonstrated how concepts emerged and developed from the data, 
how the researcher moved from the descriptive through the inductive-deductive process 
of abstraction and how the core category was generated. This chapter describes in detail 
the process that led to the development of substantive theory and provides 
corresponding quotations that give additional weight to the conceptual theory to make it 
clear that emergent theory is grounded in the data.
This research was an attempt to describe why and how multinational companies in 
Argentina carry out pharmaceutical lobbying. The research has gone some way towards 
bridging the gap between theory and practice.
5.2 Interview questions and interviewee time table
"Grounded Theory entails two basic analytical procedures. Firstly one continually 
makes comparisons and secondly one asks questions" (Howell, 2000, p. 129). The 
interview process provided the main source of data for this research. The research
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questions, the pilot interviews and formal theory were the basis for the fixed questions. 
These questions were adapted in relation to the respondents' profiles and some 
questions changed if the respondent was an official or a sales or marketing director. As 
mentioned previously the autonomy of interviewees was respected through coding 
responses to provide anonymity and thus to protect them from harm. This coding might 
be confusing when reading the quotes of respondents. The following table presents the 
interviewee coding and the interview timetable to facilitate the reader the identification 
of the respondents. For quoting, the researcher has adopted the following abbreviations: 
Pharmacopolitics Manager (PH), External lobbyist (EX), HMO Official (HO), Public 
Official (PU) and Sales Director or Marketing Director (SD)
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The profile shows the characteristics of the respondent, whether he/she was a 
pharmacopolitics manager, an official, an external lobbyist or a Sales/Marketing 
Director. The questions helped to provide the same information in all the interviews and
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facilitated the process of coding and building the categories. The questions were open, 
aimed at enhancing the richness of the data and the questions permitted the researcher to 
probe further the responses. The semi-structured interview questions were:
1. Who are the officials that pharmaceutical companies choose as targets for 
lobbying?
2. What do you think are the key motivations for pharmaceutical companies 
to lobby Public and HMO officials?
3. What are the objectives that you seek when you lobby officials?
4. Who are the participants in the process of pharmaceutical lobbying?
5. What do you think are the key issues for success -when you engage in 
lobbying?
6. How would you describe the process of pharmaceutical lobbying?
7. Which strategy do you follow if you want to influence an official?
8. How much relevance do you give to scientific information in the process of 
lobbying?
9. Are there other non-scientific instruments that you use to achieve your 
objective?
10. When a lobbying process is not successful, what do you do next?
11. Is pharmaceutical lobbying carried out alone or in a cooperative way?
12. Do you think that it is possible to free-ride?
Questions 2 y 3 although similar are different in the context of the language, Spanish, in 
which they were formulated. Motivations, in Spanish, referred to the reasons why 
pharmaceutical companies carried out lobbying to officials. Objectives described the 
specific goals to be achieved through lobbying e.g. the introduction of a certain product 
in a formulary. The researcher used both questions to collect the information from two
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different perspectives: the strategic one (motivations) and the tactical (objectives). In 
question 8, scientific information referred to the information about a product or 
technology given to the official aimed at influencing a policy decision. Cooperative 
lobbying in question 11, focused on the lobbying carried out in a coalition, either the 
chamber or a group of companies. Free- ride in question 12, referred to those companies 
that attempted to benefit from the cooperative lobbying without contributing with the 
costs of this lobbying.
5.5 The interview results
The researcher asked the same questions in the same order to all interviewees in order to 
facilitate the process of the open coding of the data. The questions in the interviews 
permitted the collection of sufficient data to build the substantive theory and the 
interviews allowed the construction of sub-categories around the core category of 
pharmaceutical lobbying. The twelve questions permitted the building of seven sub- 
categories.
Question one (Sub-Category = Target for lobbying)
Who are the officials that pharmaceutical companies choose as targets for lobbying?
At the beginning of the research, there were only eleven questions. At that stage, the 
researcher began the interviews with question number two which was about the 
motivations of pharmacopolitics managers in lobbying officials. After the coding of the 
initial three interviews the researcher decided that there was an additional element to 
take into account. In the first three interviews the respondents mentioned that it was 
important to lobby officials and not physicians. The researcher, on reflection, decided 
that the question: "Who is the target for pharmaceutical lobbying?" was missing. The
researcher included this question in the next interviews and it became clear that the
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target for lobbying was the officials. None of the respondents considered physicians as 
decision referents in the lobbying process. Not even opinion leaders3 were essential in 
the introduction of products in the formularies. In the cases where physicians were 
acting as officials then the pharmaceutical companies regarded them as exactly this and 
took no notice of their profession in the lobbying process.
"...these new pharmapolitics managers are not related to the old managers or sales 
managers, whose task was to convince the physicians about the therapeutic qualities of 
a product or to train and motivate the sales representatives to achieve this objective. 
Today, this manager is a highly skilled negotiator who has to deal with the official of 
the HMO who is another negotiator with opposed interests to that of the pharmaceutical 
company" (Interviewee J, EX).
One respondent mentioned opinion leaders as important but only in the context of 
companies that did not lobby the officials.
"...there are a few pharmaceutical companies that do not lobby and they have a niche 
product; this product is not incorporated in the formularies and not even in the PMO 
(national formulary). These companies work with opinion leaders as the pathologies are 
very specific. These pathologies are treated by, let us say, 500 to 1000 physicians in the 
whole country. These companies work with the medical associations focusing their 
promotions on the physician" (Interviewee A, PH).
30pinion leaders, or "thought leaders", are respected individuals, such as prominent medical school 
faculty, who influence physicians through their professional status. Pharmaceutical companies generally 
engage key opinion leaders early in the drug development process to provide advocacy and key marketing 
feedback.
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Consequently, officials were the lobbying target of the pharmaceutical companies. 
Even then the researcher realised that there was, in all the pharmacopolitics manager 
interviews, always a comparison between the relationship between pharmaceutical 
company-physicians and pharmaceutical company-officials. On analysing these 
comments, the concept of the transfer of decision power from the physician to the 
official began to gain relevance. The researcher returned to the data and explored the 
concept until he reached a new understanding of the issue involved: the officials were 
replacing physicians as "experts" in the area.
"...HMDs delegate this power of decision making to professionals...they should prove 
first that the product is effective...and second that it should benefit the HMO" 
(Interviewee I, EX).
The next interviews ratified this concept. There was a change of focus for the 
pharmaceutical company; from the ambit of the physician to the official. This change 
was motivated by a transfer in the decision making process. It was no longer the 
physician who decided what to prescribe but the official who indicated to the physician 
what to prescribe.
"The company's customer changes from being exclusively the physician to be a 
combination between the physicians and the HMDs who are responsible for the 
reimbursement of the drug. HMOs are deciding what the physician prescribes, 
narrowing the prescription alternatives in the formularies" (Interviewee B, PH).
"Research on who is responsible for the incorporation of a product in the formulary is 
the initial step; is he the auditor or the medical practices manager?" (Interviewee A, 
PH).
The pharmaceutical industry previously promoted the drugs to the physician alone and
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the physician had the authority to prescribe what was best for the patient. If the patient 
complied with the physician's prescription, he/she purchased the pharmaceutical 
product. The person with the knowledge to diagnose the right disease and to indicate 
the right medicine was the physician. The pharmaceutical companies had no influence 
in patients regarding medicines which need a prescription. It was illegal for 
pharmaceutical companies to promote these medicines which need prescription directly 
to the patient. The physician was the individual who had the power to decide what was 
the best drug for the patient. Pharmaceutical companies promoted the medicines that 
needed a prescription only to physicians. This was the classical industry-physician- 
patient relationship. Respondents mentioned that with the introduction of restricted 
formularies the physician lost his/her freedom to prescribe. A closed formulary is a 
restricted list of products that limits reimbursement to specific products: the list is 
given to physicians and pharmacists to guide them in the prescribing and dispensing of 
pharmaceutical products. Physicians were compelled to prescribe the products that 
were in the formulary even if there was a better alternative for the patient. The official 
took the role of expert and decided which products should be included in the 
formularies. There was a transfer of power of decision making from the physician to the 
official. The physician diagnosed the disease but he/she is no longer decided what to 
prescribe- the official now took that decision.
"...the official issues strict rules to the physicians; when the physician works in a clinic 
with an internal pharmacy, the official tells the pharmacist to replace products for the 
ones in the formulary. Officials exclude on purpose some products from the 
formulary..." (Interviewee B, PH).
The pharmaceutical industry, through its pharmacopolitics managers, changed its habits 
because of this situation: still promoting to physicians but lobbying the officials for the
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introduction of new products in the formularies. The physician lost his/her role as an 
expert and the official now occupied this role.
"There is no doubt about it. It is one of the few transactions where the consumer does 
not decide- the physician decides for the patient. On another level, somebody who could 
even not be an expert in the field (the official) decides whether a physician should or 
should not prescribe a certain product, even not knowing what the product is about..." 
(Interviewee C, PH).
The introduction of products into formularies was one of the main lobbying activities 
of the pharmapolitics manager and this was always present in the data. Thus the 
researcher developed a tentative model of this transfer of decision making power from 
physicians to officials in relation to the introduction of products onto formularies. This 
model illustrated the concept of the transfer of decision making power from physicians 
to officials. The model was validated and saturated during the interviews. The 
interviews helped to expand the model and the sub-category. As a result, the researcher 
identified a new sub-category- "target for lobbying"- which seemed to explain not why 
companies lobbied but why they chose officials as the target for lobbying. They chose 
officials because they were responsible for the formularies and the introduction of 
products onto formularies was one of the key aspects of the pharmaceutical companies' 
lobbying interests. The model shows the different aspects of this transfer of decision 
making power.
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The pharmaceutical industry, through its pharmapolitics managers, changed target and 
decided to lobby the public and HMOs officials. The relationship between the official, 
the expert now, and the physician and the patient had been broken. The official had the 
power to decide what was included in the formularies and frequently, but not always, 
the knowledge to decide what was the most cost-effective treatment for the HMO. The 
target for lobbying was now the official.
Respondents also mentioned that the target for lobbying should be at the highest 
possible level in the officials' hierarchy. The pharmacopolitics manager's objective was 
to lobby the highest-ranking officials as they are the ones who actually made the 
decisions. The reason why the highest ranking official was the target for lobby was 
explained by the following quotations:
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"My personal strategy is to approach the superintendent directly, considering his status 
as a physician. I begin with him, at the head of the organisation, as he gives directions 
and so that the subordinates will hear us..." (Interviewee B, PH).
"Why begin at the head of the organisation? Because if you begin at the head of the 
hierarchy and he give orders to his subordinates, the process is much simpler. When the 
head says: 'go and see this x official and explain the same that you have explained to 
me' and then you go and see this official, this official has already received the call from 
the head who told him 'have an interview with this pharmapolitics manager. He is going 
to explain something to you that sounds interesting to me'. After that you don't have to 
do much more..." (Interviewee A, PH).
The "target for lobbying" represented the platform on which all the lobbying process 
was based. Pharmapolitics managers identified the target as the public and HMOs 
officials, separating themselves from the classic approach of the pharmaceutical 
industry namely influencing only the physicians. A transfer of decision making power 
took place and the official now occupied the "expert" role deciding on health care 
issues. The pharmapolitics manager strategy was to lobby the highest-ranking officials 
as they were the ones who decided on health care matters.
Question tn>o and three (Sub-Category = Motivations)
What do you think are the key motivations for pharmaceutical companies to lobby
public and HMO officials?
What are the objectives that you seek when you lobby officials?
Once the target for lobbying was identified, the researcher's next objective was to 
decipher what were the motivations of the pharmaceutical industry in lobbying the 
officials. As mentioned previously, the researcher used both questions to collect the
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information from two different perspectives: the strategic one (motivations) and the 
tactical (objectives). The researcher decided to use the term motivations for the sub- 
category including both perspectives. For the study, motivations referred to the reasons 
why pharmaceutical companies lobbied officials what is related to the first research 
question: "Why does the pharmaceutical industry lobby officials?"
Analysing the open coding, the researcher realised that most of the labels were activities 
e.g. introducing products, increasing market share, influencing officials, etc. but there 
was no process to be analysed but concepts implied by those activities. The researcher 
re-grouped those activities into concepts that reflected the pharmaceutical companies' 
motivations to lobby officials. The motivation concepts that arose from the data were: 
introduce products in the formularies, maintain market share and increase sales and 
profits. By reviewing the transcripts and by reflecting on the interpretations of what the 
respondents had said, the researcher realised that there were implicit activities that were 
present in the data. The researcher open coded these activities and re-grouped them into 
two new motivation concepts: simplify future negotiations and influence official 
decisions. The following table depicts the five concepts:
Table 14 Motivations concepts
Motivations
Introduce products in formularies
Maintain market share




These concepts reflected the reasons why the pharmaceutical companies and the 
pharmacopolitics managers carried out lobbying to officials. The five concepts through 
the process of axial coding were integrated in the sub-category motivations. The 
substantive theory around the concepts will be explained next.
Introduce products in formularies
This concept was the most prevalent in the interviews. The first motivation for 
lobbying officials was to introduce new products in the formularies. The 
pharmapolitics managers highlighted it as one of the most important activities of their 
job.
"...to achieve the objective that is to have the product included..." (Interviewee A, 
PH).
"...the work of lobbying is based in providing scientific information and at a certain 
point negotiating the incorporation of one product..." (Interviewee A, PH).
"...if the question is: why lobby? The answer is a little bit different. It relates to the 
issue that, in Argentina, not all HMOs or state institutions accept that all products of all 
pharmaceutical companies should be included in the formularies. Therefore, the 
pharmaceutical company has to get close to these institutions in order to explain its 
motives and the reason why its products should be in the formulary of the HMO or 
institution" (Interviewee B, PH).
Pharmapolitics managers focused all their attention on introducing the products into the 
formularies. They did not mention why it was important for the company to introduce 
the product in the formularies. Reflecting on this issue, the researcher realised that 
pharmapolitics managers took for granted the explanation of why introducing a product
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in a formulary was important. Only one respondent, a free-lance lobbyist, explained 
why the introduction of new products in formularies was important:
"The reason why formularies are important is because they state which products should 
be prescribed by the physicians and reimbursed by the HMO. In the case where an 
HMO has three million affiliates, like PAMI (pensioners HMO), and a certain product 
from my company is not included in PAMI's formulary, those patients cannot buy my 
product because this product has no reimbursement for them and they have to pay full 
price. If the number of people in Argentina with health care coverage is twenty four 
million people, not having a product in PAMI's formulary means that my product can 
only be bought by twenty one million people in the best case. When a company 
introduces a new product in the market, there are only three and a half million who can 
buy the product if they are affiliated to an HMO with an open formulary; that means 
that they have reimbursement for the new product. It is essential for the pharmaceutical 
company to broaden its market by introducing the new product in the formularies..." 
(Interviewee L, EX).
The researcher noticed that pharmapolitics managers in the first three initial interviews 
did not spontaneously mention the link of introduction of new products in formularies 
and the increase in these products' sales. The researcher probed this concept in the 
following interviews and received responses like:
"...my job is to have the products introduced. I am not responsible for the new 
product sales..." (Interviewee E, PH).
"I get my annual bonus from the degree of penetration in the formularies; it is not 
related to sales..." (Interviewee G, PH).
The perspective of the pharmapolitics manager was only to lobby the officials to include
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the products in the formulary- their performance was not related to sales of the 
product. The researcher noted that the sales directors interviewed spontaneously 
mentioned incremental sales. They said that the introduction of a product in the 
formularies "leverages the sales of this product" (Interviewee S, SD).
"...as in every place, the first motivation is the introduction of the company's 
products. That means, to sell its products. The motivation is this one. The most 
desired interest of the pharmaceutical company is good profit and good profit begins 
with the sale of its products. The motivation to lobby is to sell the company's 
products" (Interviewee V, SD ).
This link to increasing sales was described by HMD officials from a negative 
perspective:
"...a new introduction increases my costs..." (Interviewee N, HO).
"...have already negotiated a discounted price, at least for two or three years, in the case 
of chronic illness products because the new product is a burden in our HMO costs..." 
(Interviewee O, HO).
Two respondents also mentioned that the introduction of a product in a certain HMO 
like PAMI, the pensioners HMO, was a positive marketing action. PAMI was the 
biggest HMO in Argentina and the inclusion of a product in PAMI was essential for the 
success of a new product in the market. There was a domino effect towards the other 
HMOs after the inclusion of a product in PAMI.
"When this reality is explained to a manager who comes from abroad, it is not easy for 
him to understand that his company pays a very high rebate to be in PAMI's formulary.
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We consider that PAMI is a great shop window, a great marketing trigger for the 
product" (Interviewee F, PH).
One respondent mentioned that it was necessary to overcome the entry barriers imposed 
by the competitors to achieve a better position in the formulary. The researcher found 
that this assertion was related to the formularies in which the drug is already included 
and one pharmaceutical company looked to introduce its own trade-mark.
"If I cannot get my products in the formularies it is because my competitors are 
protected by some sort of prebends that I have not implemented. I have in some way to 
disarticulate this situation to get my products in" (Interviewee B, PH).
Maintain Market Share.
Respondents considered that one motivation to lobby the officials was to maintain 
market share in the HMOs that have formularies. Officials periodically introduced new 
products but they also took out products based on lack of efficacy or costs. This issue 
was critical for pharmapolitics managers whose job was not only to introduce new 
products but also to maintain the products already introduced. This concept was 
supported by respondents:
"...not to lose the opportunity to secure formulary positions in an HMO...to avoid 
being excluded from the formulary..." (Interviewee A, PH).
"...to promote the product and extend its use in other HMOs using the fact that it has 
been introduced in this HMO..." (Interviewee F, PH).
This sub-category was firmly supported by all respondents as it was seen as essential to 
maintain competitive position in the formularies: older products should have the same
chance as new products to be prescribed and reimbursed.
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Increase sales and pro fits
The researcher realised during the interviews that there was, in the language of the 
pharmapolitics manager, a division between sales that originated from the introduction 
of products in formularies and those sales that originated from direct lobbying of 
HMDs or the government. The difference was that direct lobbying could achieve 
additional sales from the government or from HMDs in the cases of chronic illness. 
These direct sales were directly to the health care provider and they do not derive from 
formularies. This motivation of incremental sales and profits was one of the 
motivations of the pharmapolitics manager in their approach to officials.
Three pharmapolitics managers referred to their task as also lobbying HMOs in order to 
sell their products in disease management programmes at good prices. These 
programmes targeted chronic illness. The HMO provided the medication directly to the 
patient without the intervention of a pharmacy.
"HMOs manage disease management programmes as chronic illnesses or a catastrophic 
disease...the lobbying is to sell these products to HMOs at a good price" (Interviewee 
B, PH).
"Products related to special treatments have a different approach, more based in the 
commercial side. One looks for the best commercial agreement for the HMO and for the 
pharmaceutical company" (Interviewee A, PH).
".. .there is a reimbursement from the APE (government) to the HMOs, so that you can 
negotiate a better price" (Interviewee C, PH).
Another motivation to lobby was the possibility of selling directly to HMOs without 
going through a tender process. These sales usually entailed a better price as there was
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no competition from other companies.
"...the equation should be profitable for the company..." (Interviewee D, PH).
"...more focused in analysing the fine details of the business than in purchasing the 
cheapest products which are against the quality of health care for their patients" 
(Interviewee I, EX).
Two pharmacopolitics managers commented that another motivation was to "lobby to 
achieve certain type of sales to the government" (Interviewee A, PH) regarding tenders 
of new products. The government had to purchase pharmaceutical products through a 
tender process. The pharmacopolitics managers' job was to lobby to have the new 
product included in the tender process.
"...to position a product in the tender when the government is developing a coverage 
plan for a specific pathology" (Interviewee G, PH).
"It could also be lobbying to achieve sales to the government, in some coverage plans, 
when the government buys drugs" (Interviewee A, PH).
On reflection, the researcher realised that the officials who developed formularies were 
also involved in the implementation of the tender process. The pharmapolitics manager 
had the same interlocutor - the government official or the HMO official. This finding 
explained why the pharmapolitics manager, and not the sales representative, was 
responsible for sales. The pharmapolitics manager had an established relationship with 




The three concepts are explicit motivations for lobbying. By reviewing the transcripts 
and by reflecting on the interpretations of what the respondents had said, the researcher 
realised that there were implicit activities that were present in the data. In all interviews 
with pharmapolitics managers, the researcher realised there was actually a stronger 
motivation than the explicit motivations mentioned. The researcher had to interpret 
phrases and activities hidden between explicit motivations. The researcher open coded 
these activities and re-grouped them into a new motivation concept. The explicit 
motivations were the reasons of the company but the pharmapolitics manager's most 
strongly supported motivation was to be able to exert influence on the official. After 
identifying this motivation the researcher went through the data and found that this 
motivation, was present in all the pharmapolitics interviews. Some examples showed 
this motivation. The possibility of influencing, or the influence exerted, is underlined:
"...there is always the possibility of modification of a law in Parliament..." 
(Interviewee A, PH).
"...the adequate lobby could even make an official turn away the scientific matters..." 
(Interviewee J, EX).
"Changes like that were achieved: not very easy...but through meetings with the 
Minister of Health, the regulation was changed..." (Interviewee B, PH).
The researcher considered that the motivation to exert influence on officials' decisions 
was one of the most important for the pharmapolitics manager. The pharmapolitics 
manager's job was to lobby the official and thus influence that official's decision. The 
researcher found out that there was a confluence between the motivation and the job, as
if there was an overlapping of work required and desire to do it. The pharmapolitics
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manager needed to be able to influence the official decisions. As mentioned previously 
in the motivation concept "Introduce the product in the formularies", pharmapolitics 
managers focused all their attention on introducing the products into the formularies 
and did not mention why it was important for the company to introduce the product in 
the formularies; introducing a product in a formulary is a way to exert influence on the 
official. The motivation was for pharmacopolitics managers to exert influence, not to 
sell the companies' products. The last three interviews with pharmapolitics managers 
(who were re-interviewed) confirmed this proposition.
"... conclusively there is a motivation to have the legislation changed. I believe 
lobbyists in the entire world do just the same. An example could be to lobby in congress 
(deputies and senators), provincial parliaments or Buenos Aires Town Hall to make 
evident that it would be convenient (from the perspective of the pharmaceutical 
company) that a certain law should be modified for the welfare of the entire population" 
(Interviewee B, PH).
Simplify negotiations
This concept related to the sub-category of building trust. Initially the researcher 
included this motivation in the building trust sub-category but later in the research 
process realised that it should be included as another motivation concept. The 
respondents mentioned that the fact of always lobbying with the same officials created 
an environment of trust, which might simplify future negotiations.
"...it is essential to establish and maintain the relationship and give to it some added 
value like collaborating in the layout of a pathology program, helping in an emergency 
situation with the free provision of a drug...consequently the negotiations are much 
simpler" (Interviewee A, PH).
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Pharmapolitics managers used lobbying as a tool to create a working relationship in the 
future. The outcome of lobbying could be negative in the present but it would help in 
future meetings between the pharmapolitics managers and officials. The 
action/interaction of the participants of the lobbying process modified the context 
towards a positive attitude in future negotiations.
Question four (Sub-Category = Participants)
Who are the participants in the process of pharmaceutical lobbying?
The participants in the process of lobbying relates to the basic question: "Who" 
lobbied officials? After the open coding, the researcher identified nine different 
participants in the lobbying process. The degree of participation in the lobbying 
process was a property which helped the researcher to classify the participants. Taking 
this degree of participation as a parameter, the researcher classified them as active 
participants, passive participants and occasional participants. The following table 
shows the different participants in the lobbying process.
Table 15 Participants in the lobbying process 
I Active Participants Passive Participants j Occasional Participants
I Pharmapolitics Managers i Pharmaceutical Companies ; Chamber (CAEMe) i
I '•'.'• 
I • [':
\ Public Officials : Government American Embassy \ 
i HMDs Officials i HMOs ; Free-lance Lobbyists \
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Active Participants
The Pharmapolitics managers were the proactive participants of the lobbying process. 
They were the initiators of the lobbying activities towards officials, trying to influence 
the decisions of the officials. They were also the initiators of the process of lobbying in 
pharmaceutical companies.
"...those responsible for pharmapolitics try to work with the needs of the government 
officials..." (Interviewee D, PH).
"...the good work of pharmapolitics managers could even produce a turn away from 
science in the mind of officials ...talking about trade union HMOs and private HMOs, 
the introduction of a product is based on good lobbying and not on the scientific 
information..." (Interviewee A, PH).
The officials, as the objects of the lobbying, had to decide whether to accede to the 
petition of the pharmapolitics manager or not. They had to decide whether to grant the 
pharmapolitics managers access.
"...the participants, from the government or HMOs, are the same (officials)..." 
(Interviewee B, PH).
"...regarding the informal procedures, one tries to get as close as possible to the people 
who take the main decisions..." (Interviewee D, PH).
"...frequently, it is the official who proposes a different agreement for the introduction 
of a product..." (Interviewee A, PH).
Usually the lobbying process was conducted between the pharmapolitics manager and
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officials. Various interests influenced the decisions taken by officials, frequently not 
related to scientific or medical matters but to other aspects of the relationship existent 
between the official and the pharmapolitics manager.
"...surely there is an economic issue behind this. And the economic issue in Argentina 
could mean two things: the first that there is an important benefit for the institution 
(HMO)... the second possibility is that there is a personal interest..." (Interviewee B, 
PH).
"An alarm signal is when the process stops without an apparent cause. This implies that 
the motivations are other factors but not scientific ones..." (Interviewee E, PH).
The official was the individual who, through the establishment of close ties with the 
pharmapolitics manager, was responsible for expressing both the needs of the HMO and 
him/herself. The pharmapolitics manager usually worked on them to have a product 
introduced in the HMO's formulary.
"...work over the needs of the HMO, whether it is software, scientific evidence, or the 
training of the personnel. He should also identify if the official has personal needs..." 
(Interviewee H, PH).
Pharmacy Benefits Management Organisations exist in Argentina and they played a role 
in the creation of formularies. The researcher noticed that respondent's attitude to them 
was the same as to HMOs and so for the purpose of this study they have been referred 
to as HMOs.
Passive Participants
The passive participants were those entities who gave the active participants
assignments. The pharmaceutical companies sent the pharmapolitics manager to lobby
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the officials in order to be able to influence decisions in the HMOs or in government.
"...corporatism requires that pharmaceutical companies, and especially their 
pharmapolitics managers, participate in corporate lobbying activities..." (Interviewee K, 
EX).
"...these new pharmapolitics managers are not related to the old managers, or sales 
managers, whose task was to convince the physicians about the therapeutic qualities of 
a product or to train and motivate the sales representatives to achieve this objective. 
Today, this manager is a highly skilled negotiator who has to deal with the 
representative of the HMO who is another negotiator with opposed interests to that of 
the pharmaceutical company". (Interviewee J, EX).
On the other side, the government and HMOs gave the officials delegated powers to 
implement formularies that could affect the interest of the pharmaceutical companies. 
Officials converted themselves into the target for pharmaceutical lobbying.
"...these types of institution (HMOs and government) delegated the decision making 
power, or at least this possibility, to professionals (officials)..." (Interviewee S, SD).
"If the responsibility of the decision, or the power to decide, lies exclusively in a 
professional (official), I would get in contact with this professional..." (Interviewee I, 
EX).
"The fundamental issue in all cases is to discern who the person is that takes the 
decision..." (Interviewee A, PH).
Occasional Participants
Occasional participants were those that sometimes facilitated the lobbying of the
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pharmapolitics managers. In this research three types were identified. The first one was 
the Multinational Companies Chamber (CAEMe). The chamber itself negotiated some 
HMDs formularies.
".. .the Chamber has to represent the interests of all companies..." (Interviewee A, PH).
"...in the decisions that are taken in congress or in the health superintendence, I believe 
that the Chambers have a great influence" (Interviewee B, PH).
The second was the American Embassy. It was a strong negotiator at the time of the 
issuing of the Patent Law and its modifications. PhRMA, the American Pharmaceutical 
Chamber, also pressured the American Embassy to push for changes in the Patent Law.
"...due to the pressure of the American Embassy on the Government, a great change 
was achieved in the Patent Law..." (Interviewee U, PO).
Free-lance lobbyists were used also in the lobbying of officials. In the cases where the 
pharmapolitics manager had no access to a specific official, or the pharmapolitics 
manager lobby had failed, free-lance lobbyists were hired.
"...when the lobbying has no effect, one looks for alternative ways to achieve the 
goal..." (Interviewee D, PH).
One respondent mentioned that free-lance lobbyists were hired when the company's 
compliance rules prevented them from meeting the official's requests.
"If the official requested direct payments, we would rather hire an external lobbyist to 
do the job..." (Interviewee F, PH).
Question five (Sub-Categories = Product - Building Trust)
What do you think are the hey issues for success when you engage in lobbying?
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The respondents expressed many different issues for success in the lobbying process. At 
first sight, the researcher thought that it was going to be difficult to build substantive 
theory with this dispersion of data. The researcher performed the open coding and 
labelled the data. Concepts, sub- concepts and activities emerged. After the first coding, 
the researcher began to look for relationship between the sub-concepts, concepts and 
activities looking to integrating them in a broader concept. At that stage he could 
identify two perspectives; there were concepts related to the product and its 
characteristics and there were concepts referred to the relationship with the official.
One key issue was the existence of a scientific product, in this case the pharmaceutical 
product. For effective lobbying, the pharmapolitics manager needed a physical 
product with certain and specific properties. Responses such as need of information, 
scientific support and scientific evidence related to the existence of a product with 
specific properties. The researcher identified that they were talking about the properties 
of the product that they were supposed to lobby. The basic research question "what" 
came out after the open coding process, from the data itself, as the question as such was 
not present in the fixed set of questions.
On the other side, all respondents mentioned that building trust with the officials was 
essential for any lobbying activity. The building trust process should begin before any 
lobbying was carried out.
The researcher established that the key to success of the lobbying were these two issues. 
After the open and axial coding the researcher integrated all the responses in two sub- 
categories named product and building trust.
The researcher explains first the findings related to product and then to building trust.
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Product
The lobbying was based on the pharmaceutical products of the companies, which were 
the material object or objects; that meant the different items that the companies 
researched, developed and later introduced in the market. Pharmaceutical products 
have different properties themselves but in the context of pharmaceutical lobbying, 
respondents emphasised specific ones. The researcher classified those properties as two 
types: intrinsic and perceived.
Intrinsic properties
Respondents commented about the special characteristics that pharmaceutical products 
needed in order to be successful in the context of lobbying. The intrinsic properties of 
the product could be further broken down into the following areas: quality, scientific 
support, essential for the patients and broadly used.
Pharmapolitics managers emphasised quality as the difference between multinational 
companies and generic companies. Officials had the same valuation of quality. Quality 
was important for pharmapolitics managers as they needed to be sure that the product 
would be effective when it was used by the physician. They lobbied officials in the 
knowledge that the product had a certain efficacy and safety profile and that the official 
believed in what the company said. The situation was different in the case of generic 
companies, where the product had to be tested on patients to validate the efficacy.
"Inevitably they (officials) should try to generate fair rules for the participants and 
deter price competition with players who do not have adequate quality standards..." 
(Interviewee J,EX).
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"...to have an extraordinary product is reason enough to be included in a formulary..." 
(Interviewee B, PH).
All respondents mentioned scientific support as one of the most important property for 
lobbying success. Scientific support represented all the information about a product 
such as clinical trials in animals and humans and the results of these trials. Officials also 
expected the pharmaceutical company to present scientific evidence of the efficacy of a 
product.
"...present the product that has enough scientific evidence although sometimes the 
official does not consider all the scientific material available in the dossier..." 
(Interviewee A, PH).
"...I have to use the back-up of knowledge: literature, clinical trials, etc. I have to get all 
this to persuade a professional (official)..." (Interviewee F, PH).
"...this requires that previous data exists...to demonstrate that the item is cost-effective 
compared to other alternatives; that there is a benefit from the pharmacological point of 
view and a benefit from the cost of the drug. This demonstration should be done from 
the scientific and economic side". (Interviewee D, PH).
Essential for the patients: Pharmaceutical products were essential for the health of the 
patients. This quality was more relevant to officials than to pharmapolitics managers. 
Officials expected that new products would have substantial improvements compared 
to the existing ones, improving the prognosis of the disease. Officials mentioned that in 
recent years the pharmaceutical companies have been launching me-too products 
(products with a similar chemical structure but with no therapeutic advantages over the 
ones already in the market) with a higher price and they regarded those products as
expensive and not cost-effective. These types of products were not regarded as essential
180
for the patients and they should not be introduced in the formularies.
"The motivation lies in the welfare of the patient; the government has a function of 
being the controller of the health system and it should try to foster the new advances in 
therapeutics" (Interviewee R, PO).
"...a new product substitutes other products and not only that but it substitutes other 
therapies. That the new product avoids hospitalisations and makes the patient's life 
better" (Interviewee C, PH).
Broadly used: Pharmapolitics managers knew that one property for lobbying success 
and the introduction of the product in the formularies was that it was usable by a large 
group of patients. The product itself should have quality, scientific evidence and be 
essential for the patients. Officials felt pressured to introduce it because the new 
product would benefit a large number of patients. Nevertheless, officials tried to 
restrain the utilisation of new drugs because of cost-containment within the HMO.
"HMOs, with excellent service and managed by very bright people, prefer to pay more 
in the future for the effects of illnesses rather than to pay now a significant sum for a 
product which could save future costs". (Interviewee B, PH).
Perceived properties
These were the properties that the officials and the pharmapolitics managers viewed in 
the pharmaceutical product. It entailed how the participants expressed their views about 
the material object - the pharmaceutical product. These properties were vital in the 
context of lobbying to understanding the preconceived conceptions that officials and 
pharmapolitics managers had in the lobbying process. These properties are scientific 
value, economic value and social value of the pharmaceutical product.
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Pharmapolitics managers believed that the companies' product had an adequate 
scientific value that made possible the lobbying process. In other words it was 
thoroughly researched and tested and that there was sufficient scientific information to 
be presented to the official for the inclusion in the formulary. This belief was shared by 
the officials who considered the pharmaceutical products to be of high scientific value. 
There was a consensus between the official and the pharmapolitics manager that the 
product had a proper scientific status.
"...present scientific evidence, pharmaeconomics studies..." (Interviewee E, PH).
"...in catastrophic diseases...there are products with excellent scientific support and 
they are unique for the disease..." (Interviewee M, HO).
"This demonstration has to be done from the scientific perspective..." (Interviewee O, 
HO).
Due to its scientific value, the respondents believed that it should be the official who 
decided about its utilisation. The official prevailed over the physician in deciding which 
products should be prescribed. Pharmapolitics managers mentioned this issue as 
prevalent over others.
"It is one of the few transactions in which the consumer does not decide, but the 
physician decides for him. On another level, somebody (official) who is an expert in the 
subject should decide whether a physician can prescribe a product or not" (Interviewee 
C, PH).
The economic value property was controversial. The perspective was different 
depending whether the respondent was an official or a pharmapolitics manager. For the 
pharmapolitics managers the economic value of a product was the highest percentage
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of reimbursement for the patient or the highest price. The highest percentage of 
reimbursement facilitated the patient the access to the medication. The pharmapolitics 
managers perceived the highest price as being a result of introducing new products in 
disease management programs. Recently launched products were not normally 
suggested as possible entries on the formulary lists.
"I must achieve the highest percentage of reimbursement in PAMI (pensioner's HMO) 
as there are thousands of patients who can buy my product" (Interviewee F, PH).
"...disease management programmes for chronic illnesses or catastrophic diseases; the 
lobbying is carried out to sell at a good price..." (Interviewee B, PH).
Officials, on the other hand, perceived new products as a cost burden for the HMOs. 
The cost containment policy implemented by HMOs restrained the official's ability to 
easily incorporate new therapies.
"...the majority of HMOs based their decisions on economics, where price matters..." 
(Interviewee H, PH).
"...in HMOs there is a rationalisation of cost in medicines. Restricted formularies are a 
way to contain costs in medicines..." (Interviewee M, HO).
For officials the new products were more expensive and had no additional advantage to 
the ones in the formularies; these products were regarded as not being cost-effective 
compared to the current alternatives to treat the disease.
"Today you should prove to the officials the advantages of the introduction of a new 
product in the formulary; even the economic advantages of your product versus that of 
your competitor" (Interviewee J, EX).
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Respondents also mentioned that the economic value of a product could be a definitive 
argument to achieve the incorporation of the product in the formulary. That meant to 
show that the product was cost-effective in pharma-economic terms.
"If they (the products) do not have enough comparative advantages over the products 
already in the formulary, I would try to work on the economic side and costs..." 
(Interviewee A, PH).
Pharmapolitics managers expressed that there was a social value of the product, 
meaning that the pharmaceutical products provided the patients a better life or a longer 
life expectancy. This quality was related to some new products that gave a better 
therapeutic alternative than the ones already on the market. Its use gave the patient a 
better life. The officials perceived social value as a pressure to include the product in 
the formularies. Officials aimed at improving the quality of life of patients by providing 
health care and when a product presented a benefit for the patient they should include it 
in the formulary. Pharmapolitics managers were aware of this objective and they used 
the social value as a tool to pressure the official. A pharmapolitics manager viewed the 
issue as follows:
"It is a product with a high social sensitivity and the construction of a social 
framework is essential to the pharmaceutical companies business..." (Interviewee J, 
EX).
"...there is a vision of medicines as a social good with subsidies from the 
government..." (Interviewee D, PH).
The first sub-category was the existence of the material object namely the 
pharmaceutical product. The second one was building trust with the officials.
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Building trust
This sub-category was mainly concerned with the issue of building relationships 
between the pharmapolitics managers and officials. Respondents stated that building 
trust was one of the key issues for the pharmaceutical lobbying process.
"...the pharmaceutical companies' closeness with the state and trade union HMOs is 
essential for getting to know the key people and to be known by them" (Interviewee B, 
PH).
Respondents mentioned that no effective lobbying could take place without an 
established relationship, which permitted the creation of a negotiation environment that 
allowed the presentation of the request of the pharmapolitics manager. It also permitted 
the expression of the officials' interests, needs and demands.
"Lobbying has to do with a deep relationship. This relationship goes beyond the 
lobbying process company-HMO and company-government..." (Interviewee A, PH).
"The participants, in the government and the HMOs, are always the same people. You 
build a relationship, a friendship..." (Interviewee D, PH).
The researcher identified two different concepts in the building trust sub-category. The 
first was the need for pharmapolitics managers to build a long-term relationship with the 
officials independent of a special lobbying need. The second was the creation of a 
negotiation environment for a specific lobbying process.
Buildine relationships.
Pharmapolitics managers emphasised the fact that building relationships with the HMD 
and public officials was vital for lobbying success. Respondents said that the
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relationship with key officials should be established and maintained in time so that it 
could be used when needed.
"...it is essential to establish the relationship, maintain it and provide some added value 
to it..." (Interviewee A, PH).
This relationship was independent of whether there was a specific interest at that 
moment.
"...the relationship is most of the times beyond the lobbying of pharmaceutical 
company-HMDs or pharmaceutical company-government..." (Interviewee F, PH).
There was special focus in the personal side of the relationship so that the formal 
relationship became a close one, where the pharmapolitics manager and the official 
interacted.
"You get a close contact, and that is where a friendship begins..." (Interviewee A, PH).
"...one tries to position the company's product based on the relationship that one has 
with the official..." (Interviewee C, PH).
Pharmapolitics managers focused on the personal interests of the officials in order to get 
close to them and to be able to build an environment of trust.
"The personal aspects should never be left aside because the Formularies Committees 
are composed of people and those people are the ones who take the ultimate decision..." 
(Interviewee D, PH).
The aim of the pharmapolitics manager was to establish those relationships with the 
highest-ranking officials in order to effectively influence the HMD or the government. 
These relationships could simplify present and future negotiations.
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"...if you begin with the head, there are fewer steps that you have to follow. If you 
persuade the head, seventy-five percent of the decision is made. If you begin with 
middle management it is more difficult..." (Interviewee B, PH).
"...regarding the informal processes, your aim should be to get as close as possible to 
the key decision people", (Interviewee D, PH).
Consequently, the fundamental properties of this concept were:
a) Essential: lobbying for pharmapolitics managers was quite difficult without the 
building of the relationship.
b) Highest ranking of officials: the pharmapolitics manager focused his/her 
lobbying activities on the key decision makers.
c) Personal: not based on formal contacts but on the informal ones. Officials and 
pharmapolitics managers built personal ties between them.
d) Stable in time: the relationship continued over time and became stronger through 
years of interaction.
The building of a close, informal, long-term relationship with officials provided the 
basis to build a negotiation environment for the lobbying process.
Negotiation environment
Respondents said that the meaning of a negotiation environment was a time and place 
where the officials were confident in discussing certain issues, for example the 
introduction of a new product in the formulary.
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"Then the negotiation begins, there, in this moment when one can bring an alternative 
solution to the issue..." (Interviewee A, PH).
Respondents separated the relationship and the negotiation environment. The close 
relationship achieved generated the environment but the responses clearly highlighted 
the differences:
"...through pharmacopolitics it is necessary to achieve a space, a place, from where one 
can present the advantages of the product. .." (Interviewee C, PH).
According to interviewees, the environment was created in response to a specific need 
and it was built before the process of lobbying began:
"...the early construction of this negotiation environment is a substantial part of the 
lobbying business of the pharmaceutical companies..." (Interviewee J, EX).
"...it is necessary to choose well the place where you are going to meet the official. He 
should be relaxed and comfortable. When I realised that he was in good mood, I would 
begin to talk about my product..." (Interviewee H, PH).
The researcher took these two concepts, building relationships and the negotiation 
environment and analysed the open coding from the perspective of the processes and 
sub-processes. He realised that building trust was itself a process so that he analysed the 
sequences of evolving actions/interactions and he developed a model of the building 
trust process. The researcher identified the main sub-processes which were the basis for 
the model. The researcher used coding for process to illustrate the building trust 
process. The diagram below depicts the process before the specific process of lobbying 
began. The pharmapolitics managers stated that they first looked for key officials with 
whom to build a long-term relationship. Once identified, they began to build a close
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relationship. No respondent clarified in which way they built the relationship. The 
researcher noted that the interviewees used all means of hospitality. This brought out 
the issue of reciprocity. Reciprocity means that in response to friendly actions, people 
were frequently much nicer and much more cooperative than predicted (Fehr & 
Catcher, 2000). Knack (2000) remarked than when trust and norms of reciprocity were 
stronger, opposing sides were more likely to agree on the ground rules for seeking 
debate. Butin et al (2005) described three major aspects that must be fulfilled in order to 
denote actions or situations as reciprocal: a) a sequential process within which an 
individual acts b) another reacts and the reacting individual can grasp the effects of the 
first action and c) the second individual aims at creating a kind of equality or parity (tit- 
for-tat). Axelrod (1984) showed how stable cooperative behaviour could arise in self- 
interested agents when they adopt a reciprocal attitude towards each other. Susman 
(2006) referred to reciprocity in American congress; he remarked that lobbyists 
provided gifts and entertainment to the legislators to obtain preferential treatment. He 
concluded that, in spite of all the lobbying regulation in the USA, nobody had addressed 
the basic human impulse to return a favour. The data from the interviews provided no 
support to the theory that the relationships and the building trust process were built 
under a positive reciprocity relationship. Even then, participant observation showed that 
all means of hospitality were used- meals, tickets, etc- and this indicated an implicit 
reciprocity process.
Once the relationship was established, pharmapolitics managers tried to build the 
negotiation environment for a specific issue. The building of the negotiation 
environment enabled lobbying to take place. In cases where it was not built, the 
pharmapolitics manager had to strengthen the relationship in order to develop the 
negotiation environment.
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Figure 5 Building Trust Model
Identification of Key 
Officials
After building the negotiation environment, the lobbying process began. The researcher 
implemented the following questions for the gathering of data on the lobbying process.
Questions six, seven, eight, nine, ten (Sub-Category = Strategy)
How would you describe the process of pharmaceutical lobbying?
Which strategy do you follow if you want to influence an official?
How much relevance do you give to scientific information in the process of lobbying?
Are there other non-scientific instruments that you use to achieve your objective?
When a lobbying process is not successful, what do you do next?
Strategy was the most relevant of all sub-categories. This sub-category described how 
lobbying was performed by the pharmapolitics managers. The findings related to the 
second research question; how lobbying was carried out by pharmapolitics managers. 
Within this sub-category the pharmaceutical lobbying process was explained.
190
Pharmaceutical lobbvine process
The researcher used coding for process for the analysis of this concept. This coding 
looked at the different activities that were included in the lobbying process. The 
researcher identified five sub-processes: preliminary review, obtaining access, 
preparation, negotiation and results. Below is a chronological description of the five 
sub-processes:
Figure 6 Lobbying process model
Negotiation ————J Succs:
Preliminary Review:
The preliminary review considered all the issues that the pharmapolitics manager had to 
be acquainted with to prepare for the lobbying process. Interviewees mentioned that 
these issues were:
a) Identify the key people that need accessing. The first question that respondents 
asked themselves was- who is the person in this HMO or in government who 
achieves the action that I want? This item related to the sub-category target for 
lobbying, being the pharmacopolitics manager responsible for identifying the
active participant to be lobbied.
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"This is initiated with the investigation of who is responsible, either the Medical 
Practice Manager or the Auditor. Who is the key person for the incorporation of 
a product?" (Interviewee A, PH).
Previously known insiders in the HMO, managers of other companies, officials 
in other HMOs or other areas of government provided information about the 
target for lobbying to the pharmapolitics manager.
b) Following the identification of the key person, the pharmapolitics manager 
assessed the information needed about this official. Pharmacopolitics managers 
focused on whether the official had a scientific profile, commercial profile or 
costs-oriented profile. They also looked for hobbies and personal information 
about the official.
"The first and essential factor is to be super-informed. What does that mean? 
You need to make an extensive analysis of the situation. Then a meeting must be 
arranged and that would be the first formal meeting where the purpose would be 
a very precise observation of the official..." (Interviewee C, PH).
c) Another issue to be considered was investigating the habits of the HMOs, 
provinces or state. Was the HMO likely to receive rebates from the industry? 
Did it have a very restricted formulary? Was it an open formulary? It was also 
important to know the guidelines regarding the introduction of a product onto 
the formulary. Were there any compliance proceedings to take into account?
"If we speak about rebates for products prescribed for outpatients, the 
introduction of a product in an HMO with rebates implies that the product will 
have to contribute with those rebates". (Interviewee E, PH).
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d) Interviewees mentioned that if the official had been in position for sufficient 
time then the pharmapolitics manager should also investigate the receptive 
profile of the official. Was he/she eager to get information or was he/she more 
prone to receive contribution payments for the HMO or for himself/herself? 
Previous experiences of the pharmapolitics manager or from other members of 
the pharmapolitics establishment could help to have the right approach in the 
decisive moment.
"...one gets the impression in the first meeting about where the negotiation is 
heading for..." (Interviewee I, EX).
"...you also work with the training of the officials of that HMO...whether they 
are interested in going to a congress or to present a research study abroad. In 
these situations you have the opportunity to get closer..." (Interviewee A, PH).
Obtain access.
Respondents said that it was easy to obtain access to key people when there was a 
previous relationship. Pharmapolitics managers aimed to build long-term relationships 
with key decision making officials such as the big HMDs and some officials in the 
government. If there were changes, for example in the government, obtaining access 
was more difficult as the relationship had to be built again.
Most interviewees mentioned that access to people where there was no previous 
relationship was difficult. The first time there had to be an introducer, somebody 
connected with the official and who made the introduction. Respondents mentioned 
there were no access fees in these cases- the managers did not have to pay to meet an 
official or even the Minister of Health. Access was facilitated by people who knew the
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officials and were somewhat connected with the pharmapolitics manager such as 
colleagues from other companies.
By this precept, respondents said that their range of acquaintances and facilitators had to 
be broad so that every time that there was a change or access was needed then they 
would have an opportunity to meet the key officials.
"...there are times that you help someone by introducing him to a certain official and 
there are times that you have no access to the official so you ask someone help you in 
that moment..." (Interviewee F, PH).
This possibility of access granting gave power to certain pharmapolitics managers over 
others. One respondent mentioned this issue and he called it: "a chain of favours" 
(Interviewee C, PH). A pharmapolitics manager granted someone access and he/she was 
then entitled to request support when he/she needed it. The one who had the most 
contacts could exert a power position in cooperative negotiations. It was also important 
when looking for allies. This was a self-profit equation:
"I can help you today but when I need an ally, I will be counting on you to support my 
position" (Interviewee C, PH).
Preparation.
Once the pharmapolitics manager obtained access and had information about the official 
that he/she was going to meet then the next step was preparation for the meeting. 
Respondents explained that the main issue was to prepare a dossier about the product. 
The pharmapolitics manager adapted this dossier to the specifications requested by the 
HMOs or the Ministry of Health. In some cases, like the PMO (National Formulary), 
the preparation of the dossier was a complicated task. This dossier focused mainly on
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the scientific side of the product; it contained clinical trials showing efficacy and 
approval authorisations of the product. In cases where there were pharmaeconomics 
trials that showed the cost-effectiveness of the product these needed to be included. 
Local pharmaeconomics models were prepared taking into consideration the cost profile 
of the HMO. The pharmapolitics manager needed all potential evidence because did not 
know a priori which inquiries he/she would receive in the interview.
"You have to be really well prepared; to be a lobbyist implies that you go through 
continuous training. Suddenly, I have to leam about a new therapy for newborns and 
two days later I have to learn about a coronary disease and its treatment..." (Interviewee 
B, PH).
"...the introduction of a product in the PMO (National Formulary) requires that there is 
information that proves that the item is cost-effective compared to other options...there 
must be a benefit from the pharmacological perspective and from the economic 
perspective..." (Interviewee D, PH).
Once the dossier was complete, the pharmapolitics manager asked for an interview and 
the negotiation process began.
Negotiation.
The negotiation sub-process relates to the interaction with the official aimed at 
obtaining a desired action. In the lobbying definition of Moloney and Jordan (1996), 
planning would entail the preliminary review, obtain access and preparation sub- 
process and negotiation is the act of interest representation to decision makers. The 
negotiation sub-process began with the first meeting with the official. Respondents 
mentioned that, usually, the initial contact was in the office of the official. In cases
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where there was a previous relationship with the official then the meeting could be in 
another place. Respondents clarified that meetings were never at the pharmaceutical 
company. Other places mentioned by the respondents were restaurants, bars or lobbies 
in hotels. Throughout the interviews it was clear that there was a standard negotiation 
procedure. The lobbying issue most mentioned by respondents was the introduction of 
products in a formulary therefore this issue was considered as an example for the 
description of the standard negotiation procedure. First of all the pharmapolitics 
manager asked the official for a meeting but without explaining the purpose of the 
meeting. The meeting was arranged and with the first contact between the 
pharmapolitics manager and the official the specific negotiation process began. The 
following diagram depicts the first stage of the negotiation process which entails sub- 
processes of the negotiation sub-process. Coding for process was used in the analysis of 
the negotiation sub-process. The sub-sub-processes identified permitted the 
development of the two stages of the negotiation process.
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Firstly, the pharmapolitics manager made his/her purpose explicit and requested of the 
official the introduction of a product in the formulary. The pharmapolitics manager 
defended the introduction of the product with the transmission of the product's 
scientific information and the description of its therapeutic advantages. The product's 
dossier had been prepared for use in support of his/her statements and this was given to 
the official for study and evaluation. The pharmapolitics manager viewed the first 
interviews as simply being informative and did not expect the official to decide 
anything in the first encounter.
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"First, a meeting is arranged. I believe that when the meetings come into question, there 
is always a hard position in the first one, the second one is more relaxed and in the third 
there is some agreement scenario..." (Interviewee A, PH).
Respondents said that observation in the first interview was essential to gauge the 
receptivity of the official to the issue. The pharmapolitics manager tried to emphasise 
the technical advantages for the patients of the HMO.
"The official gets scientific information, pharma-economics studies...in the case, that 
the official is not satisfied, I bring information about economics and costs for the 
HMO..." (Interviewee B, PH).
Respondents said that the first interview did not usually result in a decision and that the 
official usually declared that he/she will study the dossier. The official might request 
additional information. This information included, not always but frequently, 
pharmaeconomics studies.
"...one provides scientific information and you receive feedback from the committees 
or officials to whom you have presented the information. This feedback could be 
positive, there could also be an objection to some specific issue which needs more 
information, but normally the process advances" (Interviewee D, PH).
After the first interview, the pharmapolitics manager had to look for hints in order to 
decide whether the official was more interested in the scientific side of the product or 
was more prone to contribution payments personally or for the HMO. The profile of the 
official indicated which negotiation approach to follow.
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"The first meeting used to be formal, an evaluation meeting, a study of the official... so 
that in this first meeting you get an idea of what should be the approach of the 
negotiation..." (Interviewee J, EX).
After considering the information from the interviewees the researcher developed a 
negotiation profiling matrix that showed which approaches should be followed based on 
the information already gathered in the preliminary review sub-process.
Table 16 Negotiation profile matrix







Exploratory • Exploratory Confirmed
; •
Exploratory j Exploratory ; Confirmed
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If the pharmapolitics manager had an established relationship with the official and prior 
negotiations he/she would know whether the scientific information or contribution 
payments were more important for the official and could follow a safe strategy. If the 
pharmapolitics manager did not have a relationship with the official, but a colleague 
provided information about the profile of the official, the negotiation approach was 
exploratory; the pharmapolitics manager could not take for granted what the colleague 
had said. This information usually helped in the approach but, as the relationship was
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personal and based on personal experiences with the official, it could not be assumed 
that the official would behave the same way with another pharmapolitics manager. The 
pharmapolitics manager had a hint of how to steer the negotiation but he/she needed to 
look for signs of approval. In the case of a new official without previous information, 
the approach would be exploratory. Respondents said that in this case the negotiation 
process was usually longer and the pharmapolitics manager had to go through the whole 
negotiation process as described in the first stage negotiation process model (figure 7).
After the first meeting new meetings were arranged; the pharmapolitics manager 
provided additional information and the discussion continued.. During this process the 
pharmapolitics manager made closer ties with the official and decided whether it was 
appropriate to continue with a transmission of information approach or to switch to a 
contribution payment approach. The decision to offer contribution payments or to 
continue offering information was taken in one meeting. The first step is the observation 
and analysis of the responses together with body signs. It was important to observe how 
the official reacts to the request of the pharmacopolitics manager. The pharmapolitics 
manager looks for hints that might indicate the course that the negotiation should take. 
Sometimes those hints are obvious and other times they are subtly insinuated.
Expressions like "it is too costly for the HMO..." (Interviewee O, HO) did not mean 
that the official was asking for a rebate or a contribution payment.
Therefore, the pharmapolitics manager had to introduce 'encouragements' in the 
conversation and evaluated the reaction to those proddings in order to determine 
whether the official was interested in scientific information or in contribution payments 
or in both. Once there was a clear reaction to a stimulus, the pharmapolitics manager 
could probe in that direction until the motivation of the official became clear. Then
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he/she chose an approach and focused on it, contribution payments or communication of 
information or a mix of both.
The negotiation discussion might continue only based on scientific information. One 
example for this is the introduction of products in the National Formulary. The official 
should be persuaded by the pharmapolitics manager of the advantages of the product 
and he/she then decided that the product would be introduced. The negotiation process 
was finished and successfully.
However respondents mentioned that there were other cases where the pharmapolitics 
manager had to change approach and focused on contribution payments. There could be 
two modalities: the first one was that the official was aware of the incremental costs for 
the HMOs of the new product and tried to negotiate a higher rebate for the HMO. The 
second one was that the official wanted a contribution payment for his/her private 
interest. Interviewees remarked that even in the event of a contribution payments 
approach, the scientific phase was always present in the negotiations; it could be longer 
or shorter but it was always present in the negotiation.
"One tries to incorporate the product in the best way, but in this country there are 
aspects not related to the scientific evidence and not related to pharma-economics. At 
this stage it is the official who proposes some kind of agreement. You have to pay 
attention to where the conversation is leading". (Interviewee A, PH).
"The second possibility is that there is a spurious interest..." (Interviewee B, PH).
If the pharmapolitics manager decided to explore a contribution payment approach, it 
was always necessary to have previously built a trust environment. No contribution 
payments negotiation could take place without trust between the official and the
pharmacopolitics manager.
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"...evidently in the relationship with the government and the HMDs it is essential that 
this relationship be properly established...good lobbying is also related to a deep 
relationship. You have a fluid contact, you build a friendship and some doors are 
opened so that you collaborate from another perspective". (Interviewee D, PH).
In cases where there was no evidence of trust then the pharmapolitics manager would 
call for a break in the negotiations.
".. .the first thing I would do is to see how to break down the barriers; I have to assume 
that they are there in a realistic way. If I cannot get beyond this barrier, is because my 
competitors are protected by some type of sinecure or some other doubtful arrangement 
that I have not implemented. I would stop the negotiations and try to get closer to the 
official" (Interviewee B, PH).
After establishing the trust environment the pharmapolitics manager could initiate the 
contribution payments approach. The manager should identify the type of contribution 
payment the official requires; either the type that benefited the organisation or the type 
that benefited the official directly. Those that benefited the organisation were 
reimbursements, or rebates, related to the use of the company's products.
"If we talk about rebates for products prescribed for outpatients, the introduction of a 
product in an HMO with rebates implies that the product will have to contribute with 
those rebates" (Interviewee G, PH).
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Another type of contribution payment for the HMDs was the implementation of Disease , ( con formato: sin subrayado
-,., . _ 4m. ~ 1 Con formato: Sin subrayadoManagement Programmes . These programmes were aimed at the treatment of a chronic —————————————
pathology and the pharmaceutical company cooperated with part of the costs of 
implementation.
"It could happen that I have the need to introduce a certain product in the formulary, 
but the HMO has difficulties with a Disease Management Program that does not include 
my drug. If I cooperate with the implementation of the Disease Management 
Programme, even if it is not related to my product, I might be able to introduce my 
product..." (Interviewee A, PH).
When the contribution payments benefited the official directly then the official had 
deviated from the best interests of the HMO in pursuit of a private interest. Respondents 
mentioned that officials tried to disguise the private contribution payment as also 
achieving a benefit for the HMO.
"The second possibility is that there is a spurious interest. Usually in Argentina, the 
spurious is not totally spurious; it looks towards the convenience of both parties, HMO 
and official. So that the spurious is not noticed there is a benefit for the HMO and a 
benefit for the patient of the HMO" (Interviewee B, PH).
"Usually, this type of arrangement has two perspectives: it benefits the HMO and it also 
leaves an extra benefit for other parties" (Interviewee I, EX).
4 A program that bundles use of prescription drugs with physicians and allied professionals, linked to 
large databases created by HMOs, to treat people with chronic diseases. The claim is that this type of 
service provides a higher quality of care at more reasonable price than an alternative, presumably more 
fragmented, care.
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Once the pharmapolitics manager had implemented the contribution payments approach 
the process was always the same irrespective of the type of contribution payment. The 
second stage of the negotiation process included the contribution payments sub-process 
and the following figure shows the contribution payments process. As mentioned 
before, coding for process was used to identify the sub-processes in the negotiation sub- 
process. The researcher divided the negotiation sub-process in two stages to facilitate 
the description of the substantive theory.




First, the pharmapolitics manager made clear to the official the understanding that there 
was the possibility of contribution payments. The official requested a certain
contribution payment.
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".. .that you have to give some contribution for what is permitted. That it is not the same 
as contributing for something illegal" (Interviewee B, PH).
The pharmapolitics manager evaluated the request and considered whether the cost- 
benefit was acceptable. The pharmapolitics manager could make a lower offer than that 
demanded by the official. There would be an interaction of contribution offers and 
negotiation until there was consensus on both sides. Both parties would arrive at a 
position where both had won or at least had an acceptable result.
Results
Results were positive in cases where the lobbying was effective and the desired action 
implemented. It was irrelevant for the analysis of success whether there was only 
communication of information or contribution payments were needed.
What happened in the cases where there was no agreement? The process failed and the 
pharmapolitics manager was pressured by the company to achieve its objectives:
"... the sales manager pressured me to have this product introduced in the 
formulary..." (Interviewee E, PH ).
The pharmapolitics managers said that at this stage they looked for alternatives. The 
alternatives mentioned were:
1. The pharmapolitics manager approached a higher-ranking official in the 
organisation, HMO or government and restarted the whole process.
2. The pharmapolitics manager hired a free-lance lobbyist with an established 
relationship with the official and restarted the process. This alternative had 
an additional cost for the company. It was also mentioned that in this
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alternative, the company lost control of the situation as somebody else was 
negotiating on its behalf.
The pharmapolitics managers mentioned that there were a few cases when the objective 
could not be achieved but generally the rate of success was higher than the failure rate.
Question eleven, twelve (Sub-Category = cooperative lobbying)
Is pharmaceutical lobbying carried out alone or in a cooperative way? 
Do you think that it is possible to free-ride?
This research focused at first on individual lobbying but further reading of the literature 
prompted the researcher to investigate cooperative lobbying. Cooperative lobbying was 
regarded in this research as lobbying exerted by a chamber or a group of companies 
with a common objective.
Respondents mentioned that cooperative lobbying was frequently used especially in 
regards to legislation, ministries of health (national or provincial), large HMOs or large 
PBMs. The objective was to concentrate forces in order to be a more powerful 
negotiating force. Cooperative lobbying was used when the target for lobbying was 
more powerful than the individual companies.
"...the argentine negotiation...on one side it is cooperative..." (Interviewee S, SD).
"...and this cooperative activity also requires that the pharmaceutical companies and 
their pharmapolitics managers participate in the cooperative part..." (Interviewee J, 
EX).
The objective of the cooperative lobbying was to negotiate from a stronger position than 
by lobbying alone. It should be noted that all respondents mentioned that cooperative 
lobbying was always used when the other party was the government; in case of large
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HMOs it was also used. The modalities of cooperative lobbying could be lobbying 
exerted by the multinational companies chamber or a group of companies lobbying as a 
cartel. Respondents also mentioned that in the case of cooperative lobbying, national 
and multinational companies joined forces to achieve the objectives pursued.
"...multinational companies and national companies applied pressure to change the 
Reference Prices decree to a reasonable situation..." (Interviewee B, PH).
"...I believe that the key issue here is specifically the cooperative lobbying business" 
(Interviewee L, EX).
"...CAEMe, the chamber, is always in negotiation with PAMI (pensioners HMO) for an 
increase in the capita..." (Interviewee F, PH).
The multinational companies also joined forces with the American Embassy. The 
officials at the chamber had close contacts with the officials of PhRMA (Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers of America). The petitions to the American Embassy were channelled 
through PhRMA and the big American companies.
"...the American Embassy....was more proactive regarding pharmaceutical products... 
specifically in the issue of the Patents Law" (Interviewee D, PH).
Cooperative lobbying improved the position of the pharmaceutical company against 
large organisations. Even then the pharmapolitics managers mentioned that they had to 
use both types of lobbying to be effective: individual and cooperative.
"...the one responsible for pharmapolitics should take into account both scenarios: first, 
the cooperative action and then the individual action. It does not mean that the 
cooperative is more than the individual, both things at the same time". (Interviewee J,
EX).
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Individual lobbying needed to be pursued with big HMOs or with the government 
because cooperative lobbying might not be beneficial to the interests of one company. 
Cooperative lobbying did not look after the particular interests of one company but to 
the interests of the industry. The pharmapolitics manager would lobby the officials in 
big organisations to achieve minor changes in what had previously been agreed 
collectively. These minor changes could mean a huge difference for the individual 
company.
"...how to achieve, in a framework, what has been previously collectively negotiated, a 
benefit for one's product or have an advantage over my competitors..." (Interviewee 
A, PH).
Cooperative lobbying was executed by the chambers or group of companies and was 
frequently used when the targets for lobbying were the big HMOs or the government. 
The reason why cooperative lobbying occurred was the size and importance of the 
target. One example mentioned (Interviewee C, PH) was the boycott against the 
implementation of the generics law introduced by the Ministry of Health. The law stated 
that physicians should only write the name of the drug in a prescription and not the 
trademark. Therefore the patient in the pharmacy could choose the most convenient 
alternative. This regulation left the decision in the hands of the pharmacist and the 
patient. The pharmaceutical industry implemented a boycott through the HMOs 
formularies and conditioned payment of rebates to HMOs to the acceptance of 
prescriptions with trademark. The HMOs decided to continue receiving the rebates and 
did not enforce the rule to physicians about prescribing only with the name of the drug, 
thus accepting the use of trademarks in the prescriptions.
The twelfth question was whether it was possible to free-ride. This concept was present
in all the literature about lobbying. In the first three interviews with pharmapolitics
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managers this concept was absent. The researcher subsequently introduced this question 
to prompt responses. Even then the pharmapolitics managers were not very explicit 
about the subject. They simply mentioned that it was difficult to free-ride because of the 
coercion of other companies. The external lobbyists' interviews provided the data 
needed to analyse this concept in the Argentine context. One of the external lobbyists 
said that free-riding was not common because those companies that attempted to free- 
ride were then punished by the others by exclusion from the HMOs formularies. The 
industry, in these situations, would act in a cooperative way. Free-riding was almost 
non-existent because the big companies had the power to enforce punishments and the 
penalties for free-riding were high. Olson (1965) confirmed this attitude when he stated 
that rational individuals would decline to contribute to the costs of collective action 
unless there was coercion. Respondents' quotations confirm this issue:
"...in the case that one company does not follow the cooperative action, this company is 
punished..." (Interviewee T, SD).
"...punishment could be having the company excluded from all formularies meaning 
that they would lose a substantial share of the market" (Interviewee J, EX).
Sales directors and marketing directors from companies that did not have a 
pharmapolitics manager also confirmed this concept. These companies relied on the 
Chamber for the introduction of the products in the formularies.
"...I know the Chamber is not working for us, but we benefit from their actions in 
PAMI..." (Interviewee S, SD).
They agreed that the punishment for free-riding was to be excluded of all formularies 
and from the industry negotiations. This comment proved that free-riding was only
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possible when the advantages of free-riding were high and the other members of the 
group did not have the power to punish the free-rider for its behaviour.
"...we just follow what the Chamber or the big companies tell us to do ..." (Interviewee 
S, SD).
"...specially avoiding conflicts with the establishment..." (Interviewee V, SD).
The respondents from companies without a pharmapolitics manager said that they 
complied with the rules imposed by the establishment. Although free-riding could be a 
natural behaviour of companies in the Argentine context, companies avoided this 
because of the penalties involved.
The researcher has explained the findings of the research based in the interview 
questions. The researcher had made no question about the ethical considerations of 
respondents as the aim of this study was to abstract from the ethical issues. 
Nevertheless, the researcher found in the open coding process that the 'ethics' emerged 
as a concept. The researcher decided to comment briefly this concept although it is not 
the aim of this research.
The researcher noticed that ethical considerations were made all through the research 
even if respondents never mentioned the word corruption. The fact that contribution 
payments are made directly to officials, with the aim of deviating the officials from the 
best policy, is accepted by all respondents. Most respondents experienced corruption in 
dealings with the government. The government corruption generated funds to be used to 
finance the ruling political party. Confronted with the issue that there was corruption in 
the health care sector, pharmapolitics managers showed an ambivalent feeling about 
corruption. They felt that it was not right to enter into corrupt practices but, as they saw
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it, there was no choice. All pharmapolitics managers thought that the goal justified the 
means. It seemed like a necessary part of the job description.
Corruption and its rationale have been discussed by numerous authors but it was not an 
objective of this study, which only focused on the implementation of lobbying, not on 
its moral consequences. The researcher has no plans to develop in the future any 
research related to corruption in the pharmaceutical lobbying and its implications.
5.4 From the data to the categories
The two research questions were answered in the emergent theory: why and how the 
pharmapolitics managers perform their lobbying? The fixed set of questions and the 
participant observation permitted the collection of almost all the data used in this 
research. Open coding was used for questions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 11 and 12. Coding for 
process was used for the questions 5 (building trust), 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 (lobbying 
process). The conditional matrix was used as an analytical device helping to identify the 
relationships between the different sub-concepts, conditions and consequences. Through 
the process of axial coding, the researcher identified the relationship between the 
concepts, sub-concepts, properties and processes. Sub-categories emerged as aggregates 
of the most closely interrelated elements for which supporting evidence was strong. The 
researcher identified seven sub-categories. These categories were defined as a 
fundamental class or division of data. In the context of this research they represent a 
fundamental issue or topic concerning pharmaceutical lobbying. A full tabulation of the 
seven sub-categories, together with the concepts, processes and properties, is included
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Each of these sub-categories is a cluster concept that captures an important explanatory 
aspect of the overall phenomenon of interest; why and how multinational 
pharmaceutical companies perform lobby operations in Argentina. The naming of the 
categories was arbitrary. In each case, it represented an attempt by the researcher to 
capture and imply the logic that tied together the various concepts and properties. That 
the research was carried out in Spanish proved to be another obstacle for the adequate 
naming of the categories. The researcher had done all the coding process (open, axial 
and process) in Spanish so that when he identified the seven sub-categories, he had the
' The labels included in the Appendix shows only a selection of those identified in the process of open 
coding.
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appropriate name in Spanish. Literal translation is not adequate in this case. An example 
of this would be the sub-category "Cooperative lobbying". In Spanish this sub-category 
would be named "Corporative lobbying" and this has the same meaning as 
"Cooperative lobbying" in English. Being able to express my thoughts clearly has 
always been a major concern to me when I spoke my native language Spanish; so that 
trying to translate the appropriate name for the sub-categories has been a difficult task. 
The sub-categories showed the researcher the logical way to the identification of the 
core category.
5.5 Core category
Finding the core category- the one that integrates all the other major categories- is the 
aim of grounded theory. By using selective coding the researcher went through the 
process by which all categories were unified around a core category (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990). Selective coding required the selection of the focal core code that was 
the central phenomenon that emerged from the selective coding process. This focal core 
code for this research was pharmaceutical lobbying. Seven sub-categories were found 
in the axial coding process. These sub-categories were related to the core category, 
pharmaceutical lobbying. These categories were classified as representing context, 
conditions, actions, interactions and outcomes. The basic questions "why, who, what 
and how" are represented in the sub-categories. The researcher developed a theoretical 
framework of interrelated concepts that showed posited relationships between the 
pharmaceutical lobbying identified in answer to the fixed set of interview questions. 
The questions and participant observation aimed to identify what was the central 
activity occurring here, what were the conditioning or influencing concepts, what were 
the observable outcomes and any intervening concepts and variables being represented
by the sub-categories (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). The selective coding stage integrated
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the seven sub-categories in what emerged as the core category, pharmaceutical 
lobbying. Pharmaceutical lobbying as a core category has analytical power. "What 
gives it that power is its ability to pull the other categories together to form an 
explanatory whole" (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 146). Following the grounded theory 
methodology the seven sub-categories, found in the axial coding process, provided the 
basis to explain the substantive theory in the research.
5.6 Substantive Theory
The researcher addressed the two research questions of 'why'' and 'how' the 
pharmaceutical industry carried out its lobbying. The target for lobbying, for the 
pharmacopolitics manager, was the official. There had been a transfer of decision- 
making power from the physician to the official so that the official now decided what 
the physician should prescribe. The officials exerted their power through the formularies 
by introducing or removing drugs. The pharmacopolitics manager targeted the official 
for lobbying in order to have the company's products introduced onto formularies. 
Regarding the question 'why' was pharmaceutical lobbying carried out, the researcher 
identified five motivations. Respondents stated three motivations explicitly: introduce 
products onto the formularies, maintain market share in the formularies and increase 
sales and profits. The researcher identified two implicit motivations: to influence 
decisions and simplify future negotiations. The basic research question 'who' developed 
into 'who were the participants in the pharmaceutical lobbying process' during the 
emergence of the fixed set of questions. The researcher recognised nine participants: 
pharmacopolitics managers, public officials, HMO officials, pharmaceutical companies, 
government, HMDs, the multinational companies Chamber (CAEMe), the American 
Embassy and the free-lance lobbyists. The researcher classified them according to their
degree of participation in the pharmaceutical lobbying process- pharmacopolitics
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managers, public and HMO officials were identified as active participants; 
pharmaceutical companies, the government and HMOs as passive participants; and the 
multinational companies Chamber (CAEMe), the American Embassy and the free-lance 
lobbyists as occasional participants. Pharmacopolitics managers agreed that building 
trust and the product were the keys to success in pharmaceutical lobbying. Product 
related to having a product with certain intrinsic properties such as quality, scientific 
support, being essential for the health of the patients and being broadly used. On the 
other side there were some perceived properties (scientific value, economic value and 
social value) that officials and pharmacopolitics managers regarded as important for the 
policy decision. The basic question of 'what' was the physical item in the lobbying 
process, was addressed: it was the pharmaceutical product. Pharmacopolitics managers 
lobbied for the pharmaceutical product to be included in a formulary. Building trust 
related to building a relationship with the official and to creating a negotiation 
environment for the pharmaceutical lobbying process. Building trust was a process 
and coding for process was used for its analysis. The pharmacopolitics manager had to 
build a relationship (close, informal, long-term) with the official so that 
pharmaceutical lobbying could take place. This relationship was essential for any 
lobbying activity. Once the relationship was established, the pharmacopolitics manager 
had to create a negotiation environment for the pharmaceutical lobbying process. The 
pharmacopolitics manager had to delineate his/her strategy to lobby the official. The 
researcher identified four sub-processes and one output in the strategy sub-category. 
The sub-processes were preliminary review, obtain access, preparation and negotiation; 
the output was success or failure. Preliminary review referred to the collection of 
information about the official and the HMO by the pharmacopolitics manager to prepare 
his/her strategy for the lobbying process. After that, the pharmacopolitics manager tried 
to obtain access to the official. If there was an existing relationship, this posed no
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problem. In cases where there was no existing relationship, a third party (colleagues, 
free-lance lobbyists) was used to gain access. After access was obtained, the 
pharmacopolitics manager prepared the dossier of the product (scientific evidence) 
aimed at transmitting information about the product or technology to the official. The 
pharmacopolitics manager arranged the meeting with the official and the negotiation 
process began. At the meeting, the pharmacopolitics manager requested a desired 
action, i.e. the introduction of a product in a formulary, and gave the dossier to the 
official. The official asked for more information or acceded to what the manager 
requested. The pharmacopolitics manager had to adapt his/her lobbying strategy 
according to the previous information gathered and the signals received from the 
official. The negotiation continued with the transmission of information until 
achievement of the expected result. In the case where the negotiation did not advance, 
the pharmacopolitics manager could decide to follow a contribution payments strategy. 
A trust environment between the official and the pharmacopolitics manager had to exist 
for there to be a contribution payments strategy. The official requested a contribution 
payment for himself/herself, either for the HMO or for both. The pharmacopolitics 
manager evaluated the request and negotiated with the official until reaching an 
agreement. In cases where that did not happen, the pharmacopolitics manager would 
look for an alternative strategy to achieve his/her objective. The pharmacopolitics 
manager would try to gain access to a higher-ranking official in the organisation or 
would hire a free-lance lobbyist to carry out the lobbying of the official.
Pharmaceutical lobbying could be carried out singly or in a cooperative way. 
Cooperative lobbying was considered in this research to be lobbying exerted by the 
Chamber (CAEMe) or a group of companies with a common objective. The researcher 
identified that cooperative lobbying was used when the targets for lobbying were
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large organisations such as HMOs or the government. The reason being that a coalition 
of companies can negotiate from a stronger position than from lobbying alone. In 
cooperative lobbying, the group exerted pressure and the HMO or the government was 
unable to outmanoeuvre the group members. Individual companies also lobbied large 
HMOs and the government for minor changes as cooperative lobbying did not look 
after the particular interests of one company but only to the interests of the coalition. 
Free-riding was not possible in the context of pharmaceutical lobbying in Argentina 
because of the coercion exerted by the largest companies- the punishment being the 
exclusion from the formularies and from the industry's negotiations. Pharmaceutical 
lobbying as a core category addressed the two research questions of 'why' and 'how' 
the pharmaceutical industry carried out lobbying. The substantive theory also found that 
corporatism was the predominant theory in pharmaceutical lobbying. No evidence was 
found that supported the pluralist theory.
5.7 Conclusion
This chapter developed the substantive theory found in the process of the research. 
Grounded theory was used as a methodology and the substantive theory was grounded 
in the data. The emergent theory is supported by all the data gathered. Seven sub- 
categories were identified and through the selective coding one core category was 
identified, pharmaceutical lobbying. The findings of this research supported earlier 
studies on the lobbying theory. It also provided new insights in the process of 
pharmaceutical lobbying. Locke (2001) identified two common approaches; a) the 
literature is interwoven with the data, b) the findings from the data are presented 
separately and the integration of existing theory and research delayed until the 
discussion section. The researcher took the latter approach. The findings were reported
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This chapter deals with the substantive theory discussed in chapter five and compares it 
with the formal theory of lobbying. This process aims to strengthen the external validity 
of the substantive theory. External validity requires establishing clearly the domain to 
which the study's findings can be generalised. Here, reference is made to analytical and 
not statistical generalisation and required generalising a particular set of findings to the 
broader theory of lobbying and not broader population. Three main topics discussed in 
this chapter:
a) The linkage of the emergent theory with the macro-theory of lobbying.
b) The linkage of the emergent theory with the meso-theory of lobbying.
c) The linkage of the emergent theory with the micro-theory of lobbying.
Through these linkages the researcher aimed to verify or dispute the formal theories 
based on the research data. The discussion of the substantive theory with the formal 
theory enabled the researcher to develop the conceptual findings. This research was 
supported by theories of lobbying; the macro-theory, the meso-theory and the micro- 
theory. Elements of each emerged from the data in all parts of the research. The 
comparison of the formal theory with the substantive theory improved external validity 
by establishing the domain to which the study's findings can be analytically generalised. 
The limitation of the conceptual findings was that they were related only to the 
pharmaceutical lobbying performed by multinational pharmaceutical companies in 
Argentina. Further research is required to establish whether the conceptual models
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developed in this research could be applied to another country or context.
Four models have been developed to illustrate the conceptual findings. These models 
derived from the discussion of the formal theory and the substantive theory. Two of 
them were related to the macro-theory of lobbying and the other two to the meso-theory 
of lobbying. A conceptual model based on the micro-theory of lobbying was not 
developed because this theory was the application of lobbying in specific situations and 
this issue has been extensively explored in the Substantive Theory chapter. 
Nevertheless, the differences to the situation in the USA have been pointed out.
The four models are:
a) The position of the pharmaceutical industry in the corporatism-pluralism 
scenario.
b) Comparison of lobbying styles.
c) The pharmaceutical lobbying process.
d) The cooperative and individual lobbying strategy.
The researcher has discussed the limitations of the study, suggested recommendations 
for further research and dealt with the implications of the study for professional 
practice.
6.2 Discussion of the substantive theory with the formal theory
6.2.1 Substantive theory and formal macro-theory of lobbying
Pluralism, where power was spread throughout society with no particular sector being 
dominant, was antagonist to the role of pharmaceutical industry as an interest group in
220
their relationship with government and HMDs. Felicio (2002) remarked that there were 
no other power sources or interest groups who balance the relationship of the 
pharmaceutical industry with the government and HMDs. The pluralist model of 
competing interest groups that tried to influence government decision was not found in 
the substantive theory. The substantive theory showed only one interest group, the 
pharmaceutical industry as a corporation or coalition, which built close ties with the 
government and HMOs to pursue its interests. There was no bargaining between interest 
groups as Dahl & Lindblom (1976) suggested so pluralist theory was not applicable to 
the pharmaceutical industry as an interest group.
Nevertheless some elements of pluralism were found in the substantive theory. One was 
the polyarchy concept developed by Dahl (1991) who stated that interest groups had 
unequal resources to influence government or officials. The pharmaceutical industry 
was one of these groups, with plenty of resources to influence government. It hired its 
pharmacopolitics managers to exert more influence on government decisions than other 
interest groups. Truman (1951) did not believe in the equality of groups as he felt that 
any system tended to discriminate in favour of established groups and interests; this 
could be seen in the close ties between high ranking officials and pharmacopolitics 
managers. The assertion by Lindblom (1977) and Grant (2002) that business occupied a 
privileged relationship with decision-makers was supported by the substantive theory. 
Lindblom & Braybrooke (1963) introduced the theory of incrementalism where the 
players learnt from experience and increased their power in a certain sector or area. This 
was essentially true in pharmaceutical lobbying because greater lobbying by 
pharmapolitics managers of the officials resulted in a better established relationship and 
this further facilitated the process of lobbying.
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The pluralist model of different interest groups competing with each other in different 
areas of influence and with different powers was not supported by the substantive 
theory. Substantive theory showed no competition with lobbying groups or lobbying 
actors.
The position of the pharmaceutical industry was definitively more closely related to 
corporatism. The pharmaceutical industry in Argentina was a major interest group with 
close ties to the government and power to influence its decisions. Shonfield (1965) 
observed that the major interest groups, such as the pharmaceutical industry, were 
brought together and encouraged to conclude a series of bargains about their future 
behaviour which would have the effect of moving economic events along a desired path. 
Schmitter (1974) stated that in a corporatist system there were few groups, each in a 
specially privileged relationship with government. This statement described the 
relationship that the pharmaceutical industry maintained with the government and 
HMOs. Schmitter (1974) also remarked that in corporatism the constituent units were 
recognised by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their 
respective categories. That held for the pharmaceutical industry in Argentina as no other 
interest group was in competition with the industry's interests (Felicio, 2002). 
Lehmbruch (1977) placed greater emphasis on policy making in which concerted action 
assumed central importance. Lehmbruch saw corporatism as an institutional pattern of 
policy formation in which large interest organisations, like the pharmaceutical industry, 
cooperated with each other and with public authorities in not only the articulation and 
even intermediation of interests but also in the authoritative allocation of values and the 
implementation of policies. A case that illustrated this collaboration was the 
pharmaceutical industry's cooperation with the Health Superintendence in the 
modification of the reference-price decree. Crouch (1983) stated that insider groups
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were incorporated in decisions and played a structured and significant role in 
policymaking; the pharmaceutical industry could be identified in the substantive theory 
as an insider group in the process of decision making. The existence of outsider groups 
following Grant's (1989) classification was not supported by the substantive theory.
Schmitter (1974) defined corporatism as a structure of interest representation and 
Lehmbruch's (1977) corporatism as a system of policy making. The pharmaceutical 
industry, as a corporate member, represented the interests of its members acting on its 
behalf. On the other side, the pharmaceutical industry is consulted by the government in 
policy issues, having a dominant role in the policy outputs. Cawson's (1985) view 
amalgamated both perspectives. Adapting his definition to the reality of the 
pharmaceutical industry, it can be said that corporatism was a specific socio-political 
process in which the pharmaceutical industry, representing its monopolistic functional 
interests, engaged in political exchange with state or private health care agencies over 
public policy outputs in a role that combined interest representation and policy 
implementation through delegated self-enforcement.
The concept developed by Wassenberg (1982) was an advance towards a better 
definition of the role of the pharmaceutical industry in the corporatist model. This 
concept (Wassenberg, 1982) examined the role of collective actors, not government but 
companies, which hovered around and defended the specific interests of sectors like the 
pharmaceutical industry. Wassenberg (1982) argued that corporatism could exist at 
three levels, according to the specialisation of the actors involved:
a) Macrocorporatism represented the peak institutions of the politico-economic 
body like congress.
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b) Mesocorporatism related to the institutionalised entity of complete industries 
which is represented in this research by the pharmaceutical industry and its 
chambers.
c) Microcorporatism, which in this research was the individual pharmaceutical 
company or the pharmapolitics manager and thus is the lowest unit of political 
body.
The mesocorporatism perspective had a less ambitious understanding of corporatism as 
a sectional limited form with an empirical approach. The introduction of the meso- and 
micro-concept was vital in defining the role of the pharmaceutical industry, the 
chambers and its pharmapolitics managers in order to integrate them into the corporatist 
concept. This related to the interviews and the substantive theory in terms of the action 
of individual companies when lobbying HMOs and officials at a micro-corporatism 
level. When the industry performed cooperative lobbying, either through the chambers 
or through a coalition of companies, they fitted in the meso-corporatism concept.
The view of corporate pluralism formulated by Kvavik and Heissler (1974) was not 
supported by the substantive theory. Kvavik and Heissler (1974) described corporate 
pluralism as a process of co-optation whereby groups were offered representation in 
policy-making circles in exchange for supporting the resulting policies, even if the 
policy was not exactly (or even very close to) what the group desired. The 
pharmaceutical industry did not support policies that were not close to those that it 
desired. An example was the boycott against the implementation of the generics law 
introduced by the Ministry of Health. The law stated that physicians should only write 
the name of the drug in a prescription and not the trademark. Therefore the patient in the 
pharmacy could choose the most convenient alternative. This regulation left the decision
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in the hands of the pharmacist and the patient. The pharmaceutical industry 
implemented a boycott through the HMOs formularies and conditioned payment of 
rebates to HMOs to the acceptance of prescriptions with trademark. The HMOs decided 
to continue receiving the rebates and did not enforce the rule to physicians about 
accepting the use of trademarks in the prescriptions.
Kelso's (1978) view largely reflected the role of the pharmaceutical industry as an 
interest/pressure group. He stressed the importance of cooperation between interest 
groups and government agencies, and of building networks between private groups and 
the government to make decisions on policy. These networks were described in the 
substantive theory chapter in the category "building trust". Kelso's (1978) model 
comprised a political system broken into a series of autonomous fiefdoms presided over 
by interest groups, like the pharmaceutical industry, that cooperated with the 
government and had an important role in decision making.
Regarding the interest group theory, the pharmaceutical industry fitted in Salisbury's 
(1984) definition when he mentioned that the classic view of the interest group omitted 
individual corporations like the pharmaceutical industry. Olson (1965) raised an 
important issue that was supported by the substantive theory namely that an interest 
group would decline to contribute to the costs of collective action, and thus would free 
ride, unless there was coercion to force it to do otherwise (Maloney & Jordan, 1997). 
These organisations should have "the authority and capacity to be coercive or have a 
source of positive inducements that they can offer the individuals in a latent group" 
(Olson, 1965, p.34). In the substantive theory it was demonstrated that the 
pharmaceutical industry coerced its members and that punishments were applied to 
free-riders such as exclusion from the formularies. This coercion was applied by the 
Chambers or by groups of large companies. In this way members joined for selective
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incentives (Olson, 1965) such as inclusion of the products in the formularies; moreover, 
coercion was a means of inhibiting free-riding.
For Olson (1965) lobbying was a by-product of large economic groups that obtained 
their strength and support because they performed some function for the group interests. 
The substantive theory did not support this assertion. Lobbying was the principal way to 
achieve the legislation that would benefit the whole group. The substantive theory 
supported the existence of organisational entrepreneurs (Salisbury, 1969) in which 
chambers executives or coalitions leaders guided the other companies. The group 
maintenance issue was regarded as an exchange situation in which entrepreneurs 
lobbied for the rest of companies in specific issues, which they offered to members at a 
price, namely membership (Jordan & Richardson, 1987). Walker (1983) introduced the 
concept of patronage as means of maintaining the groups; a concept that was not 
supported by the substantive theory, but the researcher observed that there was 
patronage of the Multinational companies chamber (CAEMe) as it was funded by its 
member companies.
Salisbury (1984) argued that interest representation was dominated by institutions such 
as corporations and local government. He maintained that the classic view of the interest 
group omitted individual corporations, state and local governments, universities, think 
tanks and most other institutions of the private sector (Jordan and Richardson, 1987). As 
mentioned before, the pharmaceutical industry had to be considered as within this type 
of interest group. Moloney and Jordan (1996) also noted the interaction of corporations 
with government decision making circles. Howell (2004) referred to this issue saying 
that they were the type of organisation whose political task was to reflect the interests of 
the economic or occupational section that they represented. The substantive theory 
showed how the chambers lobbied for the interests of the pharmaceutical industry. The
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pharmaceutical industry complied with Richardson's (1993) definition as a pressure 
group that articulated demands that the authorities in the political system should make 
an authoritative allocation; in its activities, the pharmaceutical industry did not seek to 
occupy the position of authority. Woll (2006, p.465) noticed that the term "interest 
groups" excludes firms and their political influence and her approach was: "Lobbying is 
all the activities by private actors aimed at influencing political decision-makers", 
including firms as "actors" but not as "interest groups". This assertion was firmly 
supported by the substantive theory as firms were active participants in the 
pharmaceutical lobbying process. Within the companies, the pharmacopolitics managers 
were the individuals who acted as 'lobbying actors' representing the interests of 
companies. Coen (1997) showed that individual firms were important political actors 
and studies had increasingly focused on new groups and ad hoc alliances rather than on 
traditional interest groups. Coen's view was also found in the substantive theory; the 
companies build coalitions to lobby the government or large HMOs.
Lobbying has to be understood by looking at the context in which interest groups were 
trying to act. Pharmaceutical lobbying in Argentina was different from the US and EU. 
The researcher developed a lobbying style framework of pharmaceutical lobbying based 
on the one presented by Woll (2006). The organisation of interest representation in 
Argentina had three modalities: one was the national Chamber of Multinational 
Companies (CAEMe) which lobbied the government and the large HMOs, the other was 
issue-specific coalitions between a group of companies that also lobbied the large 
HMOs and the last was the direct lobbying of the individual company (oriented at 
HMOs and officials) through its pharmacopolitics managers in issues related 
specifically to products. The instruments available in the three modalities were 
transmission of information and contribution payments. Pharmacopolitics managers
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acted in the formulation of policies or in the formulation of formularies. There were 
revisions whereby pharmacopolitics managers tried to change what had been agreed by 
the Chambers or the coalitions in cooperative lobbying. The relationships between the 
pharmacopolitics managers and the officials tended to be long-term, not issue oriented 
and based on reciprocity. Pharmacopolitics managers expressed their demands in a 
direct way. Most of the time when there was a relationship the demand was direct and 
based on the information provided by the pharmaceutical companies.
6.2.2 Substantive theory and formal meso- theory of lobbying
This section analysed the findings of the research compared to the meso-theory of 
lobbying which determined two channels of influence: contribution payments and 
transmission of information. Both channels were used in pharmaceutical lobbying in 
Argentina. For the discussion of the formal theory, transmission of information was 
dealt with first. Fundamentally it is as described in the substantive theory; this 
instrument was used first by pharmapolitics managers in their lobbying of officials.
The different models created by different authors were discussed to assess the meso- 
theory of lobbying with the substantive theory. The reduced form lobbying models were 
basic and they did not consider certain aspects of individual behaviour in the process of 
lobbying but despite this they were the starting point for the various models.
Substantive theory suggested that pharmaceutical lobbying fits in the "regulatory 
approach", as first proposed by Stigler (1971) and formalised by Peltzman (1976). The 
lobbying process was implicit, assumed that the official set a policy in order to 
maximise a weighted sum of special interests' utility and aggregate welfare. The 
regulatory approach focused on the determination of the policy outcome, such as the 
introduction of a product in a formulary, and that pharmacopolitics activities led to a
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policy bias in favour of a certain company or group of companies.
The "policy formation approach" developed by Becker (1983) was not supported by the 
substantive theory of pharmaceutical lobbying in Argentina. In this model, two 
opposing lobbies used contribution payments to influence the official towards a decision 
favourable to their special interests. In the case of this research the model was not 
applied because either the pharmaceutical industry acted in a cooperative way- lobbying 
as an interest group the government and big HMOs- or on a micro-level when a 
company pursued the introduction of a new product in a formulary. On the micro-level 
there was no competition trying to counteract the company's activities. The only event 
in which there were two opposing lobbies was the issuing of the patent law in congress. 
At that time multinational companies lobbied through the American Embassy against 
the national companies who tried to counteract this lobbying.
Officials had an incentive to listen when they were imperfectly informed because the 
pharmaceutical industry had better information about the relevant issue than the 
officials, independent of whether it was a product or a new technology. This related 
strongly to the concept of "bounded rationality" developed by Simon (1955). Officials 
faced uncertainty about future policies and they could not incur in costs in acquiring 
information. These two factors, thus, limited the extent to which officials could make a 
fully rational decision. Simon (1955) claimed, they had only "bounded rationality" and 
officials were forced to make decisions not by "maximisation" but by "satisficing", 
based on the information provided by the pharmacopolitics managers. The huge 
amounts spent on the research of a new product ensured that pharmaceutical companies 
had the most complete information available about the new product or technology. The 
officials did not have the same information thus were imperfectly informed about the 
subject to be evaluated. This situation generated an information motive for lobbying.
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Extensive information about a new product gave pharmaceutical companies the chance 
to influence the officials' decision through the provision of whole or part of this 
information. Different "transmission of information models" were developed by 
different authors and they were assessed against the substantive theory of this research. 
These abstract models were adapted to the pharmaceutical lobbying context. Words 
such as agent and principals were changed for official and companies.
The models of Potters and van Winden (1992), and Ainsworth (1993) were basic 
communication models. These models were supported by the substantive theory. The 
official had little knowledge about a new product or technology. The task of the official 
was to choose a correct policy under uncertainty and bounded rationality (Simon, 1955). 
The company, through the pharmapolitics manager, provided the official with a dossier 
of necessary information so that he/she could evaluate the new product or technology. 
The official had to decide whether to trust this information received from the company 
or could ask for additional information to be "satisfied" with his/her decision; again, the 
company could provide this information to the official. The pharmacopolitics manager 
aimed to influence the official's decision with the provision of information. The two 
models mentioned above divided the companies into good and bad type lobbies. The 
substantive theory could not evaluate through the data whether the officials regarded 
companies as good or bad. It was already mentioned in the substantive theory that the 
officials regarded the pharmaceutical industry as a necessary evil so it was clear that 
there was a negative attitude from officials towards pharmaceutical companies in 
general. It was also the case that officials regarded the scientific information provided 
by pharmacopolitics managers as reliable.
Austen-Smith and Wright (1992) focused on the counteractive lobbying of two interest 
groups with opposing interests. This model was not supported in the substantive theory.
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The only concept related to this model was when the respondents mentioned the patent 
law where national companies competed with multinationals. Pharmaceutical lobbying 
in Argentina was only carried out by one actor. It could have been the pharmaceutical 
industry as a whole, acting in a cooperative way, or it could have been the individual 
pharmaceutical company trying to influence an official. Even when a pharmapolitics 
manager tried to incorporate a product in the PMO (National Formulary) there was no 
other lobbying actor trying to hinder or counteract this action. This model did not 
consider when lobbies cooperated by bringing the same information to the official; it 
did not consider the cooperative lobbying found in the substantive theory.
Lohmann's (1993) analysis deviated from the basic communication model and it 
focused on the position of the official when he/she made a decision about a certain 
policy. In this model, there were a finite number of lobbying groups distributed along an 
interval. They were characterised by single peaked preferences about the policy in 
question and each group preferred the policy alternative which was closer to its ideal 
point. This model contained some elements that were found in the substantive theory 
but it did not correspond to the reality found in pharmaceutical lobbying as there was 
usually only one lobbying actor, which could have been the pharmaceutical industry or 
one company. The common elements found were the following:
• The official also had information about what the lobbying actor, in this case the 
pharmaceutical company, expected about a certain policy.
• It introduced the concept of the costs of getting the information that has to be 
presented to the official. The pharmaceutical company had to decide whether to 
incur in additional costs, of pharmaeconomic studies, if the information 
presented in the dossier was not enough.
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These two elements were supported by the substantive theory; the pharmacopolitics 
manager expressed his/her expected policy so that the official had this information. The 
other issue was that the pharmaceutical company, when asked about more studies, 
especially local, had to decide whether to incur those additional costs.
This model also introduced the concept of moderates and extremists, which was similar 
to the model of good and bad lobbies. As noticed before, this moral classification was 
not found in the data gathered. The model also argued that only moderates would not 
always send information but that was not the case in pharmaceutical lobbying as 
information was always supplied.
Lagerlof (1997) extended this model and assumed that the interest group was 
imperfectly informed. The substantive theory showed that pharmaceutical companies 
had invested hundreds of million dollars in research and development and therefore the 
assumption that the lobbying actor was imperfectly informed was not valid to a certain 
extent. The researcher acknowledged that perfect information was not possible to 
achieve, but the pharmaceutical companies possessed the most complete information 
available regarding the product or technology. The pharmaceutical company was only 
forced to acquire additional information when the official expected it. This additional 
information was most of the time local pharmaeconomic models or studies.
Communication costs served as an access device that informed the officials about the 
benefits of granting access to certain groups. Lohmann (1995a) and Austen-Smith 
(1998) presented models where the interest groups and lobbying actors, in this case the 
pharmaceutical companies, gained access to officials via contributions. The substantive 
theory demonstrated that in Argentina no contribution had to be paid to obtain access. 
Access was facilitated by previous contacts or by another pharmapolitics manager/free-
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lance lobbyist, who, on rare occasions, collected a fee for performing the introduction. 
Therefore, this model did not apply to the substantive theory of pharmaceutical 
lobbying in Argentina.
The other channel of influence decisions were the contribution payments. Contributions 
provided incentives for the officials to deviate from the best policy choice. These 
models fully specified the objective function of both the official and the pharmaceutical 
company. This allowed for an analysis of strategic interaction between interest groups 
/lobbying actors and the official. The consideration that the researcher took on analysing 
the contribution payment models was that sometimes these contributions were aimed at 
HMOs and in other cases at the private interest of officials. The models of this section 
made use of theoretical results from common agency theory which comprised of 
situations in which a set of principals (pharmaceutical companies) influenced the 
decision of a common agent (officials).
Grossman and Helpman (1994) introduced the first lobbying application into the 
framework of the common agency theory. In this model the official decided a policy 
which affected the payoffs from the pharmaceutical companies who in turn try to 
influence his/her choice. In the first stage of the game each lobbying actor decided on a 
contribution offer to the official, or the HMO, stating how much money was to be paid 
for each alternative policy realisation. In the second stage the official observed these 
offers, determined the policy, and collected the respective money offers. It must be 
remarked that this model did not fit exactly in the substantive theory of pharmaceutical 
lobbying as the model implied that there were competing interests between lobbying 
actors. In pharmaceutical lobbying there could be different contingent offers but they 
would be for different objectives namely for different products. There was also the case 
where pharmaceutical companies acted in a cooperative way; the official had only one
233
offer. He/she had to decide simply whether to accept or to decline. Nevertheless, the 
model was helpful for the substantive theory as it provided a contribution payments 
framework stating how the pharmaceutical industry or the individual companies and 
officials interacted.
The official might well have preferences about the policy. For instance, a benevolent 
official would prefer the policy which maximised aggregate welfare for the HMO. 
Contribution offers by companies served to compensate the agent for any deviation 
from the welfare maximising policy. On the other hand, the official could be completely 
opportunistic and care only about contributions and not about the policy itself. In the 
substantive theory there was a mixed approach; officials frequently looked for a 
deviation of the policy that partially benefited the HMO and also partially benefited 
their private interests. This model introduced the contribution payments issues and 
provided the guidelines into which the substantive theory was grounded. This model did 
not consider the cooperation between companies, as described when the pharmaceutical 
industry had to lobby the government or big HMOs.
Rama and Tabellini (1998) stated that cooperative lobbying led to higher payoffs than 
non-cooperative lobbying. Particularly they analysed the case when there was one 
coalition lobbying the government compared to individuals with the same purpose. This 
abstract model depicts what happened in Argentina when lobbying the government as 
described in the substantive theory. If the government achieved a high payoff with any 
of the individual companies alone, it was able to play the companies against each other 
and benefited from a conflict of interest between them. In contrast if the joint payoff to 
a coalition of all players, the government and all companies, was high then there was an 
interest to include all relevant actors in the political process. The substantive theory 
indicated that pharmaceutical companies in Argentina cooperatively lobbied the
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government or large HMOs to avoid being outplayed by these organisations. The 
payoffs for the coalition were higher than the payoffs of individual lobbying.
The common agency lobbying model presented by Grossman and Helpman (1994) only 
assumed a small country. This implied that the government set policy independently of 
possible countervailing measures by a foreign country and so strategic interaction 
between different countries played no role. Grossman and Helpman (1995), in another 
paper, extended the basic lobbying model to consider this aspect and studied strategic 
interaction between two governments. In the substantive theory, it was shown that the 
USA interacted in the Argentine scenario specifically regarding the medicine's patent 
law. The American government received the pressure of the American pharmaceutical 
industry through its chamber (PhRMA). This lobbying by PhRMA aimed to introduce 
changes in the patent law in Argentina. As the countries traded with each other there 
was a degree of pressure than could be exerted to influence the other government. In the 
patents law case the USA persuaded the Argentine government to introduce some 
changes suggested by PhRMA (the American pharmaceutical chamber). At that time the 
influence of the American Embassy over the government was high. Even then, the law 
was not exactly what the American government wanted. The Argentine government was 
no longer able to independently respond to lobbying activities but needed to take 
strategic interactions with the American government into account. This extension of 
Grossman and Helpman (1995) was supported by the substantive theory.
The literature on lobbying divided into two broad movements as the preceding sections 
indicated; either as contribution payments or as a means of transmitting information. 
The approach stated by Bennedsen and Feldmann (2001) was the only one that could 
describe pharmaceutical lobbying in Argentina. They introduced the first mixed 
approach with both components. Their new model focused on the instrument choice of
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lobbying. They assumed that a lobbying actor, in this case a pharmaceutical company, 
could influence a political decision in two independent ways. Firstly, it could engage in 
costly information acquisition and transfer the result truthfully. In the case of the 
pharmaceutical companies the acquisition of costly information was essential as the 
information was needed for the registration of the product. Pharmaceutical companies 
communicated this information truthfully to the officials.
Secondly, the pharmaceutical company determined contribution payments that 
compensated the official or the HMD, or both, for a deviation towards its preferred 
policy choice. The question for Bennedsen and Feldmann (2001) arose when the 
company had to decide which type of lobbying the official preferred and how these 
instruments affected each other. That was also an uncertainty for the pharmapolitics 
managers when he/she approaches an official with whom he/she had no relationship. 
First, he/she would transmit information and later in the negotiation the pharmapolitics 
manager had to decide whether to turn to contribution payments.
Damania and Fredriksson (2000) focused on incentives to free-ride in a set-up where 
two lobbying actors followed a common interest. Each group might abstain from 
lobbying, lobby alone, or form a coalition with the other lobby. The authors stated 
conditions such free-riding on the other firm's lobbying activities, joint lobbying, or 
unilateral lobbying occurred in the state game. If the game was repeated infinitely, 
cooperation might result even if free-riding was the optimal behaviour in the state game. 
Cooperation was implemented through trigger strategies, which let each firm cooperate 
as long as the other one did. Cooperation was more likely if the short term benefit of 
defection was small relative to the discounted future benefits of cooperation.
The substantive theory demonstrated that free-riding, when occasionally occurred, was
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strongly punished in the Argentine pharmaceutical market. First, the findings correlated 
with Damania and Fredriksson (2000) as companies did follow a common interest and 
they tended to lobby together in a cooperative way. The benefits of cooperation were 
much higher than those of free-riding. Additionally there were severe punishments for 
the companies that decided to free-ride. In these cases the pharmaceutical industry in 
Argentina had the authority and capacity to be coercive to its members. These 
punishments were the exclusion from the HMDs' formularies and from industry 
negotiations with the Government. The rational choice for companies was to adjust to 
the cooperative rules and form a coalition.
Mitra (1999) abstracted from incentives to free-ride within interest groups and presented 
another model. He extended the basic lobbying model and analysed the entry decision 
of interest groups and not the exit decision. This was supported by the substantive 
theory that showed that most companies decided to enter the lobbying coalition as the 
benefits of participation exceed the costs of entry.
6.2.3 Substantive theory and formal micro-theory of lobbying
The formal micro-theory of lobbying was reviewed only to describe the characteristics 
of the health care system and so that the reader can understand the different elements 
present in the substantive theory.
The term pharmacopolitics or pharmapolitics was defined as the activities performed by 
the pharmaceutical industry aimed at influencing government, public officials and 
Health Management Organisations (HMOs) in order to get a competitive advantage in 
the Market (Quinones, 2002). The definition given by Quinones was supported by the 
substantive theory. The motivations for pharmaceutical lobbying were not only aimed at 
gaining a competitive advantage in the market but also to increase sales, maintain
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market share within the formularies, influence the officials in their decisions and build 
relationships to simplify future negotiations.
The researcher would like to briefly point out some differences between the two health 
care systems that were supported by the substantive theory.
Cooperative lobbying was carried out in both countries and was used to lobby the 
government and large HMDs. In both cases they used the Chamber as an instrument of 
cooperative lobbying. The difference in Argentina was that a coalition of companies- 
national and multinational- also lobbied the government and large HMOs. In the USA a 
coalition of companies lobbying together was not permitted so lobbying was carried out 
by the Chamber or by individual companies.
In both countries, the pharmaceutical industry was one of the most potent political 
forces when it came to influencing legislation in the government or large HMOs. There 
were no records in Argentina about how much money was invested in the 
pharmaceutical lobbying. Hiring of free-lance lobbyists was done occasionally in 
Argentina in those cases where the pharmacopolitics manager had no access to the 
official. In the USA it was a common practice.
The methodology of executing lobbying in Argentina differed to the USA. Respondents 
mentioned that there were no donations to campaign contributions. The financing of the 
ruling political party was generated by corruption in the health care system. The use of 
advocacy groups was not supported by the substantive theory. In both countries, there 
were close ties to the public officials. Lobbying was implemented by pharmacopolitics 
managers in Argentina. In the USA, lobbying of public officials was implemented 
through external lobbyists.
Pharmaceutical companies had the same motivations as in the USA except for the
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pursuing of tax breaks in the legislation. Patents, increasing sales, maintaining share in 
the formularies, protecting against generic sales and preserving the freedom to establish 
prices were also motivations for lobbying in Argentina. The economic impact of 
lobbying in Argentina could not be identified in the substantive theory.
The HMO context was similar to the USA. There were multiple fragmented 
organisations that provided health care to a number of individuals. The objectives of 
these organisations were the same in both countries. The HMDs were organisations that 
contracted and supplied medical care on the basis of a fixed periodic payment; their 
activities were the management of medicines and treatment aimed at containing costs 
and promoting effectiveness. The different elements of the HMO setting were as 
follows:
a) Restricted formularies: in both countries HMOs adopted the use of restricted 
formularies to contain costs. The principal objective of formularies was to bring 
down costs selecting a narrower choice of drugs and adopting generics to replace 
the highly-price brand-name products (Dranove, 2003). A high percentage of the 
Argentina population belonged to an HMO with a restricted formulary. The 
respondents mentioned that there were controls issued by the HMO to make sure 
that physicians complied with the formularies. Those controls did exist in the 
USA. The pharmaceutical industry in Argentina and the US cooperated with the 
design of disease management programmes.
b) Pharmacy Benefit Management (PBM): in both countries, HMOs contracted 
PBMs for the management of pharmacies and the formulary. PBMs controlled 
costs by negotiating discounts from manufacturers, usually in the form of 
rebates, in return for placing the manufacturer's drug on the PBM formulary.
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PBMs in Argentina selected participating pharmacists, groups of drug 
manufacturers and administered point of sale claims. As in the USA, PBMs 
were intermediaries between the pharmaceutical industry, the HMOs and the 
pharmacies. The difference between Argentina and the USA was that PBMs in 
Argentina had to negotiate rebates with a group of companies, a coalition, 
instead of individual companies. The pharmaceutical industry realised that 
cooperative negotiation was needed to achieve lower rebates and extended 
formularies; in this way pharmaceutical companies were able to introduce more 
expensive medications and in the case of multinationals, new products.
c) Managed care account manager and pharmapolitics manager: The main 
difference between the managed care account manager and the pharmapolitics 
manager was that the pharmapolitics manager performed the lobbying not only 
to HMO and PBM officials but also to the government and public officials. The 
job was more comprehensive in Argentina as it was related to the total process 
of lobbying for a multinational company.
d) Distrust: in both countries there was distrust by HMO officials towards the 
pharmapolitics manager or managed care account manager. This distrust was 
based on a conflict of interest where HMOs saw financial support from 
formulary positions being sold and this financial support also compromised 
objective pharmacy and therapeutic committee decisions. The pharmaceutical 
company's objective was to maximise sales in a formulary and the HMO wanted 
to contain costs and provide a better service to their affiliates. However, the 
pharmapolitics manager in Argentina built close relationships with HMOs 
officials and there was not an issue over lack of trust.
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e) Rebates: in both countries. There were two typical types of rebate offered to 
HMDs or PBMs: an access rebate and a market-share rebate. The difference 
between Argentina and the USA was that in Argentina the access rebate was 
usually a contribution payment to the official instead of the HMO while the 
market-share rebate was a contribution payment made to the HMO.
f) Objectives of pharmapolitics activities: The inclusion of products in formularies 
was a controversial issue in the managed care setting even in Argentina. The 
reason why the pharmapolitics manager existed was that, although there should 
be an independent pharmacy and therapeutics committee to decide which 
products were included in a formulary with checks that none of the decision 
makers "inappropriately curry favour" (Studin, 2002, p.49), there was 
nonetheless the possibility of exerting influence on the inclusion decisions by 
HMOs. This influence was carried out through rebates, special agreements or 
other means such as hospitality, grants or programmes with key decision 
makers.
6.2.4 Summary
Formal theory of lobbying was discussed against the substantive theory described in the 
previous chapter. Firstly the inclusion of the pharmaceutical industry in the formal 
macro-theory, then an analysis was made of the definition of the role of the 
pharmaceutical industry as an interest group in the framework of pluralism, 
corporatism, meso-corporatism and corporate pluralism. The researcher also explored 
the interest group theory formation in the light of substantive theory.
Next the meso-theory of lobbying was explored. The two different approaches of 
lobbying, transmission of information and contribution payments, were then discussed.
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Elements of both approaches were supported by the substantive theory. The approach 
that fitted best with the substantive theory was that of the mixed approach presented by 
Bennedsen and Feldmann (2001) - this stated that both approaches were used and the 
lobbying actor should decide which to use at a certain moment. Free-riding was also 
discussed and the substantive theory demonstrated that free-riding in the Argentine 
pharmaceutical industry was difficult because of the punishments imposed by other 
companies on the free-riders.
The micro-theory of lobbying was also summarised. The literature review considered 
only the literature of the USA as there was no relevant Argentine literature. The market 
was similar so it was pertinent to use the American literature. The discussion illustrated 
the similarities and differences in the application of pharmaceutical lobbying.
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6.3 Conceptual findings
The research questions in this study aimed to address why and how pharmaceutical 
lobbying was carried out by pharmaceutical companies in Argentina. The substantive 
theory has dealt with both research questions extensively. Later, the discussion of the 
formal theory and substantive theory enabled the researcher to abstract from the 
substantive theory and through a deductive and intellectual processes develop the 
conceptual findings which provide new insights into the theory of lobbying. The 
researcher developed four new models which applied to the core category, 
pharmaceutical lobbying in Argentina. The models and insights are explained below:
6.3.1 Position of the pharmaceutical industry in the corporatism-pluralism scenario
Throughout the discussion with the formal macro-theory of lobbying it was explained 
that the Argentine pharmaceutical industry, as an interest group, was identified more 
with the corporatism theory than with the pluralism as it has a specially privileged 
relationship with the government. The pharmaceutical industry was also recognised by 
the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within its category. The 
pharmaceutical industry also cooperated with the government in the design of 
regulations that might affect its interests.
In an attempt to describe the position of the pharmaceutical industry in the pluralism- 
corporatism scenario, the researcher decided to take into account not only the original 
ideologies of pluralism and corporatism but also its variations of meso-corporatism and 
corporate-pluralism. The model identifies new insights in the lobbying theory as it 
describes the position of the pharmaceutical industry, the individual companies and 
their pharmacopolitics managers regarding these theories.
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The pharmaceutical industry fitted in the meso-corporatism approach as a collective 
actor that defended the specific interests of the pharmaceutical companies. As discussed 
in the previous section, the pharmaceutical industry as an interest group was not related 
to the concept of pluralism or corporate pluralism. Kelso's (1978) version of corporate 
pluralism was the closest to the pharmaceutical industry in the pluralist model; in his 
definition there were a series of autonomous fiefdoms presided over by interest groups 
which cooperate with the government, having an important role in decision-making. 
However, the researcher considered that meso-corporatism was the best fit for the 
pharmaceutical industry and the pharmaceutical companies as lobbying actors. In the 
meso-corporatism approach, the pharmaceutical industry was the peak association that 
influenced government about health care decisions.
Once positioned in meso-corporatism the researcher realised that there was a further 
classification to be made. Wassenberg (1982) established three different types of 
corporatism:
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a) Macro-corporatism: represented the peak institutions of the politico-economic 
body, e.g. congress.
b) Meso-corporatism: considered the pharmaceutical industry directly lobbying 
congress and the government as a peak institution in its sector. In this research, 
the multinational companies chamber (CAEMe) occupied the role of peak 
institutions in its relationship with the government. Coalitions of companies 
could be also considered in the meso-corporatist concept.
c) Micro-corporatism: This element was important as it best described the 
individual company in the lobbying process. The pharmaceutical company, 
through its pharmapolitics manager, influenced the officials at this level 
inducing them to make favourable decisions for the companies. Although 
Wassenberg (1982) classified the chambers as a part of the micro-corporatism 
model in this research they were part of the meso-corporatism model as they had 
a special relationship with the government.
This model explained the position of the pharmaceutical industry and its chamber as an 
interest group in the scenario of the different theories within the macro-theory of 
lobbying. It also positioned the pharmaceutical company as a lobbying actor in the 
corporatist model.
6.3.2 Pharmaceutical lobbying style
Lobbying cannot be understood without looking at the context in which the lobbying 
actors were trying to act. The model of Woll (2006), which depict the different styles of 
lobbying in the USA and in the EU, was adapted to show the pharmaceutical lobbying 
style in Argentina.
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The organisation of interest representation in Argentina had three modalities: one was 
the national organisation- the Chamber of Multinational Companies (CAEMe) which 
lobbied the government and the large HMDs. The second was issue-specific coalitions
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between a group of companies that also lobbied the large HMDs and the last modality 
was the direct lobbying of the individual company, oriented at HMOs and officials, in 
issues related specifically to the company's products. The pharmaceutical lobbying style 
in Argentina had in common with the American style the direct representation and 
issue-specific coalitions and it shared with the EU the representation of interests at a 
national level by national peak associations (CAEMe).
The instruments used by the three modalities (Chamber, coalitions or individual 
companies) of lobbying actors in Argentina were financial contributions in the form of 
payments to the HMO, to the official or both the HMO and official (Grossman and 
Helpman, 1994). The issue of consultation identified by Woll (2006) was interpreted by 
the researcher as transmission of information (Potters and van Winden, 1992 & 
Ainsworth, 1993). Lobbying actors met the officials and they consulted about specific 
issues. The lobbying actors expressed their views and provided information. In 
pharmaceutical lobbying in Argentina both instruments were used: contribution 
payments and transmission of information as in the model of Bennedsen and Feldman 
(2001). It also shared with the EU limited external lobbyists hiring.
Pharmacopolitics managers and the pharmaceutical industry acted before legislation 
was issued or the formulary developed. Lobbying was based in influencing the 
formulation of the new policy. Lobbying was also carried out to change existing policy 
in favour of the pharmaceutical industry (e.g. the reference prices decree mentioned in 
the substantive theory) or to introduce the company's product in the formulary at an 
individual level.
The relationship between the pharmacopolitics managers and the officials tended to be 
long-term, not issue oriented and based on reciprocity. In the substantive theory, this
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concept was developed in the building trust concept. Relationships between officials 
and pharmacopolitics managers were encouraged.
The answer to the question of how lobbyists expressed their demands was in a direct 
way. Most of the time there was an existing relationship between the lobbying actor and 
the official so the demand was direct, focusing on immediate interests. It differed from 
the EU style that was cautious and consensus-oriented.
The lobbying style model demonstrated that pharmaceutical lobbying in Argentina was 
different to that of the USA and EU although it shared common features with both of 
them. This model could be used by other researchers in Argentina to find out whether 
the model is applicable to other industries.
6.3.3 Pharmaceutical lobbying process model
This model was based on the meso-theory of lobbying. In this theory, there were only 
two channels of influence: transmission of information and contribution payments. All 
the literature based on the game theory considered either one channel of influence or 
another; the only model that considered a mixed approach was presented by Bennedsen 
and Feldmann (2001). The model developed in this research for pharmaceutical 
lobbying introduces two elements, which differed from the traditional approaches in the 
meso-theory of lobbying:
a) Firstly there was a preliminary process before the transmission of information 
and/or contribution payments which was not considered in the traditional meso- 
theory of lobbying. This preliminary process should be included in the process 
as it was part of it and conditioned the role of the participants in the process.
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b) Secondly there was always transmission of information. It differed from the 
approach of Bennedsen and Feldmann (2001) who stated that the lobbyist should 
decide which approach to be used based on the expected outcomes. In this 
model, pharmapolitics managers always transmitted information independent of 
the expected outcomes; this transmission of information could occur with 
contribution payments or without. The difference in pharmaceutical lobbying 
was that the information had been acquired, for registration purposes, before the 
lobbying process began. The pharmaceutical companies needed the information 
for registration purposes and the information was always available for the 
pharmapolitics manager. The following is the model of pharmaceutical lobbying 
in Argentina.
Figure 11 Pharmaceutical lobbying model





















a) Acquisition of information: The process of registering pharmaceutical products 
entailed the acquisition of costly information by the pharmaceutical company. 
As the cost of information acquisition for the pharmapolitics manager was small 
or non-existent, a policy of transmitting information was preferred. If the official 
asked for additional information it was likely that this information already 
existed. Only local pharmaeconomic studies resulted in an additional cost. The 
pharmaceutical lobbying model was different from the one presented by 
Bennedsen and Feldmann (2001); in the latter the lobbyist should know the 
interests of the official because any option - transmitting information or 
contribution payments - had a cost. In the case of pharmaceutical lobbying, the 
only cost for the pharmapolitics manager was contribution payments.
b) Building trust: This element was not mentioned in the meso-theory of lobbying. 
The meso-theory models assumed that the different interest groups had the same 
possibilities regarding the official in their lobbying process. The model in this 
research considered there was a difference when the lobbyist had close ties with 
the official. Bargaining power was different; in the lobbying game some 
companies had more influence on the key officials than others. Pharmaceutical 
companies in Argentina did compete for the attention of the official even if they 
did not compete for formulary positions. The official, on deciding which product 
from a list of five to introduce first, would choose the product from the 
pharmapolitics manager with whom he/she had the closest relationship. 
Therefore, there were some companies with a stronger position and others with a 
weaker position at the beginning of the lobbying game because of the building 
trust process.
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6.3.3:2 Transmission of information
Information was always supplied to the official during the pharmaceutical lobbying 
process in Argentina. This transmission of information had caused the official to always 
expect the receipt of a dossier about the product or the new technology. When he/she 
did not receive information he/she assumed that the product or technology was not 
worth considering. The substantive theory chapter said that in those cases where there 
was no scientific information available the pharmapolitics manager had to use other 
instruments i.e. contribution payments. In cases when the official expected only 
transmission of information and he/she was not amenable to contribution payments the 
lobbying process would fail due to lack of scientific evidence. The company had to 
decide whether to acquire this costly information or give up the objective pursued. 
Transmission of information was the means by which the pharmapolitics manager 
initiated the lobbying process. The official took into account the information received 
and then decided whether this information was enough or, if he/she expected a 
contribution payment, would wait for the negotiation phase.
6.3.3:3 Decision
This part was dealt with in the substantive theory chapter. The pharmapolitics manager 
had to decide whether to continue with transmission of information or switch to 
contribution payments. After the decision of which of the two channels of influence was 
to be used the pharmapolitics manager began the negotiation process.
6.3.3:4 Negotiation
Negotiation always began after the submission of information. There was an iterative 
process, which could follow the channel of transmission of information, of the official 
asking for more information and the pharmapolitics manager providing more
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information until the official was satisfied and accepted the request of the 
pharmapolitics manager. In this case the official maximised aggregate welfare for the 
HMO or the government. It also maximised the utility of the pharmaceutical company 
as there was no additional cost for achieving its objectives. Alternatively the process 
could lead to a contribution payments situation and the pharmapolitics manager had to 
estimate which offer would be acceptable for the official. The pharmapolitics manager 
had to discover whether the official was opportunistic and only looking for his/her 
private interest or if he/she was seeking to benefit the HMO. The model of Bennedsen 
and Feldmann (2001) stated that the question arose when the company had to decide 
which type of lobbying the official preferred. There were three possibilities: rebate for 
the HMO, payment to the official or as stated in the substantive theory a mixed payment 
with a rebate for the HMO and a contribution payment for the official. The first issue 
was to find out which was appropriate and then negotiation took place. According to the 
substantive theory and supported by the formal meso-theory, the pharmapolitics 
manager made an offer and the official had to decide whether to accept it or not. There 
was an interaction between offers until an acceptable agreement was reached. The 
pharmapolitics manager formalised the agreement and obtained a result. 
This model can be applied to individual lobbying and cooperative lobbying. In the case 
of cooperative lobbying, the process was the same. The pharmaceutical industry 
initiated the lobbying process by obtaining information about the issue. The difference 
here was that the information was provided by the chambers or by a group of 
companies. Once the information was prepared in a dossier then the chamber official or 
the pharmapolitics manager with the closest relationship to the government or HMO 
official supplied the relevant information. The official evaluated it and might consider 
asking for more information. The process continued until the official had enough 
information to take a decision or the Chamber Manager decided to open the contribution
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payments channel. After that, the negotiations on the theme of contribution payments 
continued until an agreement was reached; the agreement was formalised with either a 
rebate for the HMO, a contribution payment for the official or both.
This model based on the formal meso-theory of lobbying incorporated the substantive 
theory and synthesised the different elements of pharmaceutical lobbying in Argentina. 
This conceptual model can be tested on the pharmaceutical industry in other countries to 
establish whether it fits in different contexts.
6.3.4 Cooperative and individual lobbying
Cooperative lobbying was described in the substantive theory chapter addressing 
question eleven and was mentioned in the meso-theory of lobbying by Damania and 
Fredriksson (2000), Howell (2004) Aidt (1997), Graziano (2001), Hula (1999) and 
Hojnacki (1997) and Almeida (2005). Cooperative lobbying consisted of companies 
joining together to form a coalition for a specific purpose. Companies in Argentina 
preferred to lobby together when the target for lobbying was the government or the 
large HMDs. This was to avoid being played off against each other or their opponents 
benefiting from conflict of interests between them. A coalition had more political power 
than an individual company. Consequently, in Argentina, the cooperative approach was 
preferred for lobbying of government or large HMDs such as PAMI (the HMO of 
pensioners). However, it was also mentioned by pharmapolitics managers that, 
frequently, cooperative lobbying did not attend the interests of individual companies. 
Therefore, they also had to lobby the government and the large HMOs after the 
cooperative negotiation took place regarding specific interests of their companies. The 
following model shows this interaction between pharmapolitics managers and the 
government and large HMOs. Even if a cooperative agreement was achieved with the
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whole industry the official could make minor changes that would benefit one individual 
company.
In the cases of small HMOs individual lobbying was necessary. This was the job of 
pharmapolitics managers. They had to lobby these organisations to try to generate better 
business conditions for the company.
The following figure depicts the model of cooperative and individual lobbying. 
Figure 12 Corporate and individual lobbying strategy












The pharmaceutical industry had two ways of lobbying depending on the lobbying 
target. If the target were the government and the large HMOs, the lobbying was 
cooperative. Even then there might be an individual lobbying to government or large 
HMOs in minor issues. If the targets were the other HMOs the lobbying was individual, 
carried out by the pharmacopolitics manager.
The researcher has presented the conceptual findings of this research. Four models were
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developed: the position of the pharmaceutical industry in the corporatism-pluralism 
scenario, the lobbying style model, the pharmaceutical lobbying process and the 
cooperative and individual lobbying strategy. The first two models were based on the 
formal macro-theory of lobbying and the second two models on the formal meso-theory 
of lobbying. The models were grounded in the substantive theory and fitted with the 
lobbying exerted by the multinational pharmaceutical industry in Argentina. Within this 
context, the models can be analytically generalised. The generalisation of these models 
to other contexts or countries should be researched.
6.4 Limitations of the Research
The limitations of the research - using grounded theory methodology - manifested itself 
in a limited reliability and generalisation of the data and consequently of the 
conclusions drawn from the data. The researcher took a grounded theory approach with 
constant comparisons of the data and the findings with the aim of diminishing 
subjectivity in the research but there was always a degree of subjectivity in the 
interpretation of the data, that reflected the "self of the researcher". It was unlikely that 
another researcher would have come up with the same categories and concepts to 
explain how pharmaceutical lobbying was carried out.
The choice of theoretical concepts in this study was arbitrary, using three different 
perspectives of lobbying theory to approach the different elements of the research 
object. The choice of lobbying theories was highly personal and subjective, yet 
justifiable in the context of grounded theory research. However, after the development 
of the research design, the research questions and the fixed set of questions it was 
unlikely that another researcher using the same sample of participants would have 
gained results contrary to these findings.
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Another limitation of the study was its confinement to the reality of pharmaceutical 
lobbying in Argentina carried out by multinational companies. The theory developed in 
this study cannot be generalised to other contexts or to other countries. The substantive 
theory developed was only related to the context in which it was researched. Probably 
the biggest weakness of the research was the limited generalisation of the findings.
6.5 Reflexivity considerations
The advantage of the researcher studying his own culture from the inside was the 
possibility of being a direct source of information and interpretation. On the other hand, 
it brought the need for reflexivity when the researcher's own perspectives could have 
affected the research and the substantive theory being developed. The researcher had to 
reflect critically on 'self within the research process because the study entailed the 
interpretation of complex interactions; it was important to guard against the possible 
effects of subjectivity during the research process. Being the inquirer in all cases, the 
researcher had to come to terms not only with those with whom he engaged in the 
interviews but with his position in the research setting. The researcher realised that there 
were different considerations of 'self to be taken into account in both the interviews 
and in the interpretation of the data.
Firstly, the researcher identified his position as a colleague of the pharmacopolitics 
managers being interviewed. Trust existed between the researcher and his colleagues 
but the researcher realised that he had to maintain some distance when conducting the 
interviews as, during those moments, he was the interviewer. It was an unusual for both, 
the interviewer and interviewee, as it was a new situation. The process of them giving 
written consent and the recording of the interview made the situation more formal. The 
same occurred in the interviews with the external lobbyists although, as the relationship
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between the researcher and those respondents was not as close, the distance imposed 
was more natural. The interviews with the officials showed other peculiarities. They 
usually saw the researcher as lobbyist representing the interests of the company he 
worked for; his image was that of somebody who was always lobbying them for a 
certain purpose. The researcher felt that it was difficult for them to see a researcher who 
was investigating the lobbying process between them. The researcher had to reflect on 
how to conduct the interviews so that officials expressed their views about the lobbying 
process.
Another researcher's 'self to be considered was the researcher as an interviewer. The 
researcher's familiarity with the subject and with the participants led the participants to 
make certain assumptions and express comments like "well, you know what I mean" 
(Interviewee B, PH). In those moments the researcher had to recognise that he was the 
interviewer and, although he did know what they meant, to ask for an explanation of the 
concept and to follow the rigours of the research. However, reflexivity also pertained to 
the 'self as an interpreter. There were subtle meanings underneath the responses and 
the researcher had to interpret the meaning but without trying to introduce his previous 
beliefs or opinions. Reflexivity about 'self was also present in the analysis stage. 
Interpretation and analysis might always be prone to subjectivity. The researcher tried to 
diminish subjectivity by reflecting on his own beliefs and trying not to introduce them 
in the analysis of the data. He performed iterative and constant comparison, focused on 
the data and the relationship of the different concepts, conditions, dimensions, 
properties, actions and interactions aimed at diminishing subjectivity. The researcher 
always tried to avoid subjectivity but has to admit that a certain degree of subjectivity 
and bias may always be present. The researcher realised this during the DBA; 




The reason why the researcher decided to follow a grounded theory and not a game 
theory approach was the realisation that he was taking an analytic approach to 
understand a few controlled variables and a systemic approach should be taken for a 
deeper understanding of the interaction of variables in a complex environment. The 
researcher now has a deeper understanding of the pharmaceutical lobbying process in 
Argentina. The researcher identified the main variables to be taken into account in the 
process. The researcher plans to develop a game theory model of pharmaceutical 
lobbying in Argentina after refreshing his awareness of mathematical concepts. Once 
the model is developed and tested the objective of the researcher is to write and publish 
a paper.
Another issue that the researcher would like to explore in the future is a comparison 
between the pharmaceutical lobbying carried out in the UK compared to that of 
Argentina. The aim would be to understand the differences and similarities between the 
UK where health care is considered a social good and Argentina where it is a private 
good. This research would aim to extend the micro-theory of lobbying.
Corruption and its rational has been discussed by numerous authors but it was not an 
objective of this study, which only focused on the implementation of lobbying not on its 
moral consequences. The researcher has no immediate plans to develop any research 
related to corruption and its implications. The author recognises that the observation 
that no respondent talked about corruption, but rather about contribution payments, 
could be discussed within a linguistic research question and on a much larger platform
within linguistic theory.
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6.7 Reflections on my intellectual journey
I decided to take the DBA as its philosophy of being an active participant in the research 
process was the most appropriate for my personal situation. I had to interact continually, 
as a researcher, with the pharmaceutical lobbying world and I was central to the process 
of research. Through understanding specific situations, and in relation to more general 
concepts, I was able to make certain theoretical inferences and deal with practical 
problems. I tried to link the practice and theory of lobbying in a mediating discourse 
provided by the grounded theory methodology used in this research. The research 
process helped me to shift from a situation of empiric knowledge to one of theoretical 
knowledge, improving my professional practice as a pharmacopolitics manager. The 
interaction between theory and practice, through a mediating discourse, empowered me 
in terms of understanding lobbying strategies and helped to improve my work and to 
achieve my company's objectives. As a consequence of the research process, I modified 
aspects of my practice, behaviour and way of viewing and interpreting the process of 
pharmaceutical lobbying. I learned from case to case about my role as a lobbyist as well 
as the successes and failures that will guide the way I perform my job in the future in all 
relevant and maybe less relevant aspects of my role. While I have learned more about 
lobbying and the art of influencing people, I also learned how to conduct a research 
project. This study extended my knowledge and will contribute to the development of 
theory. The kind of theory developed is grounded in my professional practice. The 
theory developed in this study will be the starting point when I begin further research 
with an equal or similar purpose.
Studying a doctorate has been an intellectual process where change was an always 
present element. Firstly, a change of supervisor at the beginning of the doctoral process. 
A new supervisor meant a change of approach. Later on my supervisor changed
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university and I followed him all the way to Glamorgan. Darwin discovered that the 
species that survive were those that adapted to new situations and contexts. I had to 
adapt to all these changes and I emerged stronger than before.
Secondly, I changed my methodology four times- beginning with a quantitative 
Bayesian approach and ending with a grounded theory approach. This helped me in the 
research learning process as I had to first learn the quantitative and then 
phenomenological methodologies. I consider that I now have a deeper understanding of 
different methodologies for my nature research and am not confined to a certain type of 
methodology but to a broader choice.
Thirdly, I changed my lobbying strategies based on the formal theory of lobbying. In 
my job I can identify situations like cooperative lobbying and act following a certain 
strategy. As I mentioned before, it is putting theoretical knowledge into practice. The 
findings of the research have contributed to my own understanding in my role as a 
pharmacopolitics manager for a multinational pharmaceutical company. The research 
process has helped me to move from a position of empirical understanding to one of 
theoretical knowledge, which should improve my professional practice as a 
pharmacopolitics manager.
And lastly, but not related to change, I realised that persistence is one of the most 
required skills for everything in life. At the beginning, we were 40 candidates and after 
four years only three of us remain. It is not the brightest who reaches the goal, but the 
one who persists.
260
6.8 Contribution to knowledge
The research findings add to an existing body of knowledge- there has been research on 
pharmaceutical lobbying in other countries- as there had been no systematic review of 
how multinational pharmaceutical companies in Argentina undertake this process. The 
substantive theory will contribute to the general knowledge of lobbying and provide a 
deeper understanding of how pharmaceutical lobbying is carried out in Argentina
The first model of the position of the pharmaceutical industry in the corporatism- 
pluralism scenario extended the knowledge of those theories but specially that of meso- 
corporatism by identifying the pharmaceutical industry in Argentina as an interest group 
that fitted in the meso-corporatist model. The researcher also identified the position of 
the pharmaceutical companies in Argentina as lobbying actors in the micro-corporatist 
model presented by Wassenberg (1982).
The second model of the pharmaceutical lobbying style extended the model presented 
by Woll (2006) by comparing the pharmaceutical lobbying styles of the EU and the 
USA to those of Argentina. The author identified elements from both styles (EU and 
USA) present in Argentina but with sufficient differences to signify a new style.
The third model of the pharmaceutical lobbying process model refuted the meso-theory 
of lobbying that one of the two channels of influence should be used, either 
transmission of information or contribution payments. The model was also different to 
that of Bennedsen and Feldman (2001) as transmission of information was always used 
irrespective of the future lobbying strategy. This model refuted the theory that 
contribution payments for transmission of information should be used as substitutes and 
shares with Bennedsen and Feldman (2001) the logic that both instruments could be 
used together. Another distinct element was that building trust was introduced as a key
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factor for success. Building trust as a concept was ignored in the meso-theory lobbying 
models.
The fourth model corroborated the meso-theory of lobbying that when the government 
represented the official (Rama and Tabellini, 1998), lobbying in a coalition was better 
than lobbying alone. The model extended Rama and Tabellini's model because it 
introduced the large HMOs as a target for cooperative lobbying. The model introduced 
the additional concept of cooperative lobbying not attending the specific interests of 
individual companies and companies then individually lobbying the government or 
large HMOs. This model also described the lobbying target for individual companies.
The emergent theory contributed to the body of knowledge concerning lobbying theory. 
The models and substantive theory developed in this research could be tested in other 
industries within the country or in the same industry in other countries. This study 
recognises, from the perspective of the pharmaceutical industry, that lobbying has 
occupied an important role within the companies and that resources were allocated and 
will continue to be allocated for this purpose.
6.9 Conclusion
Theory emerging from the collection and analysis of data, according to the central 
tenets of grounded theory, could indeed be grounded in the broad field of lobbying 
theory. Substantive theory emerged from the researcher's grappling with not only his 
own analytical perceptions but from empathising the ways in which respondents 
themselves constructed their world. Emerging concepts were subjected to repeated 
coding, confirmation of observations from multiple data sources, theoretical elaboration 
from interpretations of these multiple sources and continual testing for consistency
across different perspectives. In this developmental process, concepts were identified,
262
developed and merged in order to produce the component elements of substantive 
lobbying theory. The researcher chose grounded theory because he could commence 
from a specific 'grounded in reality' event, pharmaceutical lobbying, with the intent of 
understanding the nature and rationale of observed incidents. Inductive theory 
generation was embedded in explanation of pharmaceutical lobbying, rather than 
generalities or broad statements. Pharmaceutical lobbying is as a broad concept, 
dynamic and interactive by nature, and grounded theory had the inductive capacity to 
scrutinise data and offer subsequent theories on such subjects. Grounded theory 
developed predictive ability - to explain what happens in the context of pharmaceutical 
lobbying. The two research questions "why" and "how" pharmaceutical companies 
carry out lobbying were addressed and substantive theory built. The theoretical 
sampling frame was designed as wide as possible so that the theory became embedded 
in reality. Triangulation of sources enhanced the consistency of the findings, 
consolidating the internal validity. Three research quality criteria were applied: 
construct validity, internal validity, and external validity. Strict operational procedures 
supported the construct validity. Implementing grounded theory methodology supported 
the internal validity. The comparison of the substantive theory against the existing 
conceptual frameworks documented in the formal theory of lobbying enabled the 
researcher to develop the conceptual findings and supported the external validity of the 
research. Formal theory was applied initially to help formulate questions for the 
respondents. The interviewees' practical knowledge was analysed and the theoretical 
framework constructed in order to look for saturation across cases. A grounded theory 
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Summary of the Research
Pharmaceutical Industry lobbying in Argentina: A study of 
_____________Ph armacopolitics____________
Pharmacopolitics activities have begun recently in Argentina as a response to changes in the 
Health System regarding the regulation of HMDs and the creation of HMO's formularies. 
Due to this changes, Pharmaceutical Multinational Companies have decided to create the job 
of Pharmacopolitics Manager, who is in charge of securing formulary positions and managing 
the relationship between the company and the Government.
The aim of the research project is to investigate two main topics regarding Pharmacopolitics:
• The relationship between the Pharmaceutical Industry and the Government and how 
the Industry influences legislation and Government decisions.
• The relatioship between the Pharmaceutical Industry and the HMOs and the 
importance for the Industry to secure Formulary positions.
Mi name is Javier de Renteria and I am working for Alcon Laboratories as a Managed Care 
Manager. I am a doctorate candidate at Anglia Polytechnic University, Danbury Park, 
Danbury, Chelmsford CMS 4AT.
I would like to invite you to participate in the research project. The participation procedure 
will be to have an interview with you. It will take between 45 to 90 minutes. The information 
that you give me in the interview will be used in my research project and eventually in the 
Thesis. I am funding myself the research. My mobile phone number is 15-5008 3961 and my 
E-mail address is javierderenteria@fibertel.com.ar .
You have been invited to take part due to your deep knowledge and broad experience in the 
research subject: Pharmapolitics.
You may feel free to refuse to take part and you can withdraw at any time just by sending me 
by registered post the copy of the Withdrawal Form to the following address:
Mr. Javier de Renteria 
Club Newman 
Ruta 9 Km. 39,5 
1621 Benavidez 
Buenos Aires
If you agree to take part, you will be interviewed by myself and the information will be 
transcripted for further analysis. A code number will be assigned to the transcription for 
anonymity reasons. The transcriptions will be kept in the researcher's home ,n a closed box. 
No e-mail will be sent with the transcript of the interviews. The information of the interview 
will be analysed only by the researcher.
There are no foreseeable risks involved. Confidentiality will be granted and the researcher will put special emphasis that no response would be construed as representing the particular respondent.
Agreement to participate in this research will not compromise your legal rights in case something goes wrong.
There are no economic benefits from taking part in the research project. Your participation will contribute to expand the general knowledge in the research subject.
YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS TO KEEP 
TOGETHER WITH A COPY OF YOUR CONSENT FORM
Participant Consent Form
Informed consent - Pharmaceutical Industry lobbying in Argentina: 
___________A study of Pharmacopolitics
NAME OF PARTICIPANT: 
Investigator and contact details:
Mr. Javier de Renteria
Club Newman
Ruta 9 Km. 39,5
1621 Benavidez
Buenos Aires
Mobile phone : 15-50083961 
E-mail : javierderenteria@fibertel.com.ar
1. I agree to take part in the above research. I have read the Participant Information Sheet which is 
attached to this form. I understand what my role will be in this research, and all my questions 
have been answered to my satisfaction.
2. I understand that I am free to withdraw from the research at any time, for any reason and 
without prejudice.
3. I have been informed that the confidentiality of the information I provide will be safeguarded.
4. I am free to ask any questions at any time before and during the study.
5. I have been provided with a copy of this form and the Participant Information Sheet.
Data Protection: I agree to the University1 processing personal data which I have supplied. 
I agree to the processing of such data for any purposes connected with the Research
Project as outlined to me*
Name of participant (print)............................. ..Signed. .Date.
Name of witness (print).........................-•-•••••-Signed........................Date.
YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS FORM TO KEEP
1 "The University" includes APU and its partner colleges
If you wish to withdraw from the research, please complete the form below and return to 
_________________the main investigator named above.________________
Title of Project: Pharmaceutical Industry lobbying in Argentina: A study of 
__________________ Pharmacopolitics
I WISH TO WITHDRAW FROM THIS STUDY
Signed: _______________________ Date:
APPENDIX 3
Prospective view of the Health 
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Prospective view of the Health System in Argentina
Purpose: To evaluate the different views of the political players and the 
Pharmaceutical Industry on the changes that will happen in the next 5 years in the 
Health System in Argentina.
Methodology: The methodology was based in open Interviews done to key people in 
the two main political parties and the Pharmaceutical Industry. For the Peronist party, 
now in the Government, the two interviews were done to Lie. Federico Tobar and Dr. 
Nestor Vazquez. Lie. Federico Tobar is the Chief Advisor to the Minister of Health 
and Director of Research of Isalud Foundation (the most important think-tank in 
Health Issues in Argentina). He has participated in more than 30 projects in the area 
of Health Management and Policy sponsored by the Kellogs Foundation, the 
Government of Brasil. the Panamerican Health Organization, the International 
Development Research Centre and the United Nations. He has published more than 
60 articles and is co-author of 8 books regarding Health Policy. Dr. Nestor Vazquez 
is the General Manager of the Health Services Superintendence, the body of control 
of the Health System. Previously he has been advisor to the Health Committee of the 
Deputies Chamber (2000 -2001), advisor to the Health Committee of the Senators 
Chamber in Buenos Aires Province (2000) and he has been the author of the law 
which regulates the PMO (Compulsory Medical Care) and he collaborated with the 
formulation of the AIDS and Addictions Law. Additionally he has published 
numerous articles and he is co-author in several books on Health issues.
For the opposition, the Radical Party, the interviews were done to Dr. Carlos Vasallo 
and Dr. Carlos Neri. Dr. Carlos Vasallo is the President of the Argentine Association 
of Health Economics (2000-2002), Director of the "Observatorio de Salud", Research 
Institute of the Chamber of Pharmacies, Professor of Health Economics in Isalud 
Foundation and in Institute Lazarte (National University of Rosario). He has also 
published several articles in national and international journals and he is co-author in 
the book "Demand and access to medicines". Dr. Aldo Neri is a National Deputy and 
member of the Health Issues Committee of the Deputies Chamber. He was appointed
as Minister of Health from Dec- 1983 to Jun-1986 when he was transferred to another 
position in the Government. He was Deputy for the Radical Party between Dec- 1987 
and Dec-1991. Afterwards he was appointed as Secretary of Health for the City of 
Buenos Aires (May-2001 to Nov-2001). He has also received the award: "Health for 
everyone" (April 1988) from the WHO (World Health Organization). He has 
published more than 100 articles regarding Health, Society and Politics and he is the 
author of 2 books on Health and Politics.
For the Pharmaceutical Industry, the interviews were done to Mr. Ernesto Felicio, 
President of the Multinational Pharmaceutical Companies Chamber and Mr. Victor 
Quinones, Manager for International Relations from the Multinational Pharmaceutical 
Companies Chamber. Mr. Ernesto Felicio has been working previously as General 
Manager for Bristol Myers Argentina and he has more than 20 years experience in the 
Multinational Pharmaceutical Industry in different positions in Argentina and in the 
USA. Mr. Victor Quinones is the Head Researcher for the Multinational 
Pharmaceutical Companies Chamber and is also the Coordinator of economic studies 
of the Latin-American Federation of the Pharmaceutical Industry.
The main issues that were surveyed were:
=> Role of the Government in the restructuring of the Health System 
=> Health Management Organisations (HMOs)
Trade Unions 
Provinces
PAMI (for the elderly people) 
Private 
=> New role and restructuring of the Public Hospitals
=> Product Formularies within the HMO's (Vademecums)
Introduction
There are three characteristics that should be pointed out of the Argentina Health 
System. The first one is that was not centrally planned by the Government and that it 
developed itself according to the political and economic circumstances of the 
different periods. The second one is that it is fragmented and that this fragmentation 
led to an overcapacity of physicians, Clinics and Hospitals. And the third one is that, 
according to Dr. C. Vasallo is more similar to the American System than the 
European one, being Health considered a private good which depending in the 
purchasing power the individual has, could be obtained or not. So that there has been 
a problem of equality in the access to Health Care related to the inequality in the 
distribution of income.
The role of the Government in this process was always erratic; sometimes being quite 
active and other times leaving the players in the System to their own fate and their 
own rules. But it should be pointed out that the State was always a big fmancer of the 
whole System and there are some Health Management Organisations (HMOs), which 
cannot survive without being funded by the state.
How did the process of building up the Health System begin? The process began last 
century around 1930's when a big immigration flow came from Europe, mainly from 
Spain and Italy. Big Hospitals were built by the State and Health was provided at no 
cost for all the inhabitants. The more affluent could afford private care, paid by 
themselves in some private Clinics. There was one Trade Union, Ferroviarios (Train 
workers) which began providing some Health Care at the beginning of the Century 
but it was an exception.
Between the 46s and the 50s, the Trade Unions flourished under the First Presidency 
of Peron. The employees of some State Companies created the first important Trade 
Unions HMOs. Peron supported these types of organisations and the workers began 
to have right under the laws and services (Health Care, Tourism, etc.) from the Trade 
Unions. Regulation was issued so that the employees and employers had to contribute
with part of their income to finance the Trade Union HMOs and this modality is still 
in practice.
Each Trade Union had to built an infrastructure to provide Health Care to their 
affiliates and sub-contracted Private Clinics and physicians. The affiliate could chose 
between those physicians and Clinics sub-contracted by the HMO, so that there is no 
free election. Some big Trade Unions built their own Hospitals and Clinics, but a lot 
of them had to be closed as people move to new trades. But in terms of numbers of 
affiliates, these HMOs account for only 25% of the whole population. The other 75% 
was not covered. Nevertheless it was the first step to the introduction of some type of 
Health Care, together with rights for the workers.
In 1970, Carlos Ongania, a de-facto President from the Military Junta issued the law 
18610, which introduces and generalizes the HMO System for all the people who are 
working for a public or private company. HMO's should be created according to 
trade and in a few years, from 1970 to 1975 more than 60% of population was 
covered. The Armed Forces and the Provinces were also included.
The Provinces had a big number of employees and they had to build their own 
HMOs. The approach they took was similar to the one of the Trade Unions, but they 
did not build Hospitals but they subcontract to private providers in the Province. 
From these HMOs the employees still contribute with part of their salaries but the 
other rest was financed directly by the Province. The Armed Forces, especially within 
the de-facto governments, used to build big structures and big Hospitals with state-of- 
the-art technology, which sometimes was better than what could be found in Private 
Clinics. The way that they were financed was similar to that of the Provinces.
In the 70 's there was also a milestone, which changed the whole Health System, and 
it was the creation of PAMI (HMO for pensioners). The different HMOs had the 
burden of the elderly, being this part of the population, the one with higher costs. Due 
to this fact, they were having financial problems. In order to solve this issue, the
Minister of Health and Social Security at that moment Dr. Manrique, decided to 
create PAMI as an HMO which was going to be responsible to provide Health Care 
to the pensioners. As soon as the people retired, they switched from their HMO to 
PAMI. This creation changed the history and it has been always a political issue 
because of the importance in votes (4.000.000 people) and also because an important 
part of the budget of the Government is devoted to PAMI. It was created as a separate 
organism, to give it independence from the Ministry of Health. Not even the Health 
Services Superintendence, that is the organization that controls all the Health System, 
had an influence in PAMI.
By the end of the 70's, 85 % of population was included in a HMO, either from the 
Trade Union, Armed Forces, PAMI or Provinces. The rest of the population were 
independent as professionals, etc. or they got Health Care in the State Hospital.
In the 80's, new Private HMOs were created aimed at the Upper Class. The Upper 
Class used to pay themselves for Health Care not having any kind of Health 
Insurance. That proved to be too costly and some new players enter the market 
targeting two different kind of customers: middle managers and top managers in the 
companies which also devote part of their salaries to the Trade Union HMOs but now 
they could divert that money to the Private HMOs and the other part of the Upper 
Class which was not in an HMO, because they used to pay themselves, and now they 
preferred to covered by these organizations. Afterwards these HMOS broaden their 
public, including people from the Medium Class and reaching agreements with 
companies for the whole Pay roll. The success of this Private HMOs was that they 
offered a better service and quality than the other ones.
In the 90's there were two big issues that influenced the System: one was external and 
the other internal but both represented a change in what was happening until that 
moment. The first issue was AIDS. Although Argentina was a low incidence Country 
the Government decided to cover 100% of the treatment for all the people with AIDS. 
A Department was created within the Health Services Superintendence to monitor
AIDS, Transplants, Haemophilia and Special Treatments. The costs of these patients 
will be met by the Government but treated by the different HMOs.
The other issue, which affected mainly the patients and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 
was the introduction of Vademecums for the Trade Unions, Provinces and Armed 
Forces HMOs. What is a Vademecum? It is a list of pharmaceutical products that 
being prescribed by the physician have a discount in the Pharmacy. Those products 
that are prescribed and are not in the Vademecum should be totally paid by the 
patient. Those, which are prescribed and are part of the Vademecum received a 
discount of between 40% to 100%. Before of the introduction of Vademecums, 
physicians could prescribe any product and the patient got always a discount. Each 
HMO has its own Vademecum with different products that are included. This issue 
created the job of Pharmapolitics in the Industry with the objective of including the 
products in those Vademecums so as to achieve a competitive advantage.
After all these changes, the HMOs have been living together in the last 20 years and 
what it is now available is a Health System with fragmentation in the providers of 
Health Care (physicians, laboratories and Clinics) aimed at each of these targets but 
almost always with overcapacity and inefficiency. The Public Hospitals still provide 
Health Care to the poorer people at a minimal cost but with scarcity of drugs and 
material, the Trade Unions still have a considerable amount of people although their 
service is not that good and the provinces HMOs give Health Care to more people 
than their affiliates as there is no control of people and practices. The Private HMOs 
continue in the market but they are going through a process of consolidation to 
achieve economies of scale. Last but not least, the control of the Government of the 
Health System, from the provider side (HMOs, Clinics and physicians, is almost 
inexistent.
So now that Argentina and the Health System is confronted with a tremendous crisis 
with not enough funds to continue as it was, the question arises of how will the
System change in the next 5 years. For that purpose, it would be interesting to know 
the prospective view of the most important political and economic players:
the Peronist Party (now in the government)
a) the Radical Party (the opposition)
b) the Pharmaceutical Industry
Prospective View of the peronist party
The Peronist Party is now in Government after the Radical Party in December 
withdrew of the Government. Elections will be held next year and all the polls 
suggest that the Peronist Party will win so that there could be continuity with the 
policies that are being implemented. Referring to how the Health System will change, 
Lie. F. Tobar remarks that there could be four scenarios:
a) Reactivation of the economy with political will to change the Health System
b) Recession with political will to change the Health System
c) Recession without political will to change the Health System
d) Reactivation of the economy without will to change the Health System
The B scenario, Recession with political will to change the Health System, represents 
what it is happening now. The A scenario is possible but in the future after the 
recession period. There is discrepancy on how long will be the B scenario between 
Tobar and Vazquez. Tobar gauges a period of 6 months and Vazquez talks about at 
least 12 months.
The B Scenario:
According to Vazquez during the B Scenario there would be no change in the Health 
System; everything will continue as it is and the lack of funds in the HMOs and the
lack of funding by the Government will bring the Health System to a standstill where 
the different players will try to survive. An estimate of 50% of all the companies, 
which import Medical Material, will disappear and some Pharmaceutical Companies 
will leave the country. Smaller generics companies will be working actively without 
Legislation that protects them and there will not be any structural changes.
From the side of the HMDs, Lie. Tobar considers that they will be cutting services 
and there would be a migration from the Trade Union HMDs to the Private HMOs 
looking for better service and from the Private HMOs to the Public Hospital as 
unemployment grows. The main worry of the Government, according to Tobar will 
be how to support the Public Hospital and give them the medicines and materials they 
need to provide Health Care. Some international loans are aimed at this objective. As 
the numbers grow at the Public Hospital, the quality will decrease, as there will not 
be an increase of infrastructure at them. Vazquez remarks that no new equipment and 
technology will be introduced because of the costs and the deterioration of the old 
equipment will impede to provide proper Health care. Tobar comments that according 
to the Ministry of Health, Dr. Gines Gonzalez Garcia, the situation is similar to the 
one of the Soviet Union after the default in its external debt. The average life 
expectancy diminished by 7 years during the Soviet Union crisis and the same is 
expected in Argentina.
The A Scenario:
After the Scenario B, the Scenario A will come in, with a reactivation of the 
economy, "with less players from the supplier side and the HMOs recovering their 
affiliates as unemployment decreases"(Vazquez). Regarding the Health System, 
Tobar and Vazquez think that the "status quo" cannot be preserved. The fragmentation 
of the Health System leads to overcapacity and inefficiencies that resulted in more 
need of resources that will not be available in the future. So that according to 
Vazquez, there will be an integration of all the players that are equal. Some Trade 
Unions HMOs will merge or make Alliances with another Trade Union HMOs and 
the Private HMOs will go through the same process. Those HMOs with a strong 
leadership will attract the others and there will be fewer players. Providers of Health
Care, physicians, laboratories and Clinics will also group themselves to offer their 
services to these big HMDs. This process could take twelve or sixteen months. From 
the funding side, Tobar suggests that it is going to be a mixed System being financed 
by the State and by the employers and employees.
The Program to be implemented by the Peronist Party in the Scenario A will be based 
in the following issues:
11 National Insurance for all the people:
The aim of this insurance is to cover all the inhabitants of the Country, including 
those who are poor and do not have any proper Health Coverage. The percentage 
of population without coverage is nowadays of 50% because of the recession but 
in normal times, this percentage is one third of the population. This new insurance 
will give access to proper medicine to all the population who are out of the formal 
economy. Health services will be provided in the Public Hospitals and Provincial 
ones. Regarding the access to medicines, these people will have access to 
Generics bought by the State and provided to the patients in the Hospitals. 
International loans and resources from the Ministry of Health will be used to 
finance those purchases.
Regarding "Trade Union, Provincial and Private HMOs, all the funds (from 
employees, employers and the State) will be diverted to a fund and each HMO 
will receive an amount of money per month according to the characteristics of its 
population calculated by an actuarial risk calculation" (Tobar). Vazquez believes 
that those HMOs will subcontract their providers as it is been done now. The 
provinces HMOs will compete also in the coverage of the people without HMO 
and they will sell their services to the National Insurance. On the other side, 
Vazquez remarked, there will be competence in quality and prices from the 
Health Providers (Clinics, Physicians).
2} PMO (Compulsory Medical Care):
This a list of medical practices and drugs that must be covered by all HMOs, 
Hospitals and the State. "An emergency PMO has been introduced now in the
crisis but a revised one will be issued in the future" (Vazquez). The list of drugs, 
according to Vazquez will be strict at the beginning and it will become more 
flexible afterwards introducing new therapeutic possibilities. The introduction in 
this list will depend on scientific facts and not in political or lobby actions. Tobar 
thinks that this list of drugs must be the same for all HMDs, but Vazquez thinks 
that each HMO will introduce additional drugs according to the characteristics of 
their population. The trademarks to be included will be decided by each HMO 
creating their own Vademecum. Vazquez thinks that the lobby by the 
Pharmaceutical Industry will be still important in the future aimed at introducing 
own trademarks in the HMDs' Vademecums.
3] Control over the Health System:
Lie Tobar claims that the will of the Ministry of Health, Gines Gonzalez Garcia, 
is to have control of every part of the Health System, including the private HMOs. 
Decrees and laws might be issued so that every part of the Health System is under 
his authority. Now PAMI is independent, Provinces HMOs are independent, 
Private HMOs are independent and Trade Unions HMOs are not fully dependent. 
The Pharmaceutical Industry is also independent. Gines must have a strong 
political support to put through this reform, as there is reluctance of all the other 
players.
4] Public Hospital:
Tobar believes that the Public Hospital should switch to a more managerial 
approach providing better results and quality. It makes no sense to introduce a 
National Insurance for the poor and change the current system, if the patient just 
gets what he is getting now. There should be resources for improving the quality 
of physicians, nurses, etc. and also to implement Managed Care practices like in 
the USA.
5) Centralized body for purchases of medicines, medical material and 
equipment:
According to Vazquez the objective is to buy cheaper and to be able to provide 
more with the same resources to all the Health System. This Centralized Body 
will not pay Value Added Tax so that the goods will be cheaper. Nowadays all the 
purchases of the Government and Hospitals are decentralized except for the AIDS 
products. The Central Government will be doing big tenders and supplying to 
Hospitals and Public Institutions through the whole country. This centralized 
body could also give service to other players in the market as HMOs. Tobar 
describes that there has been an experience in Argentina with this centralized 
buying between 1982 to 1986 with dreadful results. The medicines never reached 
the ones who needed them and a lot of this medicines expired before they could 
be used. There was big deal of corruption in the purchasing body. Tobar believes 
that this idea could only be implemented when the logistic is well done. This 
apparent savings that will be achieved buying centrally could be shadowed by the 
inefficiencies of the whole system.
6) Catastrophic diseases:
There are some diseases like AIDS, Haemophilia, Transplants, Cancer and others 
with a high cost for the Health Care System. The idea is "to create a National 
Insurance for these Catastrophic diseases" (Vazquez). Those beneficiaries with a 
disease above certain amount per year should be included in this insurance, 
loosing the coverage of their HMO. Tobar points out that small excellent HMOs, 
from about 10.000 to 15.000 people cannot survive when they have for example, 
4 transplanted patients with a costly therapy with immunosuppressives. Those 
patients should be covered by the State directly and the State will sub-contract the 
providers of Health Care for those patients. Vazquez claims that some providers 
will concentrate all the business being more efficient than the others and 
achieving economies of scale. The diseases included will be Haemophilia, 
Transplants, AIDS and Cancer. The main concern for the Government will be 




The objective of the Ministry of Health, Dr. Gines Gonzalez Garcia is to 
introduce the concept of Generics in the population so that more people can afford 
medicines. The Patent Law regarding drugs has been introduced on November 
2001. so that there were a lot of copies of the original products with different 
trademarks. There were times that a national company has launched a product 
before the researcher of the drug. This freedom in the Market has led to the 
building of a strong National Industry, which accounts for 55% of the 
Pharmaceutical Market. These products with different trade- marks were not 
cheap and they normally have the same price as the multinational companies. 
Tobar states that the concept of Generics that the Ministry of Health has, is 
different; he thinks on cheap producers with good quality and that the people will 
have access to them in pharmacies. The Pharmacist will be entitled to switch 
products upon the request of the patient. A decree has already been issued by the 
Ministry of Health. There are some drawbacks to this policy that are:
a) Vazquez remarks that this type of companies amount for a small 
amount of the sales of the market and they are more concentrated in 
the Hospital Market. They do not have the necessary Working Capital 
to produce in the numbers needed to increase their penetration in the 
Ambulatory Market. Also their distribution to pharmacies do not exist 
or it is concentrated in the big cities, so that the poorer who are around 
the country and away of civilization have no access to this type of 
products.
b) The quality of this type of products is rather poor so that they do not 
fulfil their therapeutic effect increasing the cost for the whole system. 
There are no studies of bioavailability or bioequivalence between the 
Generic and the trademark ones. These studies should be implemented 
in the future according to Tobar.
c) Another issue quoted by Lie. Tobar is that the Government is only 
thinking in the Policy of access to medicines but not in the policy of 
production and encouragement of the strong National Industry. Taking
into consideration the local industry could be positive so as to assure 
the quality of products and give employment to the whole sector. 
There is a project of law from Dr. Alessandri, that at least one step of 
the production should be done in the country.
8 - PAMI:
Tobar claims that PAMI will tend to be more and more expensive as the 
population ages. He believes that Managed Care practices, like the ones 
implemented with Medicare in the USA, should be introduced and PAMI 
should go through a restructuring and try to be more efficient. Tobar also 
states that PAMI should only provide Health Care to their affiliates and it 
should cut the services it provides like Tourism. PAMI should also be only for 
Pensioners, as now there are 29% of its affiliates that are not pensioners. 
According to Tobar, PAMI should first reactivate their services to the 
pensioners, rationalize itself and make itself smaller not affecting the service 
to the affiliates. It will continue to be centralized and in some cases where the 
population in one province is very small, an agreement could be achieved with 
the Provincial HMO. Tobar thinks that PAMI should have the same list of 
drugs as other HMOs but Vazquez remarks that PAMI should have its own 
Vademecum adapting it to the age of its affiliates as they need another type of 
medicines. The Vademecum of PAMI should not include milks for neonates 
as the National PMO does.
The other scenarios c and d are disregarded. "In case there is a recession without a 
will to change the Health System, there will not be any possibility to manage the 
situation"(Tobar). And reactivation without change will just be more of the same that 
we have with Menem. (1989-1998) With an Health Care expense of U$S 700 per 
capita per year with a deficient quality for the patient, being the beneficiaries the 
Pharmaceutical Industry and the providers of Health Care (physicians, laboratories 
and equipment companies).
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Prospective View of the Radical Party
The Radical Party is the second biggest in the Country and it has been in power two 
times in the last 20 years, having to quit both times before the end of the period due 
to an economic and social chaos. But as the opposition in the Parliament, they have a 
positive influence in the outcomes of the legislation.
Asking Dr. A. Neri about the future of the Health System in Argentina, he answered 
that without a crystal ball is difficult to make a prognosis. But nevertheless he points 
out that there could be two scenarios. The first one is what he described as a 
hypothesis of disaster. The current critical situation will continue and the 
deterioration of all the players in the Health System will be dramatic. There will not 
be any structural changes and the anarchy will preserve the fragmentation and the 
lack of control increasing the inequity within the people in the System. The players, 
Government, HMOs, Pharmaceutical Industry and Physicians will be fighting for 
their own interests and going through a Darwinian process, so that only the strongest 
will survive.
Once the crisis is overcome, Dr. Neri points out that all the groups of power (Trade 
Unions, Professionals, Pharmaceutical Industry, State Bureaucracies) in the Health 
System will be weakened by the crisis and that is the opportunity from the 
Government to try to make some necessary changes. In this weakened scenario, the 
players tend to be more flexible. If that does not happens, all the players will begin 
fighting against each other to gain some competitive advantage but the result will 
only be a draw. Neri believes that these groups of power have no creativity to change 
anything but they are strong in struggling to maintain the "status quo". Neri remarks 
that the bureaucracies of the State, which talk much about defending the Health of the 
population, are defending actually the status of the public employee. Their speech, 
which seems to be progressist, is actually neo-populist.
So that if at the beginning of the reactivation, "the Minister of Health is intelligent 
and take the reins of the situation, there could be a big chance for the improvement of 
the Health System"(Neri). The basis, which the Radical Party thinks that the change
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should come, is different from the Peronist Party in one thing; Radicals think that the 
whole Health System should be decentralized geographically giving the management 
and control of the beneficiaries to the Provinces. There would be a Provincial 
Insurance similar to what the Peronists proposed but Provincially managed. This 
insurance should regroup the people according to where they live and not to which 
trade they belong. This Insurance will be universal, covering the people under HMDs 
and also those who are out of the formal system.
1) Provincial Insurance:
All beneficiaries of this Insurance will have the same rights so that there will 
not be difference between the affiliates. The affiliates should be free to choice 
between a list of Health Providers, which will be the same for all the affiliates. 
If someone wants to have an additional coverage, like better Clinics or free 
choice of physicians, he or she should pay for it additionally to the Provincial 
Insurance according to Neri. "This provincial HMO should incorporate the 
affiliates to the Board to make sure that the interests of the affiliates are 
considered" (Vasallo). "HMOs should be controlled and regulated by the 
Central Government" (Vasallo).
Usually there is in each Province a big HMO for the Public Employees or a 
strong Ministry of Health with some kind of System of Health Coverage. The 
aim is to give this HMO the total control of their province and take advantage 
of the economies of scale as it is the biggest of the Province and has the 
structure and knowledge to provide Health Care. There are some provinces, 
mainly in Patagonia, which the HMO is not that solid and it should be done by 
the Ministry of Health suggests Neri. The Provincial HMO will have a 
complete list of the providers of Health Care in its territory and could get 
better conditions (price, service, etc.) than when the Health System is 
fragmented in different HMOs. Fragmentation brings overcapacity in the 
Health provider sector. Dr. Neri pointed out that there is a physician every 100 
people, which is too much regarding the population and infrastructure. With 
the reorganization, the system will be more efficient and there should be some
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kind of restructuring of the provider sector to meet the demand. This 
restructuring "could prove to be painful for this sector increasing the 
unemployment within physicians and Clinics will be closed"(Neri). On the 
other side the prevailing Health Care providers will regroup to be more 
competitive and they could be Public (Hospitals), Mixed or Private. Affiliates 
will be free to choose within these providers. A new policy should be 
introduced regarding the practices. Nowadays patients are free to go directly 
to the Specialist increasing the costs for all the System as Specialist fees are 
more expensive than the ones of GP's . There will be different levels of 
attention: the first one will be Primary Care with the GP's taking the 
consultation and sending the patient to the specialist (Second Level) if needed. 
Dr. Neri also thinks that, as the PMO from the Peronists, there should be 
regulation stating which practices will be covered by the Provincial Insurance 
and which drugs will get a discount.
The National HMOs, mainly the Trade Unions and the Armed Forces will 
sub-contract the service in that province paying to the Provincial HMO. The 
affiliates to PAMI, the retired people, will also be included in the Provincial 
HMO. Smaller National HMOS, which cannot survive, will be eager to merge 
with the Provincial HMO or a bigger National one. The Ministry of Health of 
each province will do the Control of the Health Care provided. There is the 
reluctance of the Trade Unions to give their affiliates and resources to the 
Provinces as the Trade Union HMOs will disappear and the funds will be 
diverted to the provinces. The main concern for the Central Government 
according to Vasallo is that the Governors coveted this initiative more from 
the point of view of having extra funds from HMOs and the Government for 
the Province, than from a Managed Care improvement of the health of their 
population. That is also the reason why the Central Government is suspect of 
the success of this initiative as it thinks that those extra funds will be used for 
another purposes than providing better Health Care.
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The aim of this approach is to concentrate the Health Care in bigger HMOs. 
provincial ones, with national guidelines and rules, providing a better service. 
This HMOs should implement, regarding to C. Vasallo up to date Managed 
Care practices to improve the quality of life of the population. Both Dr. A. 
Neri and C. Vasallo stated that laws issued by the Parliament should validate 
all these changes.
2) Public Hospital:
Which is the role of the Public Hospital in this new scenario? Hospitals should 
be decentralised and it cannot be like now that there is National Hospital, a 
Provincial Hospital and a Community Hospital in the same neighbourhood. 
Provinces should be responsible for the Hospitals in their districts. They 
should have full time physicians who dedicated themselves to these 
Institutions and not part-time as today. A validation of the title should be 
performed every certain period of years, leaving the best professionals in the 
practice. The challenge will be how to manage the cooperation between 
private providers and Public Hospitals. Some parts of the Country like parts of 
Patagonia where the Public Hospital is the only provider of Health Care seem 
no problem but in urban centres there is a competence between the Public 
Hospitals and private providers. Some Hospitals will specialize in a certain 
field and there will be a segmentation of the Public attending this Public 
Hospital. There should be some body of control that certifies the Health Care 
given in the different Hospitals and Clinics to make sure that standards of 
quality are achieved.
3) Catastrophic Diseases:
Regarding the Catastrophic diseases there are different point of view between 
Dr. Neri and Vasallo. Vasallo believes that those patients who have one of 
these diseases should be treated by the State in a special program but not 
related to the HMO. The HMO, provincial or national, should not cope with 
the economic burden of those patients. This opinion is the same as the
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enunciated by the Peronist Party, Vazquez and Tobar. On the other side ; Dr. 
Neri, thinks that there should be no discrimination. In one family you will 
have the whole family belonging to a certain HMO. If one member of the 
family has got AIDS and he or she is excluded of the HMO and sent to 
another Health Care Provider, this member will feel as an outcast. This case of 
AIDS is illustrative of what can happen making almost impossible to preserve 
the secrecy of the status of that patient increasing the stress of that person. 
When all the family belongs to the same HMO, all of them will go to the same 
physician and be treated equally. The economic burden of those patients 
should be afforded by the State but not excluding this people of their own 
HMOs. The State would make an additional funding for those cases.
4) PAMI:
What about PAMI? For both respondents, PAMI is not sustainable. PAMI has 
always been seeing as something apart, different from the other HMOs. It has 
the population with higher costs for the HMOs and now it there is a problem 
of funding which cannot be solved. It is impossible to get enough funds so 
that the crisis is inevitable. Vasallo believes that the main problem of the 
PAMI is mismanagement and corruption. There is no control about practices 
and money is dilapidated without reason. For example, a lot of patients are 
referred from the provinces to Buenos Aires for surgical procedures. Those 
patients could be treated in their own provinces but if it is done so, the 
regional office of PAMI would not have the funds to pay for the surgical 
procedure so that it is easier to send them to Buenos Aires as PAMI Central 
will pay for everything. The cost of each patient by PAMI is high. "If each 
pensioner could get that money from PAMI, he would be able to contract a 
private insurance"(Vasallo).
According to Dr. Neri and Dr. Vasallo, PAMI should be decentralized and 
given to the Provinces, but they refer that there is no political will from the 
Government to do so. Some issues like medicines could be still centralized 
because of efficiency. A trial could be done in two or three provinces to see if
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it works. If it works, the Provinces HMOs should take it. The Provincial 
HMO, PAMI and the people not covered by any HMO, mainly the poor, 
account for 85% of the population of the provinces. If the Provincial HMO 
contracts private providers and Public Hospitals, health care could be given 
rationally. If the affiliates to PAMI are in the Provincial HMO, the Central 
Government should pay them a certain amount of money per affiliate. Only 
high technology procedures should be paid apart by the State as Transplants.
5) Structure of the State within the Health System:
Having all the Health Care in hands of the Provinces, the Ministry of Health, 
will act only as a control body in coordination with the COFESA (Association 
which includes the Ministry of Health of all the provinces) The Ministry of 
Health will provide the guidelines and rules to the provinces. It should also 
coordinate the flow of funds between the Ministry of Economy and the 
Provinces HMOs.
Regarding the central purchase, the Radicals think that the purchase should be 
done decentralised to avoid high inventories and mismanagement. There 
should also be training for the Purchasers to do it more professionally.
How will be the Health System financed? It would be done on a mixed way. 
Part of the income will come from the employees and employers as it is done 
currently but another part will be coming from the state. So that each province 
will be receiving the funds from the State, according to the number of the 
affiliates from PAMI, Catastrophic Diseases and Provincial HMOs. The 
distribution will be made by the State according to the population of each 
Province and the pathologies that are prevalent. The way of collecting taxes 
should also be changed, making responsible the Provinces from the taxes that 
are collected contrary to the current system where the big load of taxes is 
collected by the Central Government.
6) Vademecumsi
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Which is the attitude of the Radical Party regarding Vademecums? There is 
discrepancy between Vasallo and Neri in this point. Both think that a basic list 
of drugs should be issued and it should be followed by the HMOs. The 
difference is that Dr. Vasallo thinks that the HMOs could adapt this list to 
their needs and the pathology of their province and include some other 
products, while Neri thinks that there should a unique list issued be an 
External Body and followed by all HMOs. Regarding which products to be 
included from the drugs that appear in the PMO (Compulsory Medical Care), 
there could be an attitude in favour of Generics but the position of both 
respondents is not definitive. The Vademecum according to Neri should be 
done by a Scientific Committee who decides which new drugs and new 
practices will be introduced. The creation of the Committee should be 
approved by the Parliament. Only therapeutic advances could be introduced. 
The Vademecum should be constantly revised and update. This committee 
would not only control drugs but also products, which can be included in the 
Vademecum, assuring the bioequivalence and bioavailability of the products. 
The products should be proved in patients and should provide a Clinical 
Benefit. Efficacy and Adverse Reactions should also be tested. The members 
of the Scientific Committee should be high qualified for the job and they 
should be elected because of their merits and not by political nepotism.
Point of View of Pharmaceutical Industry
The point of view of the Pharmaceutical Industry is more focused on the issues 
relating to drugs and generics than in the Structure of the whole Health System but 
their view is somewhat different from the previous ones.
When asked about how the Health System will change in the next 5 years, Mr. E. 
Felicio remarked that although some sectors of the economy in Argentina have 
changed considerably in the last 10 years, the Health System suffered almost no 
change. What was the reason? Mr. Cavallo issued a decree during the Presidency of
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Dr. C. Menem aimed at deregulating the Health System. The decree allowed affiliates 
from one Trade Union HMO to switch to another Trade Union HMO. It did not 
permit them to switch to a Private HMO. This issue was also requested by the World 
Bank in order to give more loans for the restructuring of the Health System. But this 
deregulation was not favourable to the bosses of the Trade Unions, as they did not 
want to loose affiliates and resources; so that after the decree was issued in February 
2000, the politicians of the Peronist Party blocked the implementation of it. There 
have been always close ties between the Trade Unions and the Peronist Party. So that 
in the end there was effectively no change.
1) HMOs:
But now the severity of the crisis is of such magnitude that it could provoke a 
change in the Health System by necessity but even then Mr. Felicio thinks that 
there are few probabilities that the current structure will change. As said before, 
the Trade Unions are closely related to the Peronist Party, which is now in power 
and would be re-elected in the next elections, which will be taking place in 2003. 
For the Trade Unions a change in the rules of the HMOs and the Health System is 
not desirable. So that they will induce the Government to maintain the "status 
quo" as they have done for the last 10 years. The Government is keen to accept 
this issue as they have the Trade Unions as allies in other fronts.
In spite of this fact, there has been a consolidation of HMOs during the last years. 
In Argentina, the minimal acceptable amount of affiliates to be operational is 
100.000. Those HMOS, which were too small, have merged with bigger ones. In 
February 2000, there were 365 Trade Union HMOs and now there are only 250 
HMOs. There is also a proposal of the bigger HMOs to share some services or 
make a pool for purchases of medicines and equipment but political issues have 
blocked all these initiatives. In the near future, Mr. V. Quinones thinks that the 
funds of the Trade Union HMOs will come from the contribution of the 
employers and employees but the State will not contribute to fill the gap between
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income and expenses. The State will be devoting all their resources to support the 
Hospitals.
Regarding the Province HMOs the situation is somewhat different but with the 
same conclusions. The Province HMO is independent and it will like to maintain 
itself in this way. The Governors will not accept to be told what to do by the 
Minister of Health. The Minister should get a consensus in COFESA (Association 
of the Ministers of Health from the provinces and state) to implement his plans. 
The Provinces HMOs account for a great number of the votes so that the 
Governors, Radical, Peronist or Independent, will not let the Central Government 
have a say in what should be done.
2) Public Hospitals:
An issue that will concentrate all the efforts of the Government, financial and in 
terms of time will be the Public Hospital. As unemployment grows and recession 
deepens more people loose their health coverage and they go to the Public 
Hospital. The Government has to implement new ways of providing Health Care 
and medicines. Neri remarks that a change is already occurring, so that more full 
time physicians are at the hospital. The demand of Health Care in the Public 
Hospital has increased but not proportional to the amount of people out of the 
HMOs. The reason for that is that the people who are sick stay at home because 
they do not have the money to go to the Public Hospital and buy medicines. But 
as soon as there is a slight reactivation, the demand will increase and the Public 
Hospitals will have to cope with increasing amount of people.
2) PAMI;
The current responsible for the PAMI, Dr. Corchuelo Blasco intended to 
decentralise the PAMI and give the affiliates to the Provinces HMOs, more in 
concordance with the opinion of Dr. A. Neri and Dr. C. Vasallo. But there was 
strong political opposition from the Peronist Party in the Parliament. He was 
criticized by his colleagues (he is himself a deputy) as he was signing treaties
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with the Provinces to dissolve PAMI. Previously to be in charge of PAMI, he had 
voted a law that legislated that PAMI should be an independent HMO and that it 
could not be dissolved. Mr. V. Quinones suggests that, according to the history' of 
PAMI, it will be very difficult to introduce any changes in this HMO. It 
represents also a huge amount of votes (15% of the total) when it comes to 
elections and the few changes that could be introduced will be only cosmetic.
4) Catastrophic diseases:
A centralised organism buying medicines and health services for this type of 
patients will make the whole system more efficient according to Quinones. The 
cost of these patients is too high to be afforded by an HMO. Regarding the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, prices of products for these patients will go down but 
the amounts requested will be higher and there will be more patients with 
adequate coverage. Nowadays there is a big spread between prices sold to 
different customers. When purchases are centralized, everything will come to a 
referral price and the cost for the whole system will be lower. The only issue that 
is critical so that the whole system is efficient is the control of prescriptions. 
Having these type of products a high price, there is some room for fraud. So that 
the Industry could help in the validation of the prescriptions to make sure that the 
patients are real and that they are treated. The Pharmaceutical Industry has 
already done that in the Oncology Market for PAMI with great success. Quinones 
believes that the Control in this case should be done not by the Government, or by 
the Health Providers but by the Pharmaceutical Industry.
5) Vademecums:
The opinion of Quinones is that the same diversity of approved practices found in 
Trade Union HMOs, Province HMOs and Private HMOs, will also be found in 
the Vademecums. The Minister of Health will try to impose its own Vademecum 
but each HMOs will decide what to do. The Government has issued now its 
Vademecum in the PMO, which should be compulsory for all Trade Unions 
HMOs. This Vademecum will be accepted by the HMOs but each one will adapt
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it to its own reality. There is no consensus within the players in the System to 
follow strictly the Vademecum of the Government. The Pharmaceutical 
Companies will continue with its lobby actions to introduce their products in 
these Vademecums.
6) Generics:
The Government is trying to implement a policy of generics copying the Brazilian 
model. The main difference is that the Generic of a product in Brazil has to go 
through studies of bioavailability and bioequivalence, which are costly. The few 
companies that in Argentina manufacture generics do not have those studies. So 
that we cannot speak about Generics but Similars. There is also a difference in 
Argentina that there are strong national companies with copies of the products of 
the multinationals but they are not regarded as Generics as they have the same 
price as the products from the multinationals. What the Government is trying to 
promote are products with no trademark that are cheaper and can be afforded by 
the impoverished population. The head of the ANMAT (PDA in Argentina) Dr. 
Limeres told in a conference in Washington D.C. that "quality should be 
sacrificed for price ".
Quinones thinks that this policy will have some effect in the future and the impact 
of these generics in the market will be a decrease in prices of around 40%; sales 
volume will increase but it is hard to estimate in which degree. The generics 
market share is only 2 to 3% now in Argentina and the main purchaser is the 
Public Hospital market as products are interchangeable. The Generic Companies 
are small, with lack of Working Capital and with bad quality control and 
manufacturing practices. They are not big competitors to the other companies in 
the market. But there is a trend of big companies, Roemmers, Novartis and GM, 
to buy small generics companies. There are also two multinational generic 
companies, which came to Argentina in the last years, Hexal and Ivax. Those 
companies will gain much from the promotion of the generic policy introduced by 
the Government. If the world market is considered, Generics account for 20 to 
25% of the total market, much more than the 3% that they have in Argentina. So
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that the Industry considers that the promotion of Generics by the Government will 
be a new reality in the next 5 years and it will change the commercial practices.
Conclusions
Both Peronist and Radical Party believe that in the next 5 years there will be first, a 
period of recession with no changes in the structure of the Health System, and 
afterwards a reactivation process in which necessary changes had to be introduced. 
The Pharmaceutical Industry expects no changes in the future, except for Generics, 
supporting this idea in an historical perspective. This believe is based on the fact that 
every time that the Government wanted to introduce a change in the Health System, 
the groups of power fought against it and the situation for the players never changed. 
As Dr. Neri pointed out, these groups of power are strong in struggling to maintain 
the "status quo".
As soon as the reactivation process begins, both the Peronist Party and Radical Party 
want to introduce a Universal Health Insurance for all the inhabitants. The difference 
between both parties is, that the Peronist Party will leave the HMOs Structure as it is 
and it will only give some Health Care to the poor in the Public Hospitals. There will 
be more medicines available for the poor in those Institutions.
The proposal of the Radical Party is more comprehensive as the Provinces HMOs get 
all the affiliates from the Trade Unions HMOs, PAMI, Armed Forces and people out 
of the formal System. The services provided will be the same for all the population, 
independent of income. Both Parties think that this Insurance will be financed by the 
contribution of the employers, employees and the State, but the Pharmaceutical 
Industry has its doubts that the State could finance it, as it will be devoting all its 
resources to the Public Hospital.
The restructuring of the Public Hospitals has been studied thoroughly by the Radical 
Party to be able to compete in the new scenario with the private Clinics. Physicians 
should be full time employed and validation of their titles every five years should be 
introduced. Managed care practices should be implemented regarding practices. The
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Pharmaceutical Industry sees the Public Hospital as the greatest issue for the 
Government in the near future as increasing numbers, due to unemployment, call at 
the Public Hospitals for Health Care. The Peronist Party does not consider the Public 
Hospital a big issue although Tobar thinks that certain Managed Care practices 
should be introduced.
There is also discrepancy between the Peronist Party and the Radical Party regarding 
the Centralised Body for purchases. The Radical Party remarks that having it 
decentralised is more efficient and it is more near to the customer. The Peronists talk 
about savings being done; the Industry sees only as a Market opportunity as 
historically the Centralised Body buys more than it actually uses.
Almost all respondents think that the Catastrophic Diseases patients should be 
included in a Special Insurance, which will provide Health Care to these patients. 
Only Dr. Neri has a different approach, looking more from the perspective of the 
patient and the family. The patient should stay in his or her HMO and be treated by 
the providers of this HMO, so that the patient will not feel excluded of his family 
group.
PAMI should be more efficient according to the Peronist Party but it is not clear how 
this tremendous task will be tackle. The Radical Party believes that PAMI should be 
dissolved and its affiliates given to the Provinces HMOs. Felicio, from the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, believes that PAMI will continue as it is. He claims that the 
political interests within the Peronist Party to preserve it are so strong that the idea to 
dissolve, proposed by the Radical Party, will never have political support.
Generics will be an issue in the next 5 years, specially affecting the Pharmaceutical 
Industry. The Peronists have introduced a new Generics Policy aimed at making 
medicines affordable for the people. This policy has not been so successful because 
the current Generic Companies in the Market were not prepared for this change, 
lacking resources and knowledge according to Quinones. Nevertheless, the 
Pharmaceutical Industry believes that Generic Companies will catch up and new 
entrants, both National and Multinational, will increase the share of Generic Products
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in the Market. About this issue, the Radical Party put more emphasis in quality 
control of practices and medicines than in the issue of promoting a Generics Policy.
Regarding Vademecums there are there are two lines of thinking, not related to the 
Parties. Tobar and Neri think that there will be only one compulsory Vademecum for 
all HMOs. Vazquez, Quinones and Vasallo, think that there will be a basic list of 
drugs and each HMO will adapt it to the characteristics of its population. Both parties 
believe that Pharmapolitics jobs will be preserved by companies to have their 
products introduced in these Vademecums. Neri suggests that the rules to introduce 
the products will be stricter so that the Pharmapolitics Managers will have to become 
more professional in terms of Pharmacology and Pharmaeconomics.
So that what will happen in the future with the Health System, is a question mark. At 
least there are some interesting ideas from both Parties to be implemented. The 
outcome will depend on how fast the economy reactivates, which will the 
Government Policy in terms of Health, how is the share of seats in the Parliament 
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Introduction
The term Pharmacopolitics or Pharmapolitics has been defined (Quinones, 2002) as the 
activities performed by the Pharmaceutical Industry aimed at influencing Government, 
Public Officials and Health Management Organisations (HMOs) or Managed Care 
Organisations (MCOs) in order to get a competitive advantage in the Market. There has 
been no research in this topic in Argentina, and the first mention of this term in the 
literature is done by Cerasale (2000), claiming that it has become a popular word together 
with Pharmaeconomics but instead of explaining its significance he continues the paragraph 
describing the advantages of Pharmaeconomics. The second mention in the literature is 
done by Tobar (2002) referring to Pharmacopolitics as the twin sister of Pharmaeconomics 
but again there is no explanation of its significance and scope.
Redwood (1997) refers to Pharmacopolitics as the policy implemented by the 
Pharmaceutical Industry according to the political environment, regarding innovation, 
location (Redwood, 2002) and cost-containment procedures. Redwood focuses in the cost- 
containment policies implemented by the Health bureaucracies and describes its flaws. 
This definition of Pharmacopolitics does not correlate with the definition of 
Pharmacopolitics accepted in Argentina; Redwood definition describes the influence of the 
political scenario in the decisions taken by the Pharmaceutical Industry.
Vasallo (2002) argues, the American Health System is more similar to the Argentine one 
than the European, being Health considered a private good which depending in the 
purchasing power of the individual, could be obtained or not, so that due to the lack of 
literature in the Pharmacopolitics subject in Argentina, the American Health System will be 
considered to review the two more important activities of Pharmacopolitics:
a) lobbying Congress and the Government performed by the Pharmaceutical Industry.
b) the influence of the Pharmaceutical Industry in HMOs/MCOs regarding Formularies, 
called Vademecums in Argentina.
The Nature of Lobbying
Definition:
The Oxford English Dictionary Online (2002) defines lobby:
"1. to influence (members of the house of legislature) in the exercise of their 
legislative functions by frequenting the lobby. Also, to procure the passing of (a 
measure) through Congress by means of such influence"
"2. to frequent the lobby of a legislative assembly for the purpose of influencing 
members' votes; to solicit the votes of members"
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2002) introduces a new fact to the definition " 
influencing public officials " broadening the target of lobbying and not limiting it only to 
the legislators. It also defines that is an influence "toward a desired action". It confirms that 
there is an objective to be reached.
In the USA, lobbying per se constitutes a lawful opportunity available to interest groups to 
exert influence and to have an impact on policy. The right to lobby (Jobst, 2002) is 
implicitly derived from the First Amendment of the USA Constitution, which states " 
Congress shall make no law [...] abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for redress of 
grievances". The rationale of lobbyists stems from the belief that a democratic society does 
not necessarily guarantee equal access of individual opinion, and hence, any tool to foster 
awareness of the legislators about certain topics should be allowed. As Lord (2000) refers, 
legislators "face a lack of knowledge about constituents relevant public policy priorities and 
preferences" due to limited personal and staff time and resources. Lord also confirm that 
legislators must rely to a great degree on the information that they receive from the different 
lobbyist groups to make decisions in the different subjects.
The classification of lobbying
Regarding the different types of Lobbying, two different perspectives could be found in the 
lobbyists arena. (Suranovic, 2001):
a) Casual lobbying: it occurs when a person uses their leisure time to petition or 
inform government officials of their point of view. In these cases there is no 
opportunity cost for the economy in terms of lost output, although there is a cost 
to the individual because of the foregone leisure time.
b) Professional Lobbying: occurs when an individual or company is hired by 
someone to advocate a point of view before the Government. That could be the 
case when a Pharmaceutical Company hired a Lobbying firm to push some deals 
through Congress.
The classification done by Suranovic is rather simplistic as it does not take into account a 
lot of diverse types of lobbying restricting it to the casual or to a professional one. There are 
other types of lobbying groups as the Political Action Committees (PAC), Interest Groups 
as Public Citizen's Congress Watch, and also the Corporate Constituency-building as 
means of influencing the legislators. Political action committees (PACs) are set up by 
corporations, unions or other organisations to act as conduits for funds to candidates who 
favour particular policy positions (Oxford Dictionary of Politics, 2002). Interest Groups 
(Oxford Dictionary of Politics, 1996) are organisations seeking to advance a particular 
sectional interest or cause, while not seeking to form a government or part of the 
government. The term is often used interchangeably with pressure group. There is also the 
Corporate constituency-building with lobbyists inside the Corporations, named in-house 
lobbyists (Oxford Dictionary of Politics, 1996), to differentiate themselves of contract 
lobbyists from Consulting or Law firms.
The characteristics of lobbying
Even if Suranovic (2001) classification is simplistic, he argues that lobbying is essentially
distributive in nature, since the lobbyists income will derive from the losses that will accrue
to others in the event that the lobbying effort is successful. This definition is important to 
the research as lobbying is an activity that does not create value for the economic system. It 
only transfers value from one part of the system to another. Another name given to 
professional lobbying in the economics literature is a " Directly Unproductive Activity" 
(Suranovic, 2001). This term is biased through the tarnished reputation of lobbying. That is 
related to the " scandals in which lobbyists employed questionable tactics to win legislation 
for special interests, acquiring a sinister image" (Oxford Guide to the United States 
Government, 2001). There are plentiful articles written about Lobbying and Corruption, 
which claim " criminal methods such as bribery and blackmail" (A Dictionary of 
Economics, 1997), but corruption is not the focus of this research.
Lobbying is also called rent-seeking, a term coined by Anne Krueger, 1974, (Oxford 
Dictionary of Politics, 1996), as it is seeking to capitalise on the scarcity value of a good or 
service. The fees paid to the lobbyists come from a pool of funds that arise when the 
lobbying activity is successful.
Lobbying is a necessity for the democratic system to work. Somehow information about 
preferences and desires must be transmitted from citizens to the Government officials who 
make policy decisions. Since everyone is free to petition the government, lobbying is the 
way in which government officials can learn about the desires of their constituents 
(Suranovic 2001).
Pharmaceutical Industry's Lobbying
The perspective of the Pharmaceutical Industry
No paper has been written by the Pharmaceutical Industry about its lobbying activities in 
the USA. The only written information is the speech given by Alan F. Holmer (2002), 
President of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufactures of America (PhRMA) in its 
Annual Meeting (2002). PhRMA is the Chamber which comprises the Pharmaceutical 
Companies in the USA; those companies account for generics companies are not members 
of PhRMA.
Holmer stated that the PhRMA strategy was divided in two different fronts:
a) advocacy programs: Holmer's objective was to make PhRMA "the premier 
advocacy organization in the world'". To achieve this objective advocacy 
programs are run from PhRMA's eight regional offices and PhRMA is 
represented in 50 state capitals by people from both political parties, Republicans 
and Democrats. " These are representatives of local citizens, know the legislators 
well, and understand how our issues will be considered in their states". PhRMA 
have also six ally development people in the regional offices, that have contacted 
labour leaders, small business owners, physicians, nurses, pharmacists, minority 
groups, patients and patients advocates. Alliances have been made with these 
groups aimed at achieving common goals.
b) federal lobbying: The federal lobbying team of PhRMA amounts to 17 people. 
Those are the in-house lobbyists. Some former congressional staff was included 
in PhRMA's payroll as Rodger Currie (Common Cause, 2001) being one of the 
leaders of the PhRMA team of lobbyists (Holmer, 2002). According to Holmer, 
the team has achieved outstanding results as banning a law on re-importation of 
drugs to the USA. As the medicines manufactured in the USA are sold at cheaper 
prices in other countries due to price controls in other countries (Common 
Cause, 2001), there was an initiative for issuing a law allowing pharmacists and 
drug wholesalers in the USA to re-import prescription drugs. This initiative was 
blocked by the lobbying performed by PhRMA as Holmer relates " Two years 
ago, on re-importation, 12 members of the House voted no. Last year, the number 
of opponents had increased from 12 to 267."
In all his assertions, Holmer denotes triumphalism with sentences like " but one 
organisation never loses, and that organisation has hundreds of victories to its credit and 
zero defeats in the United States Congress, and that is the pharmaceutical industry." The 
speech given by Holmer, does not describe how lobbying is implemented or financed in 
Washington or in a regional basis but these topic are well documented by several interest 
groups or pressure groups.
The Research done by Interest Groups
Common Cause (2001) and specially Public Citizen's (2001) have elaborated an extensive 
literature describing the strategy, the resources devoted and the achievements of the 
Pharmaceutical Industry in Washington. It should be pointed out that even if the 
information is based in reliable data, as lobbying investments done by companies should be 
disclosed every year since 1995 (Public Citizen, 2001), the opinions of these groups are 
biased towards the objective they defend. Phrases as " This industry, however, racked up its 
successes at the expense of the American public" (Common Cause, 2001), or " Public 
Citizen believes that no bribes should be given to the drug industry." (Congress Watch, 
2002) are common so that the researcher will focus on the facts more than in the opinions 
that are enunciated. In the introduction of its report "America's Other Drug Problem: A 
Briefing Book on the Rx Drug Debate", Public Citizen Congress Watch (2002) states that 
"some readers may see a pro-consumer bias in the selection of facts. That bias may well 
exist." But in the creation of the report, " we have used credible, independent sources and 
the most current data that we know of for each and every point we make." (Congress 
Watch, 2002).
According to Public Citizen's Congress Watch (2002), the pharmaceutical industry is one 
of the most potent political forces when it comes to influencing legislation in Washington. 
Through inside-the-beltway lobbying, campaign contributions, issue ads, funding front 
groups, and conducting grassroots lobbying, the industry largely gets what it wants from 
politicians in Washington. Common Cause, a citizen's grassroots lobby dedicated to 
making government more open, honest and accountable at the national, state and local 
levels, declares in its report " Prescription for Power" (2001) that PhRMA and its member 
companies have spent at least U$S 256 million on lobbying Congress, the White House 
and federal regulators over the past five years ( January 1,1996- December 31, 2001), 
according to federal lobbying reports. This information does not match with the figures 
provided by Public Citizen's Congress Watch Report (2002) which reports an estimate of 
U$S 403 million for the period 1997 to 2001. Public Citizen's Congress Watch reports have 
a sound methodology and a complete list of references. Common Cause report, has very 
few references and the methodology of obtaining the information is not described so that
Public Citizen will be considered for raw data and Common Cause information will be 
added to complement the information provided by Public Citizen and other sources.
Structure of the industries lobbying
Public Citizen's Congress Watch describes that the Industry hired 623 lobbyists in 200 L 
340 of them called "revolving door lobbyists'" as they were previous members of the 
Congress (23), staff or executive branch employees (317) and have special access to the 
current Members of the Congress. From the rest of the 623 lobbyists ; (Public Citizen's 
Congress Watch, 2001) 165 lobbyists were in-house lobbyists during the year 2000. They 
worked for the pharmaceutical companies and its two major trade associations, PhRMA and 
the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO). All the pharmaceutical companies, 
considered in the report, spent more than U$S 1.000.000 on lobbying in 2000. The 10 Top 
companies in lobbying expenditures in year 2000 were American, followed by Glaxo 
Wellcome and Smithkline Beecham; this fact shows the acceptance of the American 
Companies towards the activities of lobbying Congress and the Government.
During the 2002 election cycle, the prescription pharmaceutical industry has given 74% of 
contributions to Republicans and 26% to Democrats.(Public Citizen's Congress Watch, 
2002). According to Common Cause (2001), the industry increasingly allied itself with the 
Republican Party, which it perceived as more supportive of its goals, and which took 
control of Congress in 1995; nevertheless, the pharmaceutical industry continued to 
cultivate some key Democrats, as Senator Joseph Lieberman or Senator Robert Torricelli 
(New Jersey), state which has a concentration of pharmaceutical companies in it.
Methodology
The methodology of executing its lobbying demonstrates a high degree of sophistication. 
The traditional method is to donate campaign contributions in the election cycle so that in 
the 1999-2000 election cycle, pharmaceutical manufacturers contributed with U$S 20.1 
million (Public Citizen's Congress Watch, 2001) to the political campaigns. There has also 
been an increase of soft money, which are unlimited donations to PACs (Political Action 
Committees) controlled by Party leaders. Fifty nine percent of the industry's campaign
contribution in 1999-2000 were in soft money. (Public Citizen's Congress Watch, 2001). 
The pharmaceutical industry also contributed to the inauguration committee of President 
George W. Bush with U$S 625.000, establishing a relationship that later collected its 
rewards as Mitch Daniels (Eli Lilly) runs the Office of Management and Budget, Donald 
Rumsfeld (Searle) sits in Bush Cabinet and a one time pharmaceutical industry lobbyist, 
Nick Calio, is Bush's chief liaison to Congress (Public Citizen's Congress Watch, 2001).
Another vehicle to support the Pharmaceutical Industry's lobbying efforts is " Citizens for 
Better Medicare". According to Congress Watch it is a sham interest group created in 1999 
to oppose the drug policies against the industry. The objective of Citizens for Better 
Medicare as it enunciated in its web site is to pursue basic consumer fairness in health care 
(Common Cause, 2001). Using Citizens for Better Medicare, the pharmaceutical industry 
spent U$S 50 million in 1999-2000 on ads, aimed at supporting or attacking candidates 
which might help the interests of the Pharmaceutical Industry; Citizens for Better Medicare 
first wave of ads were modelled on the Harry and Louise film and aimed at opposing the 
Clinton health care plan on Medicare in 1993-1994 (Public Citizen's Congress Watch, 
2002). The advantage for the Pharmaceutical Industry is that Citizens for Better Medicare 
spending was kept secret under Section 527 of the federal tax code, which covers groups 
whose purpose is to influence or attempt to influence elections. Shortly after Congress 
closed the 527-loophole, Citizens for Better Medicare became a different kind of tax- 
exempt group- a 501(c)(4) non-profit. Under this category, Citizens for Better Medicare 
does not have to disclosure contributors or spending details.( Public Citizen's Congress 
Watch, 2002). This kind of tricks helped to preserve the anonymity of the Pharmaceutical 
Industry, although there are indications that establish its relationship. Tim Ryan, its 
Executive Director, was previously Marketing Manager for PhRMA (Common Cause, 
2001).
Additional to Citizens for Better Medicare, the pharmaceutical industry also contributes 
with the US Chamber of Commerce and with the United Seniors Association. (Public 
Citizen's Congress Watch, 2002). United Seniors Association spent U$S 12 million on 
issue ads from March 2001 to July 2002 aimed at promoting President's Bush and House
Republican leaders' prescription drug plan, funded in part by PhRMA (Public Citizen's 
Congress Watch, 2002).
Strategy
The Pharmaceutical Companies' strategy regarding lobbying has concentrated in three 
issues: protect themselves against competition, preserve a freedom in establishing the prices 
and tax breaks which improved the bottom line.
Protect themselves against competition
The most influential way of protecting themselves is through the growth of patent life for 
drugs as patents create a monopoly for pharmaceutical companies (Congress Watch, 2002). 
Vasallo & Sellanes (2002) refer to patent protection as the most serious adverse effect for 
consumers due to this limitation to the surge of new suppliers in the Market. It is 
paradoxically protected by the Government who has the power of issuing and enforcing 
anti-trust regulations and also the power to create these drug monopolies. This issue is 
critical for those new drugs aimed at terminal diseases as Cancer. Common Cause (2001) 
claims: " Even though Bristol Myers Squibb and other companies have compassionate care 
programs to give these expensive life-saving drugs to some impoverished patients, critics 
claim that the high cost of these drugs has continued to pose terrible financial burdens on 
many cancer victims. " There are people with second, third, and fourth mortgages on their 
houses to pay for this, " Jeffrey Kraws, a pharmaceutical analyst for Gruntal & Co., told the 
Miami Herald. " This isn't cough medicine. People are dying." This type of stories could be 
heard all over the world and fosters the prejudice of consumers against the Pharmaceutical 
Industry. This issue is contested by Holmer (2002) as he transfers the responsibility to the 
Government as patients ask politicians, " Am I still sick because there is no cure, or because 
my Government has just said " no new medicines for me"?". It is the eternal fight between 
the payers (Government, Managed Care Organisations) and the Pharmaceutical Industry 
blaming each other for the imperfections of the Health Systems as it is. Even then, patents 
are necessary for the Pharmaceutical Industry to be able to invest million of dollars in 
research and development to find new molecules.
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The effective patent life of a drug in the USA averages 13.9 to 15.4 years (National Institute 
for Health Care Management, 2000). Since the mid-1980s, the federal government has 
adopted a number of laws that extended the effective lives of drug patent by 4.4 to 5.9 
years. The major laws and the years they have added to the patent life of drugs are 
(Congress Watch, 2002):
1) The Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 added, on average, 2.3 years to the patent life.
2) The prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992 increased the efficiency of PDA drug 
review and approval and knocked 1.2 years off the review and approval process.
3) The Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, an international trade agreement, added 1 
year to the effective patent life.
4) The Food and Drug Modernisation Act of 1997 reduced the average number of years for 
clinical study by 1 year; FDAMA also gave six months of market exclusivity to a 
patented drug if a manufacturer tests the safety of the drug in children.
Those modifications achieved by the lobbying of the Pharmaceutical Companies (Common 
Cause, 2001), protected the profit of the Pharmaceutical companies. It is estimated that the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act costs consumers more than U$S 6 billion due to delayed 
access to generic drugs (Congress Watch, 2002), great part of it returning to the 
Pharmaceutical Industry.
Pharmaceutical Companies stand to lose billions from expiring patents as generics are 
introduced into the market. It is estimated that the projected sales of drugs coming off 
patents between 2000 and 2004 are U$S 25.5 billion. (Congress Watch, 2000). There is a 
product of Schering Plough, Claritin, which has received a lot of lobbying efforts to prolong 
its patent life. Claritin sold U$S 2.3 billion in 1999. Claritin's patent was extended two 
years by the Hatch-Waxman Act, 22 months under the Uruguay Round Agreements Act and 
six more months because the manufacturer tested the safety of the drug for children 
(Congress Watch, 2002). Schering Plough is pushing to extend its patent beyond 2002, 
backing its request on the fact that the approval of the antihistamine took an unusually long 
time, nearly 6 !/2 years (Manning et al, 2001) compared to the normal 2.6 years approval 
time. Schering Plough spent U$S 4.3 million on lobbying to achieve this objective but 
failed in the last session of Congress (Manning et al., 2001). Common Cause (2001)
referred that "consumer outrage and bad publicity over these patent extension attempts have 
so far stymied these congressional efforts". The Prime Institute of the College of Pharmacy 
(Manning et al, 2001) estimates that a three year extension of the Claritin patent, would cost 
consumers more than U$S 5.3 billion.
Lobbying has an effect on patent life growth in the USA, ensuring additional profits for 
brand-name products during their patent life. The achievement for the Pharmaceutical 
Industry of the regulation of the six additional months of patent protection given for testing 
the safety of drugs for children, represent additional profits of U$S 592 million a year 
(Congress Watch, 2002).
Preserve the freedom of establishing the prices of the products
Prescription prices rose at more than six times the rate of inflation in 2001 in the USA; the 
average price per prescription increased 10% from 2000 to 2001, while the rate of inflation 
was only 1.6% in 2001.(National Institute for Health Care Management, 2002). The reason 
for this increase in prices is due to several factors (Congress Watch, 2002): more utilisation 
of popular drugs whose prices are above average, being those aimed at seniors far more 
expensive than the other ones, and lack of price controls in the USA. Canada, UK or 
Continental Europe do have price controls and patients pay between 35% and 50% less than 
in the USA. These benefits in price freedom has been preserved by the industry so as to 
boost profits. According to Public Citizen's Congress Watch, USA sales account for about 
60% of global industry profits. In other words, Americans pay, on average, 60 cents of 
every $ 1 that any pharmaceutical company in the world earns in profits.
Public Citizen's Congress Watch (2002) states that at the top of the industry's agenda has 
been opposition to prescription drug coverage under Medicare and hostility to measures that 
would moderate rising drug prices. "Worried that the bulk buying power of Medicare would 
lead to discounted prices in the lucrative senior citizen market, the pharmaceutical industry 
launched an unprecedented blitz of lobbying, campaign contributions, and so-called issue 
ads to help its political allies and attack its enemies."(Congress Watch, 2001) The 
industry's political investments have paid off as Congress has failed to provide Medicare
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prescription drug coverage (Congress Watch, 2002). Instead, Republican Leaders have 
promoted proposals that would encourage seniors to get drug coverage through private 
insurance companies and HMOs, preventing the Medicare program from negotiating 
substantial price cuts (Congress Watch, 2002). Holmer's (2002) confirms that PhRMA 
highest priority is to focus all the lobbying resources on "enacting a high-quality Medicare 
drug benefit for seniors, delivered through the private sector." This reform will leave prices 
unaltered increasing the demand for medicines as seniors get some kind of reimbursement. 
Public Citizen (2002) conducted studies in 13 states and major metropolitan areas, which 
showed that the top 10 drugs used by seniors cost Medicare beneficiaries who are without 
prescription drug insurance nearly twice as much as pharmaceutical companies' most 
favoured customers, such as the Department of Veterans affairs. It is also important to 
notice that seniors are 13% of the population but account for 34% of all prescriptions 
dispensed.
Tax breaks which improved the bottom line
Public Citizen's Congress Watch (2002) refers that the tax rates for the pharmaceutical 
industry are much lower than other industries as the effective tax rate averaged 16% from 
1993 through 1996 compared to 27% for all major industries over the same period. The 
pharmaceutical industry used tax credits to cut its taxes by almost $ 28 billion from 1990 to 
1996 (Public Citizen's Congress Watch, 2002). The savings came from five federal tax 
provisions: the foreign tax credit, the possessions tax credit, the research and 
experimentation tax credit, the orphan drug tax credit and the expensing of research 
expenditures (Public Citizen's Congress Watch, 2002). The research and experimentation 
tax credit, originally, enacted in 1981 as a temporary measure, has been extended 10 times, 
most recently in 2000, when Congress gave it a five year reprieve. The 20-percent credit 
rewards research spending above a certain base level.(Common Cause, 2001). The 
pharmaceutical industry has also taken advantage of a tax break for companies that built 
factories in Puerto Rico. From 1980 to 1990, the General Accounting Office (Public 
Citizen's Congress Watch, 2002) estimated that 26 Pharmaceutical companies had tax 
savings of U$S 10.1 billion thanks to the Puerto Rico facilities. There were several attempts 
to eliminate this particular tax break named Section 936. "The fight to retain the section 936
credit consumed more lobbying and more political capital than all but the biggest ticket 
items in the proposed deficit reduction bill according to The Washington Post."(Common 
Cause, 2001). In 1996, Congress did vote to eliminate this particular tax break, but 
Members did so on the drugs companies' terms. The tax break would not apply to any 
future investments in Puerto Rico but current investments would have 10 years until the tax 
break would be completely eliminated. That gradual phase-in represented a victory for the 
pharmaceutical lobby (Common Cause, 2001). These lobbying for tax breaks have given 
the pharmaceutical industry a sustained competitive advantage over other industries.
Economic impact of lobbying
This lobbying made in Washington and in the regional legislation have given the 
Pharmaceutical Industry an extraordinary competitive advantage in the USA. According to 
the Fortune Magazine (Fortune Magazine, 2001) the pharmaceutical industry was the most 
profitable industry in America in year 2001. Fortune Magazine also states that the 10 
biggest USA pharmaceutical companies saw their gross profits increase by 33% in 2001 in 
spite of the American economic slowdown. From the literature review, it can be concluded 
that pharmaceutical lobbying has been extremely effective during the last years in the USA 
It is cited by Holmer (2002), CEO of PhRMA with its " and zero defeats in the United 
States Congress", and also by the interest groups of consumers as Congress Watch (2002)." 
they largely gets what it wants from politicians in Washington". So that Pharmaceutical 
lobbying is extremely important for the Pharmaceutical Industry to maintain its competitive 
advantage. In the literature, there are some figures of how much it will cost consumers a 
certain tax break or the extension of a patent life but there is no research done analysing 
how much of the lobbying performed by PhRMA or by Pharmaceutical companies 
correlates to Companies Sales, Profits or Market Share except for special cases as the patent 
extension of Claritin, where an amount of 5.3 billion was estimated as the expected burden 
to consumers on the enacting of the extension of the patent life in 3 years (Manning et al, 
2001). There is also no clear evidence in the literature that those companies that have in- 
house lobbyists have a better performance that those which do not have an in-house 
lobbyists. So that there is a benefit for the Pharmaceutical Companies which is the
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equivalent of the damage to consumers but there is no study published on the impact of 
Pharmaceutical Lobbying in a microeconomics scale related to the performance of each 
company.
There is also the consideration of Suranovic (2001) about the nature of lobbying and its 
distributive characteristic, transferring resources from consumers or from the Government, 
in the case of tax breaks, to the Pharmaceutical Industry. There is a cost of opportunity so 
that those resources could be used for another needs of the patients or society. This issue is 
what the consumers groups or interest groups protest about. It can be concluded that 
consumers are being punished to the benefit of the Pharmaceutical Industry although the 
latter claims that it need these resources to research new molecules. The Pharmaceutical 
Industry claims that research is risky and that they need high profits to fuel new research. 
But there is evidence which shows that the pharmaceutical industry has been the most 
profitable for the last decades (Public Citizen's Congress Watch, 2002), so that the research 
could not be too risky otherwise it would not be that profitable. According to the Fortune 
Magazine(2001) the 500 pharmaceutical companies devoted 12.5% of their revenue to 
R&D compared to 18.5% to profits and 30.4% to marketing and administration. Even then 
there is one key player missing in the analysis, that are the Health Management 
Organisations or Managed Care Organisations who actually pay for a part of those 
medicines. There is also a distributive effect that transfers resources of these organisations 
to the Pharmaceutical Industry. Those extra resources could be used in improving the 
quality of Health Care or giving additional services to their affiliates.
Only in the case of the USA the improvement of the economic environment for the 
Pharmaceutical Companies, achieved through the lobbying in Washington, have created 
additional value. Redwood (2002) argues that as industrial policy on pharmaceuticals has 
been progressively abandoned in the European Union, the focus of pharmaceuticals and 
biotech investment has shift towards the USA away from Europe. " The most visible 
symptom of this is the gradual emigration of new investment in activities and qualities that 
determine industrial competitiveness in the long run: research, development, advanced 
skills and an entrepreneurial approach to new ideas". There have been many developments
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in this direction in the past years: Pharmacia moved its corporate headquarters from the UK 
to the USA; Bayer moved its headquarters of its consumer medicines from Leverkusen to 
New Jersey; GSK after the merger moved its headquarters in the USA; Sobering AG moved 
the management of its therapeutic division from Germany to New Jersey and Novartis is 
transferring its world-wide discovery and research activities to the USA (Redwood, 2002). 
What is noticeable is that these moves come from countries which are supposed to have the 
best economic climate in Europe as the UK, Germany and Switzerland. In this case, 
although lobbying had a distributive effect normally, it had a certain creation of value for 
the American economy as it improved the economic environment attracting industrial 
investments of foreign companies.
The nature of Managed Care
Pilnick, Dingwall and Starkey (2001) described Managed Care as a generic term for a 
variety of attempts to alter or restrict the treatment behaviours of health care professionals 
in order to produce both clinically effective and cost effective outcomes; at its simplest, 
Managed Care is the management of medicines and treatment aimed at containing costs and 
promoting effectiveness. Bengoa (1998) refers Managed Care as a net of organisations 
which provide co-ordinated health services to a certain population accepting the 
responsibility of the clinical and economic outcomes of the health in this population. 
Although Bengoa, cites this definition as Managed Care, he means a HMO, which is an 
organisation or group of them that contracts and supplies medical care on the basis of a 
fixed periodic payment.
Traditionally, physicians in the USA were paid a fee per item of service; this created 
incentives for overtreatment and cost inflation and presented payers with an open-ended 
financial commitment (Pilnick et al, 2001). Managed Care Organizations (MCOs), the 
majority of which in the USA are either health maintenance organisations (HMOs) or 
preferred provider organisations (PPOs), change these incentives, "eliminating fee for 
service in favor of delivery systems that encourage providers to control the costs" (Varney, 
1995) limiting the financial commitment of payers by paying clinicians a periodic fee for 
life covered (capitation) and making them share the risks of costs for excessive or
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expensive treatment. MCO payers may be employers, insurers, the state, or, more rarely, 
individual clients.
In practice, MCO organisational models vary considerably in detail and fee-for service 
providers have also adopted some features, such as the use of restricted drug formularies, 
blurring the distinction between the various types (Pilnick et al, 2001). A formulary is a list 
of PDA-approved drug products by therapeutic category, along with relative cost 
information; these formularies are made available to pharmacies, physicians, third-party 
payers, or other persons involved in the health care industry, to guide in the prescribing and 
dispensing of pharmaceuticals. A restricted or closed formulary limits reimbursement to the 
specific drugs listed (Varney, 1995). Pilnick, Dingwall & Starkey pointed out "However, 
the MCOs' economic incentives are usually reinforced by a range of direct interventions. 
These typically include controls on clinical autonomy, controls on patient choice and a 
degree of vertical integration. Controls on clinical autonomy include restricting the 
physicians' choice of drugs to those included in a formulary or requiring disease treatment 
to follow specified protocols. Those controls are intended to change doctor's prescribing 
behaviour in line with measures of efficacy and cost efficiency. They may be enforced 
either by individual case reviews or profiling, where doctors' performance indicators are 
compared with a standard and deviations from it are investigated or sanctioned." The 
principal objective of formularies is to bring down costs selecting a narrower choice of 
drugs and adopting generics to replace the highly-price brand-name products. Motheral 
(2000) concludes that formularies can significantly reduce pharmaceutical utilisation in a 
non-continuously eligible population. But this diminishing of costs is controversial as 
Redwood (1997) describes: "Cost containment pure-and-simple can be counter productive, 
as large-scale pioneering study of integrated health costs and outcomes has recently 
demonstrated. After analysing 240.000 prescriptions and 99.000 office visits by nearly 
13.000 patients in six health maintenance organisations across the US for one year, the 
study concluded that the most restrictive formularies had consistently caused the highest 
overall medical costs to HMOs and also caused patients greater inconvenience and longer 
periods of illness and discomfort". Redwood makes a point about the effectiveness of 
Managed Care Organisations as the focus is only put in cost-containment of medicines and
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not in outcomes an overall costs, specially, remark Studin (2002), in those diseases as 
diabetes, congestive heart failure, asthma and depression where the system have 
pronounced deficiencies. But Studin (2002) notices that the failure lay not in the 
formularies but in the imperfections of the whole system of Managed Care as lack of staff 
or capital in the MCOs to systematically adopt the practices of disease management or 
clinical-quality improvement, insufficient training of staff in such important areas as 
disease management, data analysis, and patient and provider education and the poor 
relationship with the physicians which undermines the health plan credibility. MCOs could 
also benefit from collaborative activities with the Pharmaceutical Industry in order to 
measure the effectiveness of the disease management programs.
Pilnick et al, (2001)describes as another characteristic of Managed Care the restrictions on 
the providers who may be consulted, whether for primary or secondary care, to those 
employed by, or holding contracts with, the MCO in question. As a result of such restriction 
and standardisation, whereby patients relinquish some freedom of choice, MCOs can offer 
care more cheaply than traditional fee-for-service schemes.
The evolution of Managed Care practices looking for cost containment paved the way for 
the surge of a new entity appeared called Pharmacy Benefit Management (PBM). According 
to Varney (1995), PBMs select participating pharmacists, drug manufacturers and suppliers, 
administer point of sale claims processing systems, negotiate quantity discounts with 
pharmaceutical companies, administer plan record keeping and payment systems, and 
maintain quality control. PBMs also control costs by negotiating discounts from 
manufactures, usually in the form of rebates, in return for placing the manufacturer drug on 
the PBM formulary. So that PBM are intermediaries between the Pharmaceutical Industry, 
the MCOs and the Pharmacies.PBMs are contracted by MCOs to handle their prescriptions 
and formularies. PBMs process the information of prescriptions from their selected 
pharmacies and generate information for the:
• Pharmaceutical Company: In return for the consumption done, the Pharmaceutical 
Company pays the PBM a rebate related to its Market Share.
• Managed Care Organizations: The PBM designs the formulary and provides the 
information to the MCO's in return for a fee that could be fixed on a capitation or per- 
service basis. Controls can be implemented on protocols and adherence to the formulary.
• Pharmacies: PBMs pay to the pharmacies the amount equivalent to the reimbursements 
done to patients.
The influence of the Pharmaceutical Industry in Managed Care Organisations
As there was no description of the activities of in-house lobbyists because of obvious 
reasons as they are chosen on one to one basis, there are some descriptions of the activities 
that a Managed Care Account Manager of the Pharmaceutical Industry should perform 
regarding the relationship to the Managed Care Organisations.
Managed Care Accounts Managers
The sources of this information are organisations which provided training for the 
Pharmaceutical Industry. Romar Consulting Associates (2002) refer to the Managed Care 
Account Managers to be responsible for building and maintaining strong positions for their 
companies in the Managed Care Organisations. For ASI Solutions (2002), another 
consulting company, the role of the Managed Care Manager revolves around developing 
and managing contracts with managed care organisations. Romar additions another 
activities as conducting an account portfolio analysis, establish objectives, strategies and 
tactics and work with the Headquarters personnel to support strategic account plans. These 
definitions are vague and none of them permits to clarify which is the job description but it 
confirms the existence of Pharmaceutical Managed Care Account Managers who worked 
with the Managed Care Organisations. Studin (2002) explains that Manager Account 
Executives are hired to foster long-term relationships with manage care payers as 
Pharmaceutical companies realised that the sales function could no longer just focus on 
physicians and hospitals but that Selling had an institutional requirement on non-physician 
decision makers. Pharmaceutical Managed care divisions are driven by their own 
contracting function, centred on the need to secure formulary positions. Collateral activities 
involve product pull-through. Standards for determining how Pharmaceutical manage care 
divisions perform revert to product sales.
19
Pharmaceutical Industry and the introducion of products in formularies
"Health plans (HMOs and PPOs) as a general rule distrust pharma, due to a perceive
d 
conflict of interest: financial support implies formulary positions are being sold, whil
e 
partnerships compromise objective pharmacy and therapeutic (P&T) committe
e 
deliberations' (Studin, 2002). There is certainly an influence in the inclusion of products i
n 
formularies although denied by the HMOs/MCOs of the Managed Care Account Executive
s 
as some HMOs have prohibited medical and pharmacy directors from having meetings wit
h 
Pharmaceutical Account Executives. Other National HMOs have prohibited program o
r 
grant participation or another type of hospitality with Pharmaceutical Companies and ther
e 
are some HMOs which state that all the dialogue with Pharmaceutical companies has to b
e 
in a corporate level. A conflict of interest arise as the objectives of Managed Car
e 
Organisations are opposite to the ones of the Managed Care Teams of the Pharmaceutica
l 
Industry. The Pharmaceutical company's objective is to maximise Sales in a formulary an
d 
the HMO or PPO is to contain costs and provide a better service to their affiliates. But th
e 
true influence of Pharmaceutical Companies is at the PBM level, where most formularie
s 
are done. In some exceptional cases the HMO contract a PBM preserving the right to decid
e 
which products are eligible for their formulary (Carroll, 2002) but most of the times th
e 
PBM decides about the Formulary and the products included.
In the USA, three PBMs, AdvancePCS, Medco Health Solutions, and Express Script
s 
covered 180 million people (Carroll. 2002) facts that shows a big concentration. Medco i
s 
owned by Merck Sharp & Dohme and it has one third of the PBM Market, a marke
t 
estimated to cover 71% of the volume of outpatient medications covered by third-part
y 
payers (Lenzer, 2001). Eli Lilly also bought PCS Health Services, the biggest PBM in th
e 
country. The Federal Trade Commission (Varney, 1995) issued a consent decree regardin
g 
the PCS acquisition as it would harm competition in the national full-service PBM Marke
t. 
The justification of the decree was that the purchase would create entry barriers for anothe
r 
pharmaceutical company. Lilly was obliged to create an independent Pharmacy an
d 
Therapeutics Committee aimed at deciding which products should be included in th
e 
Formulary. Lilly was also compelled to maintain a firewall between the two business wit
h 
respect to other drug manufacturers' proposals, bids, contracts, discounts, etc. Eli Lil
ly
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divested its PBM after the consent decree. Merch Sharp & Dohme agreed to a similar 
consent with the Federal Trade Comission (Lenzer, 2001). Critics claimed that Merck's 
compliance with the consent decree is not perfect as it has its core products in the 
Formularies of Medco (Lenzer, 2001). Vioxx, its non-steroid antiinflammatory which 
entered the market in mid-1999 is in the formulary. Although the clinical studies prove that 
its selectivity over the COX-2 (ciclooxigenase-2) prevents the gastrointestinal side effects 
attributed to these type of drugs, new evidence shows that it produces an increase in 
cardiovascular events. Public Citizen's Sasich remarks: " Vioxx is no more effective- and it 
is no safer overall and its cost is significantly greater. So who does that benefit?" (Lenzer, 
2001). This vertical integration is an effective way to secure the position in the formularies 
(Fons, 2002), but there is another way in which the pharmaceutical industry influence the 
design of formularies at the PBM level and the instrument are the rebates.
Carroll (2002) describes two typical types of rebate offered to PBMs: an access rebate that 
gets a drug on the formulary and a market-share rebate. Most access rebates are standard 
but the special deals between pharmaceutical companies and the PBMs is market share 
rebates, as an advantage in a therapeutic category may lead to a bigger market share in that 
category resulting in an improve in the bottom line and in stock prices.
Carroll explains that as PBMs are forced to cut pricing for handling prescriptions in order 
to compete for customers (HMOs, PPOs), they have implemented aggressive deals with 
Pharmaceutical Companies over rebates and discounts, being requested in return by the 
Pharmaceutical Companies to push more expensive branded medications. The Henry J. 
Kaiser Family Foundation conducted a study in year 2000 which concluded that saving 
through PBMs cannot be automatically ensured.(Lenzer, 2001). Clients of the Merck- 
Medco PBM saw their prescription drug costs climb from $ 18 billion in 1999 to $ 23 
billion in 2000. As some of this formularies are tied to a consumption rate, the PBMs 
maintained their profits as the rebates and discounts have been kept secret by the PBMs 
(Carroll. 2002). Halbert, CEO of Advance PCS refers that the bulk of the rebates and 
discounts get passed on to clients but the clients cannot access to this information. The 
rebates help to keep the cost low for MCOs as helps the maximum utilisation of the drugs
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of the formulary. There is also a secrecy on the different agreements of the PBM with 
pharmaceutical companies; it is common that representatives of the PBM urge physicians to 
use certain drugs, including branded medications. These agreements are paid separately 
under the terms of administrative fees or educational fees.
Critics claim that the big money of the Pharmaceutical Companies is tied to the most 
expensive medications on the market (Carroll, 2002) and that PBMs push higher-priced 
branded medications. Pharmaceutical Companies also use a tactic called "bundling" which 
means that the Pharmaceutical Company conditions its participation in the negotiation table 
with PBMs to the introduction in the formularies of its high-priced name brands. Needing 
the PBM to complete its formulary with some of the products of this company and its 
rebates, the PBM concede to introduce the requested products of this company. Bundling is 
also used for blocking competitors to be introduced in the formulary. Duramed 
Pharmaceuticals (Carroll, 2002) sued Wyeth accusing it to use bundling methods to block 
Duramed from a dozen different formularies. So that the inclusion of products in 
formularies is a controversial issue in the Managed Care setting. Although there should be 
an independent Pharmacy and Therapeutics committee to decide which products are 
included in a formulary and there are checks that none of the decision makers 
"inappropriately curry favour"(Studin, 2002) with the Pharmaceutical Companies, the 
reality is that Managed Care Account Executives exert influence in the inclusion decisions 
on HMOs or PBMs through rebates, special agreements or another means as Hospitality, 
Grants or Programs with key decision makers.
Summary
Pharmacopolitics in Argentina has been defined as the activities performed by the 
Pharmaceutical Industry aimed at influencing the Government, Public Officials and Health 
Management Organisations (HMOs) or Managed Care Organisations (MCOs) in order to 
get a competitive advantage in the Market. Pharmacopolitics main activities are, first of all, 
lobbying the Congress and the Government in order to get favourable legislation and 
second, influence the Managed Care Organisations to secure a position in the Formularies
of these organisations. Due to the lack of literature in Argentine Market, the American one 
was taken as a model as it has similarities to the Argentine Market.
Pharmaceutical Lobbying has been extremely effective in Congress devoting a huge 
quantity of resources to push through the legislation it coveted. This lobbying has been 
performed by the companies themselves or by PhRMA, the chamber which represents the 
Brand-Name companies. The Pharmaceutical Industry's strategy focus on three issues: 
protect themselves against competitors through extension of patents, preserve the price 
freedom and obtain advantageous tax breaks. The achievements derived from this focus 
protected the bottom line of the Pharmaceutical Companies making this industry the most 
profitable for the last decade. The opposition to this lobbying implemented by consumer's 
Groups or by a minority of legislators, did not prosper as the Pharmaceutical Industry 
worked as a Corporate body against them. Apart from the disparities in the level of 
lobbying investment, the fragmentation of the opposing groups, could not damage the 
initiatives taken by the industry united by the same objectives. Another issue of interest is 
the distributive effect of lobbying and how this distributive effect applies to the 
Pharmaceutical lobbying. Lobbying by nature is distributive as it does not create value as it 
only transfers value from one part of society to the other one. In the case of the successes 
achieved by the Pharmaceutical Companies, funds from consumers, HMOs/MCOs and the 
Government are transferred to the Pharmaceutical Industry. The Pharmaceutical Industry 
argues that it needs this resources to fund its research, research itself that will save lives in 
the future. There is controversy of the profits of the industry are not too high but there is no 
political will to change this fact. There is one peculiarity to be mentioned about the changes 
that the Pharmaceutical Lobbying create in the USA improving the economic environment. 
This fact attracted European companies to establish their headquarters and research 
facilities in the USA, creating lobbying, indirectly, value for the USA as new investments 
settled in the country.
Managed Care is described as a generic term for a variety of attempts to alter or restrict the 
treatment behaviours of health care professionals in order to produce both clinically 
effective and cost effective outcomes; at its simplest, Managed Care is the management of
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medicines and treatment aimed at containing costs and promoting effectiveness. One of the 
components of Managed Care is the design of closed formularies which limits 
reimbursement to the specific drugs or products listed in the formulary. The aim of these 
formularies is to reduce pharmaceutical utilisation and thus costs. There is controversy 
about such an approach to medical care, not taking into account the outcomes of the use of 
medicines, which might reduce overall costs (hospitalisations, calls at physicians) for the 
Managed Care Organisations. For the time being, Managed Care Organisations are not 
prepared to of introduce changes to the current policies towards medical practices and 
formularies. Usually the MCO signs a contract with a PBM (Pharmacy Benefit 
Management) who designs its formulary and process the prescriptions dispensed at the 
pharmacies. PBMs also negotiate discounts and rebates with the Pharmaceutical Industry in 
return for inclusion of certain products in the formulary. The tactics implemented by the 
Pharmaceutical Industry with the PBMs are vertical integration, buying a PBM and securing 
its products in the formulary; or agreements on rebates. The need of diminishing costs by 
PBMs make them loose their neutrality and they closed agreements with Pharmaceutical 
Companies on high discounts and rebates, in return for having the companies' high-priced 
products in the formularies. The effects of this policy is that formularies are not only based 
in the most effective and cost-effective products, but on the Marketing interests of the 
Pharmaceutical Industry.
The Pharmaceutical Industry has proved to be very effective in achieving its goals in the 
Congress and the Government or in the Managed Care Organisations. This effectiveness 
derives from the belief that Pharmacopolitics activities are essential for the development of 
the business, devoting an important amount of resources to obtain its objectives. PhRMA 
executes the Global Strategy of lobbying and advocacy groups pursuing the common 
interests of the whole industry. Each Pharmaceutical Company devotes additional resources 
to seek its own interests, building in-house structures aimed at lobbying the Congress or 
influencing Managed Care Organisations. Although no research has been published about 
the economic impact of Pharmacopolitics' activities in the performance of each company, 
evidence shows that these activities do have an important effect on business, improving the 
profits and the competitive advantage of the brand-name pharmaceutical companies.
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Methodology




Federal legislation can have dramatic impacts on the strategy and performance of firms 
in 
the Health Industry. Being Health one of the most sensible issues for voters and f
or 
legislators, any law that is passed through the Parliament gets a lot of attention from th
e 
public. During the past few decades, legislators have had both economic and social motive
s 
for their increased commitment in health affairs. Legislators have selected specific areas o
f 
the Health Industry, or specific companies for monitoring standards, subsidies, protection
, 
regulation or deregulation. The importance of the legislative process to health businesse
s 
has been highlighted by ongoing congressional debates over issues as medicines, HMO
s 
and Medical Care.
In response to this active congressional agenda, corporations, as PAMI, Trade Union
s 
HMOs, Professional Associations and the Pharmaceutical Industry have employed a wid
e 
variety of means to try to influence the legislative process. These influence tactics includ
e 
financial contribution to the legislators or their parties, direct lobbying of legislator
s 
through professional lobbyists or direct lobbying of legislators by corporate executives. I
n 
recent years, corporations from the Pharmaceutical Industry have significantly increase
d 
their investments in the Corporate Executive lobbying. Departments have been create
d 
which not only devoted their attention to the lobbying with legislators but with all the ke
y 
players in the Health System as HMOs, Government and Professional Associations. Thes
e 
type of activities done by the Pharmaceutical Industry in Argentina has been called by th
e 
name of "Pharmapolitics", as it has a clear relationship between Politics and th
e 
Pharmaceutical Industry.
Pharmapolitics activities essentially involve the motivation of key players in the Heal
th 
System to introduce new politics and changes, which might be of interest to th
e 
Pharmaceutical Corporations. Some people suggested that Pharmapolitics activities are 
a 
highly effective mean, perhaps the single most effective mean, by which corporations fro
m 
the Pharmaceutical Industry may influence the federal legislative process and the HMOs 
in 
the Health Industry. Despite the apparent significance, growth, and efficacy 
of
Pharmapolitics activities, there has been only limited research into this important 
phenomenon. As a result, Managers have only an ambiguous understanding of how, why or 
under what conditions Pharmapolitics activities might be more appropriate and effective. 
Though there are many popular assumptions about the nature and extent of businesses 
political power, there are no researchers who could predict the influence of Pharmapolitics 
activities in the legislative process or in the regulation of the HMDs and its consequences in 
the overall business of the Pharmaceutical Industry.
It will be first discussed how Pharmapolitics activities are incorporated in the companies 
and then it will be discussed the influence in business.
Pharmapolitics in the Pharmaceutical Industry
Corporate executives have been doing themselves the activities of lobbying with the HMOs 
and legislators until the 1990s. At that time there were some important changes in the 
regulations in the Health System. The first one was the PMO ( Compulsory Medical Care) 
law, which passed through Parliament with little influence from the Pharmaceutical 
Industry. The second one was the introduction of Vademecums (Formularies in the USA) 
by the HMOs, looking for cost containment as Quinones (2002) referred. Corporate 
Executives realised that they should change their approach and they devoted new resources 
for the objective of lobbying the HMOs and Legislators. They did not have enough time to 
keep pace with the new activities. For that purpose they created the Department of 
Pharmapolitics. Multinational companies appointed Managers who could be in touch with 
the people who made the key decisions, being them legislators, Managers of the HMOs or 
head of the Professional Associations. The objective of this Managers was try to influence 
the legislators or HMOs in their decisions to get some kind of competitive advantage for 
their companies.
This introduction could be regarded as been too late as it was a reaction to laws or 
decisions, which were prejudicial for the company as their products, were left out of the 
PMO or a Vademecum. These Managers were hired within the organisation, from 
departments as Sales or Regulatory Affairs. This was done to assure confidentiality and 
identification to the company. American Companies adopted rapidly this new concept of
Pharmapolitics as in the USA they have a similar function, which is called Managed Care 
Account Managers. The difference between the Pharmapolitics Manager in Argentina and 
the Managed Care Account Manager in the USA is that in the USA, the lobbying with the 
legislators is done by an in-house lobbyist or by separate body, which hire professional 
lobbyists (Public Citizenship (2001). Regarding the article of the Public Citizen (2001) 
there were 625 lobbyists of the Pharmaceutical Industry in Washington and $ 92.3 Million 
dollars was the bill of this team of lobbyists for year 2000. In the last 8 years, according to 
Quinones (2002), a new Position or Department has been created in the Multinational 
companies in Argentina named as Pharmapolitics Manager, Pharmapolitics Advisor, PR 
Manager, etc. As soon as the bigger Multinational Companies had a Pharmapolitics 
Manager, there has been as a domino effect and the others followed this trend.
The main objective of this position is to lobby legislators and the key people in the HMOs. 
The original main activity was to introduce the products of a company in the PMO or 
Vademecums during the 1990s, but currently the Position includes other responsibilities 
and activities. Still introducing the products in Vademecums is very important and 
consumes great part of the time of Pharmapolitics Manager.
The job description of the position is still vague in the companies but the job 
responsibilities are the following:
1) Introduce the products of the Company in Vademecums of the HMOs and maintain the 
products in them. Normally Vademecums are up-dated every year or every two years. 
They do not endure the same over the time as products are changed, new ones are 
introduced and another ones are taken out. For example, it could happen that a new 
product of a company is introduced and two other important products are taken out. So 
that the activity of maintaining the products is as important as that of introducing new 
products.
How is a product introduced in a Vademecum?
a) Introduction Fee: There are HMOs, which have an introduction Fee that is an amount 
of money for a group of products. The Pharmapolitics Manager should decide which
ones according to the Marketing priorities. There might be some constraints regarding 
prices of the products. An example could be Amlodipine from Pfizer. Its price is 
double than that from the competitors with the same drug so that even if Pfizer pays 
for the introduction fee, this specific product might not be accepted.
b) Price and pharmaeconomics analysis: The Manager of the HMO together with the 
Medical Controller decide which products will be introduced. Price and efficacy will 
be regarded as important issues to make the list of products. A Pharmaeconomics 
analysis must be presented by the Pharmapolitics Manager to persuade the Evaluation 
committee of the HMO that the product should be introduced.
c) Rebate to the HMO: Some HMOs make a Vademecum with a group of companies, 
which have products that covered all the Therapeutic Classes and fulfil the PMO 
requested by the Government. Those companies have a competitive advantage in the 
population of the HMO as they have fewer competitors. In return of this preferential 
position, the Pharmaceutical companies will pay back a percentage of their own sales 
to this HMO. This modality has been introduced in the USA and it has been called 
"rebate". This rebate amounts to 8% to 25% of total sales. A contract is signed 
between the two parties and all the products of a company are introduced. The 
Pharmapolitics Manager has to make the necessary contacts to be invited by the 
HMO to participate in this Vademecum.
d) Wholesalers with a special agreement with the Province HMO or Private: There are 
some wholesalers, which have a close relationship with HMOs as they sell them the 
drugs for Cancer, Aids and for other catastrophic diseases. Through this close 
relationship, those wholesalers have the possibility of introducing some products in 
those Vademecums. What the wholesaler request from the Pharma Company is a 
discount in price. Those discounts range from 15% to 25% of gross price. The 
Pharmapolitics Manager has to identify those Wholesalers and conduct the 
negotiations to have their products introduced in the Vademecums.
2) Relationship with the Chamber and its Vademecums: Some Vademecums are managed 
by the Pharmaceutical Companies Chambers. Usually these Vademecums are open so
that all the products of all companies are introduced. The companies pay a rebate back to 
the HMOs according to the company's sales in that HMO. The information provided by 
the Chamber about the Sales in that HMO should be analysed by the Pharmapolitics 
Manager and transformed in Marketing Information for the Sales Representatives. The 
Pharmapolitics Manager lobbying is also useful in this cases to get a higher 
reimbursement rate for the products of the company.
3) Relationship with the central Government, National, Provincial, Trade unions and 
Private HMOs: The lobbying activities that enable the Company to have a direct 
relationship to those key people should be done by the Pharmapolitics Manager. In case 
a law or a decree is against the interests of the company, the Pharmapolitics Manager is 
the one who should do the necessary lobbying to change that situation.
4) Pharmacoeconomics and disease Management programs: Those activities are also within 
the scope of the Pharmapolitics Manager.
a) Pharmacoeconomics: The objective of Pharmacoeconomics is to develop models 
of treatment using different compounds but analysing Price, Efficacy, Adverse 
drug reactions, Posology, etc. to define which treatment is more cost-effective for 
the HMO. Those models are usually developed by the Pharmaceutical companies 
to demonstrate that their new compounds are more cost-effective than the older 
products, even if the price is higher. The Pharmapolitics Manager does the 
adaptation of these international models to the Argentine Market.
b) Disease Management Programs: Those programs are developed by HMOs with 
the cooperation of the Pharmaceutical Industry aimed at issuing protocols for the 
treatment of patients with Chronic Diseases as Diabetes, Asthma or Hypertension 
among others. These protocols are based in Evidence Based Medicine, that 
means that protocols have been used for long and proved as effective and 
reliable. These Disease Management programs are tied to a commercial 
agreement with a Pharmaceutical Company or a group of Pharmaceutical 
companies achieving economies of scale and a reduction in the total expense. 
Patients receive the medication at home or in certain pharmacies near to their
homes. All records of patients are introduced in a database and the HMO can 
monitor the compliance of the patient to the treatment. For the Pharmaceutical 
Company is also advantageous as they have a monopoly position for its products 
in this group of patients.
Usually the Departments of Pharmapolitics Managers of different companies have 
different size, responsibilities and scopes of action. There are companies like MSD 
or Novattis with have between 6 to 8 people in the Department and there are others 
like Roche which have only two an is bigger in terms of sales than Novartis and 
MSD; the size and activities depend on each company and the requirements of the 
Headquarters. It is thus important to define which activities are common to all 
companies so as to be able to make comparison between them.
Influence in the business
As we consider the scope of activities that Pharmapolitics Managers are supposed to do, we 
could imagine that they are important and that their influence in business should be 
significant for a company. As said before, there is a general belief that this position is 
important for the success of the business but no analysis has been done of its relation to 
Sales or Market Share.
For the purpose of analysis we should divide those activities in two types:
a) Activities that enable the company to have a better competitive advantage.
b) Activities that are directly related to sales/results.
a) Activities that enable the company to have a better competitive advantage:
1) The first one of them is the introduction in Vademecums. With the introduction of the 
Company's products in Vademecums, the company has a bigger Market related to other 
competitors. The Economics Studies Department of CAEME (2001), the Pharmaceutical 
Chamber of Multinational Companies, has issued for the year 2001 some information about
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the Market of HMO and its breakdown. The following chart shows that the people without 
Health coverage are 14.276.000 accounting for 38.6% of population. The other 22.756.000 
is the people who have Health Coverage and can afford paying Medicines. There are 
3.423.000 that have double coverage, which means that they belong to more than one 
HMO. The reason for that is that there are people who are in a Trade where they are 
obliged to be in a Trade Union HMO and they have a Private HMO additional to the Trade 
Union one.
The Market under Vademecums is that of the Trade Unions HMOs, the State Employees 
and PAMI. So that 81.9% of the people with Health Coverage are under a policy of 
Vademecums. There could be some HMOs within this Universe that have no Vademecums. 
The precise size of the Market will be discussed later in this paper but for the purpose of the 
discussion this information will be considered for the time being.
Why are Vademecums so important?
Patients get a discount in the Pharmacy for those products that are in the Vademecum of the 
HMO. For those products that are not included, patients get no discount. Discounts range 
from 40% to 100% in some products. Patients request physicians to prescribe those
products, which are in the Vademecum of their HMO. So that if the market is of 22,7 
million people and 81,9% of them are under an HMO with a Vademecum, Pharmaceutical 
companies should have their products in the Vademecums. The Pharmapolitics Managers 
main activity is to achieve this objective.
2) The second important activity of the Pharmapolitics Manager is to try to influence 
legislators to issue regulations that improve the competitive advantage of their company or 
at least that it is not prejudicial for it. For example, we could quoted the PMO (Compulsory 
Medical Care) reform that stated products for the treatment of Diabetes should have 100% 
reimbursement. How was this law important for those companies in the Diabetes field? It 
increased the possibilities of getting patients, as the medicines should be paid by the 
HMOs. Was it a clear advantage for those companies? Certainly it was but the reform of 
the law did not say that all diabetes products should be included in the Vademecums. 
HMOs covered the cheapest and oldest products and excluded from the Vademecums the 
new ones. Those confirmation was done by M. D. Lord (2000) which says:....are more 
effective for influencing legislators decisions to support or oppose proposed legislation than 
for influencing the specific content of proposed legislation.
3) The third issue is the relation with the Chambers. A company, which is active in the 
Chamber, has a trend to get some advantages, for example, a higher reimbursement for the 
patient, when a commercial agreement or Vademecum is agreed with a HMO, for example 
PAMI.
b) Activities that are related to Sales/Results:
Pharmapolitics Managers are in charge of implementing Disease Management Programs. 
These programs give the Company a Monopoly or an Oligopoly over a certain Disease in 
an HMO. The products, which are commercialised, are those ones from one company or 
two or three companies. The Company's Sales to the population with a certain disease of 
that HMO will increase proportionately to the previous Market Share in that indication. For 
example, it will be considered Glaucoma (Hypertension in the Eye), disease in which 
AlconLabs (the leader in Ophthalmology products) owns a Market Share of 33% in that 
HMO. Alcon could replace 62% of the prescriptions for Glaucoma for this HMO except
for the prescriptions of Alfa-agonists (product that Alcon does not have), which account for 
only 5% of the Market Share in this HMO. So. An additional 62% to the 33% that it 
already has represents a 188% increase in Sales in that HMO. So that the activity of 
Disease Management Programs have a direct relationship to Sales.
Origins of the research
No research has been done in the subject of Pharmapolitics in the Multinational 
Pharmaceutical Companies in Argentina. The topic of research is to try to determine if this 
type of lobbying has an impact in terms of Sales or Market Share and try to understand if 
this lobbying has an effect in overall performance in these Companies. According to the 
Merriam Webster Dictionary, to lobby is: "to conduct activities aimed at influencing public 
officials and especially members of a legislative body on legislation", which corresponds to 
the activities of the Pharmapolitics Manager.
The reason for the research being conducted was that the answers for following questions 
were still not fully were known by the Marketing Directors or General Managers of the 
Multinational companies in Argentina:
1) What is the job description of a Pharmapolitics Manager in the Multinational 
Companies?
2) How big is the market of HMDs with Vademecums in terms of patients and 
which was the development of it during the last years?
3) Are the Multinational Companies with a Pharmapolitics Manager more 
successful in terms of Sales/Market Share than those Multinational Companies 
without one?
So that the research has been undertaken to try to find an answer to these questions.
Aims of the Project
The aims of the project can be stated as:
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1) To define a common spectrum of activities which could define the job description of the 
Pharmapolitics Manager Position in the Multinational Companies in Argentina.
2) To establish the size of the segment of the market with Vademecums and its 
development through the years.
3) To test whether the Multinational Pharmaceutical Companies with a Pharmapolitics 
Manager are more successful in terms of Sales and Market Share than those 
Multinational Companies without one. The objective is to find an x-factor, which shows 
the better performance of companies with a Pharmapolitics Manager.
Content of the research universe
The research area will be the Multinational Companies from the Pharmaceutical Industry 
in Argentina, which account for 49,1% of the Ethical Pharmaceutical Market (IMS Oct'02). 
There are 45 Multinational Companies in Argentina in the Pharmaceutical Industry. 16 of 
them have a created the position as Pharmapolitics Manager in the last 5 years. They 
account for 35,5% of the Ethical Market, (IMS Oct'02) . They are Novartis, Roche, 
Aventis, Wyeth, Alcon, Pfizer, Pharmacia, Bristol Myers, AstraZeneca, Altana Pharma (ex- 
Byk Gulden), Boehringher Ingelheim, MSD, Schering Plough, Janssen, Abbott and GSK. 
The rest have no Pharmapolitics manager.
The comparison will be between the Multinationals who have a Pharmapolitics Manager to 
the ones that do not. The period considered for the evaluation will be from 1997 to 2001, 
beginning January 1 st ., 1997 and ending on December 31 st ., 2001. Years 2002 and 2003 are 
not been considered in order to eliminate the outliers. There are considerations to do 
referring years 2002 and 2003. There has been a strong devaluation in Argentina (350%) 
during 2002 and prices of Pharmaceutical products have been increased in a lesser degree 
(75%) The issue is that the increase in prices has not been the same for all the companies 
so that taking this year could lead to distortion of the analysis. It could happen that through 
devaluation some companies have increased their prices in a lesser degree than the others 
and have a substantial difference in Sales or Market Share by the end of December 2002. 
For example, if we take two similar companies as Pharmacia and GSK selling 113 Million
and 108 Million pesos (IMS Oct'02) a year and a market share of 3.33% and 3.21 % 
respectively and GSK increases its prices by 30% and Pharmacia by 20% following the 
average increase in the Market, GSK will have an increase on Market Share of 0.25 due to 
the difference on the rate of price increases and not due to commercial performance. This 
difference could be temporary or definitive but in the actual scenario of economic 
uncertainty, taking into account the figures of year 2002 could mislead the research. So that 
for the methodology, 2001 will be taken as reference and the calculation of Sales and 
Market Share will be done in pesos as it appears in the information of IMS. The 
information will be regarded to sales accounted by IMS. IMS is an international company 
that audits the sales of Pharmaceutical Companies as Nielsen does for Consumer 
Companies. IMS reckons only Sales done in Pharmacies open to the general Public. 
Hospital Pharmacies, Trade Unions Pharmacies, On-line pharmacies and Community 
Hospitals Pharmacies are not considered. The price, which is considered by IMS, is the 
price that Wholesalers sell to Pharmacies, so that the 16% margin of the Pharmacies is not 
considered. These prices do not include the discounts made by Wholesalers to Pharmacies. 
Sales made to Hospitals or Government directly by the Pharmaceutical Companies or 
Wholesalers, are not included for the calculation. Sales of products for Catastrophic 
Diseases as Cancer, Aids, and Haemophilia are not included as they are bought directly 
from HMOs or the Government. The validity and reliability of information is high as IMS 
information have a coefficient of error of+/- 5%. The sample taken by IMS for making its 
projections derives from Sales done from Wholesalers to Pharmacies. This sample 
represents 65% of the Ethical Market. The Ethical Market is the Market of prescription 
drugs. It does not include Over-the-counter products. The units of research will be pesos as 
they appear on the IMS information. IMS convert the local currency (pesos) into dollars 
every month to make their calculations, but as during the period of analysis the dollar was 
pegged 1 to 1 to the peso, pesos will be considered. All Multinationals companies will be 
considered. All Sales considered are IMS sales.
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Improve the competitive Advantage
Increase Sales
Increase the Market 
Share
The conceptual framework or theoretical framework is the following. There are HMOs and 
Legislators, which take decisions that affect Pharmaceutical Companies. Pharmaceutical 
Companies have created the position of Pharmapolitics Manager to lobby these people and 
influence their decisions in favour of the companies. The Pharmapolitics Manager has to 
provide their companies with two types of activities: those, which improve the competitive 
advantage of the company in the market or those who directly increase sales. Those two 
types of activities will produce in an increase of the Market Share of the company. On the 
other side Marketing and Promotion activities and Training of the Sales Representatives
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also produce increase of Sales and Market Share in the companies. It is assumed that all 
companies in the Research have done Marketing and Promotion activities and Training of 
the Representatives in a similar degree through the five years of time considered in the 
Research so that the only difference will be having or not a Pharmapolitics Manager.
The research design
It is considered that the people who could better describe their activities were the 
Pharmapolitics Managers currently in the job. They know perfectly the activities that they 
are responsible for and can give precise information of their priorities. In the cases of 
Multinational Companies without Pharmapolitics Manager, the person in charge of doing 
these type of activities would be the Marketing Director or Sales Manager so that they 
would be chosen for the survey. For the purpose of confirming the assumption that all 
companies did Marketing, Promotion and Training Activities the Sales Manager or 
Marketing Director will be considered for the Survey as they have the information about 
these activities.
1) The first design consideration represented a collection of all the activities done by the 
Pharmapolitics Managers of the 16 companies with a Pharmapolitics Manager to 
establish which activities are common to all. The different job descriptions could 
provide a common pattern for all the companies, which will be used afterwards in the 
analysis.
2) The second design consideration represented a collection of all the Pharmapolitics 
activities done by the other 29 Multinational Companies without a Pharmapolitics 
Manager. The Sales Manager or Marketing Director will be surveyed to know which is 
the emphasis and differences within these companies and the ones with a Pharmapolitics 
Manager.
3) The third research consideration to follow is to measure, which is the size of the ethical 
market with HMO under Vademecums compared to the market of HMOs without 
Vademecums. In this consideration we will have to exclude the market of those people
14
without any kind of insurance, as their purchasing power is marginal. "They do not buy
 
medicines or they are provided by the state" (Neri 2002).
4) The fourth research consideration is to confirm that the Multinational Companies h
ave 
done Marketing, Promotion and Training in a similar degree through all the period. For
 
this purpose two different resources will be considered. The first one will be the
 
Marketing Directors or Sales Managers of all companies through a survey. On the other
 
side, introduction of new products will serve as a double check as new introductions
 
shows the use of resources for Marketing activities and Promotion. It is a reliable way to
 
know the Marketing activity of a company. The information of new introductions will be
 
taken from IMS.
5) The fifth research consideration will be whether those companies with a Pharmapolit
ics 
Manager have a better market performance that those that do not have any
 
Pharmapolitics Manager. It should be noticed that only Multinationals are analysed
 
because of their similarities in their business policies in the Market. National companies
 
have not been taken into account as they do not have the same organigram as the
 
Multinationals and the owners or General Managers often do the activities of
 
Pharmapolitics. In some cases they are done in the level of the Sales Representatives or
 
Sales Supervisors.
The inductive and deductive process of the researcher
The approach to the research will be mainly positivistic. Even if the first paper with the
 in- 
depth interviews done to the members of the Political Parties and from the Multinatio
nal 
Companies Chamber is phenomenological and judgemental, the whole approach to 
the 
research will be positivistic. The aim of the research is to get generalisability for 
the 
following topics: a job description for the position for Multinational Companies an
d a 
factor-x that will enable to take decisions regarding the appointment or not o
f a 




For the purpose of finding a general pattern for the job description of Pharmapolitics 
Manager a survey will be conducted to all Pharmapolitics Manager in this segment so as to 
find a clear picture of differences and similarities in their jobs. On the other side, to test the 
theory that Multinational companies with a Pharmapolitics Manager have a better 
performance than the other companies without one, the dependent variable will be Market 
Share and Sales and the independent variable will be the existence or not of a 
Pharmapolitics Manager Position or Department in the Company. The results will be 
statistically controlled in the study. For the purpose of defining the degree of Marketing, 
Promotion and Training activities, a positivistic approach was taken with a survey to the 
whole universe that means all the Multinationals companies. To double-check that 
information, products launches will be taken from IMS and compare the validity of the 
Survey.
The only issue that the researcher is confronted with is the lack of reliable information is 
the size of the market under Vademecums. The reliability of information is high in the last 
two years as there is the researcher has an archive will hard copies of all the Vademecums 
in the Market with the number of affiliates of each HMO. But from the period between 
1997 to 2000, the researcher does not possess this information. One of the ideas considered, 
was to ask the Pharmapolitics Manager whether they think that the Market under 
Vademecums has been growing in the period between 1997 to 2000. But the answers will 
be biased and unreliable. The best alternative found was to get the authorisation of the 
Pharmapolitics Manager of Novartis to ask for information to the Statistics Manager for 
Pharmapolitics from Novartis, Miguel Mantecon. He has hard copy of all the Vademecums, 
including the number of affiliates since 1995. He also has a database of all HMOs and their 
evolution in time. The authorisation has been achieved and the evolution of the size of the 
Market could be precisely defined between 1997 and 2001. The only hindrance is that the 
researcher would not have the hard copy of all the material. Nevertheless the analysis of the 
size of the Market under Vademecums will be positivistic.
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Hypotheses and Propositions
First: The activities of the Pharmapolitics Manager are not homogeneous but a common 
pattern can be found.
Different companies have different profiles and different responsibilities for their 
Pharmapolitics Managers. A broad description of the different activities was given before 
including lobbying to legislators, lobbying to HMOs aimed at introducing the products in 
Vademecums, implementing Disease Management Programs, lobbying in the Multinational 
Companies Chambers, negotiating with Wholesalers and Professional bodies, adaptation of 
models of pharmacoeconomics and implementing them. There are companies with a 
Pharmapolitics Department with more than one person and other companies, which have 
only a Pharmapolitics Manager. There are some companies, which give the Pharmapolitics 
Manager great freedom of action and others in which the Pharmapolitics Manager is 
constrained in what they can do. But although being not homogeneous there can be two 
types of job descriptions, which could be found: a narrow one which entitled the activities 
that all of them do and a broad one entitling which are the ideal activities that a 
Pharmapolitic Manager should perform. That will give us an idea of the do and ought.
Second: The companies without Pharmapolitics Manager tend to do fewer activities than 
those who do.
There are 29 multinational companies, which have no Pharmapolitics Manager at all. These 
activities are performed by the General Manager, Marketing Director, Sales Director or 
Sales Supervisors. They are not done in a regular basis but by request. The amount of time 
and effort given to these lobbying activities in the whole organisation is much lower than 
the ones who have a Pharmapolitics Manager. The objective is to describe which activities 
are done and how much resources are devoted within the organisation to dot these 
activities. 
Third- TV market of HMO with Vademecum has increased in the last 5 years.
Due to the crisis, the HMO looking to curb the costs have been going through a process of 
open prescription for their patients to a process of closed Vademecums for them. The costs
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for the HMOs diminished as the physician has fewer variables to give to the patient. For 
example, in the case of ostheoarthritis in a knee. The patient could receive an 
antimflamatory (diclofenac), an antiinfiamatory cream (capsaicin) and a nutritient for the 
cartilage (glucosamin). The cost of the monthly treatment will be: $ 80.62 (Manual 
Farmaceutico Dec'02) for Voltaren (Diclofenac), $ 4036 (Manual Farmaceutico Dec'02) 
for the cream Redol Forte (Capsaicin) and $ 143.47 (Manual Farmaceutico Dec'02) for the 
nutritient Adaxil (Glucosamin). As in the Vademecum there is only Voltaren tabs and a 
cheaper cream with Diclofenac, the patient receives Voltaren $ 80,62 and Dioxaflex $ 
20,78 (Manual Farmaceutico Dec'02). It sums $ 101.40, which the HMO pays the half of it: 
$ 50.7. In case there is no Vademecum the patient would have received all of them 
summing up $ 264.45 paying the HMO $ 132.23. In this case there is a 161% difference. 
The narrowing of the choices derived in a lesser use of the medicines and a lower cost for 
the HMO. It should be said that HMOs also introduce in the Vademecums Generic 
Products with a lower price in order to diminish the costs. Motheral (2000) concluded: 
"Formularies can significantly reduce pharmaceutical utilization in a noncontinuously 
eligible population."
Fourth: Those Multinational Companies with Pharmapolitics Managers have a better 
performance than those Multinational Companies with no Pharmapolitics Managers.
The company with a Pharmapolitics Manager tend to have a greater introduction of their 
products in Vademecums hence they tend to have a bigger market for promotion of their 
products. Even if two companies have the same performance in the same Therapeutic 
Class, the one with a bigger Market will have more absolute Sales. The lack of 
incorporation of the products in the Vademecums narrows the market for those companies 
without Pharmapolitics Managers. If the proposition three happens to be true, Companies 
whose products are not in Vademecums will compete in a smaller market. The market free 
of Vademecums will be only 18,1% of the whole market. The other activities done by the 
Pharmapolitics Manager improve also the competitive position of the companies in order to 
be more effective with the Marketing and Promotion.
Assumptions
The first assumption is that the Pharmapolitics Manager will do his job and that he will 
have no constraints in the activities of introducing products in the Vademecums or doing 
other type of activities.
The second assumption is that only Multinational Companies are considered and not 
National Companies in the sample as they have another methods to produce the 
Pharmapolitics effects.
The third assumption is that all Multinational Companies continue with their normal 
Marketing, Promotion and Training activities and that none of them has stop calling at 
physicians.
Methodology
Design and choice of instruments
Prior to the interviews with the Pharmapolitics Manager, interviews were done with some 
key people from the political parties and from the Pharmaceutical Industry. These in-depth 
interviews provided background information to aid in the design and administration of the 
survey instrument. It also gave background information about the Health System and how it 
might evolve. The history of the Argentine Health System is described by the politicians 
and it gives the introduction to the subject that it is going to be researched: Pharmapolitics. 
The methodology for this part of the research is phenomenological, inductive and the idea 
was to focus in a judgemental methodology where the participants because of their 
knowledge and experience could address the questions as representatives of a whole class, 
in this case representing the Radical Party, the Peronist Party and the Pharmaceutical 
Industry. The interviews were taped and the respondents were aware of the objective of the 
research. Regarding ethical considerations, oral consent was requested of using this 
information for the paper and a hard copy of the paper was sent to them by registered Post 
to their offices. All the information that is included in the paper derives from the 
interviews.
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To achieve the common activities related to the Pharmapolitics Manager all Pharmapolitics 
Managers (16) will be surveyed. The total universe was considered, as the sample is too 
small. Accessibility to these Managers is possible and the reliability of their answers would 
be high. A possibility considered was interviewing the superiors of the Pharmapolitics 
Manager also too see whether the opinions match or not. But accessibility to this group of 
people was not easy and this double check with the Pharmapolitics Manager might distort 
the validity of the answers of the Pharmapolitics Managers, so that the researcher opted for 
only interviewing the Pharmapolitics Managers. In depth-interviews could be done but the 
problem of this approach is that although the richness of the information, it could be 
difficult to find common patterns in the activities. So that a questionnaire will be done and 
the survey will be based in the questionnaire. The survey contained a variety of different 
measures. To generate a richer response set and to assure validity and reliability of all the 
measures used, survey participants will be asked to respond to a variety of multiple scaled 
items, ordinal ranking items, semi-structured questions and open-ended questions. The 
multiple scaled items used a ten-point response scale with zero indicating no influence and 
ten indicating the highest level or degree of importance. Pharmapolitics Managers will be 
asked about their own offices than rather in reference to a typical Pharmapolitics office. 
Confidentiality will be granted and the researcher will put special emphasis that no 
response would be construed as representing either the particular respondent or their 
specific company. That is used to eliminate respondents concerns about socially 
undesirable responses that might negatively reflect upon the respondents or their 
companies. The questionnaire is aimed at defining the job, defining the activities involved 
and how much resources is devote to them, relative importance of this activities in 
achieving a better performance of the company and relative and absolute measures of their 
work. One chapter will be devoted to register how much time is consumed by the different 
activities during a month. Another important question is the relative position of them in the 
hierarchy of the company and which line of report there is. All information will be 
tabulated and processed. The sample comprises the Universe and due to the size of the 
sample, the information will be presented according to the number of mentions and not in 
percentages.
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On the other side the same questionnaire will be filled by the 29 Multinational Companies 
which do not have any Pharmapolitics Manager Position or Department. There will be 
personal interviews with the Marketing Manager/Director or Sales Manager who is in 
charge of the Pharmapolitics activities. The same considerations taken for the 16 
Pharmapolitics Manager in terms of confidentiality will be taken for these Managers. The 
objective of having the same questionnaire for both groups is the possibility of making 
them comparable and arrive to conclusions from the information collected during the 
survey.
For the purpose of measuring the size of the Market under Vademecums and its evolution 
during the period 1997-2001, several possibilities were evaluated. The first one was to ask 
the Pharmapolitics Managers about their thoughts about the evolution of this Market. It was 
disregarded, as the information will be biased and not reliable. The other one was to try to 
find an archive with the information of the Vademecums during those years. The 
researcher has only the information of the last two years, 2001 and 2002. Historical 
information is not available in the HMOs so that only a Pharmaceutical Company could 
have a complete archive. The researcher found that Novartis has the information and all the 
Vademecums in Hard Copy with the number of affiliates. Authorisation was requested to 
the Pharmapolitics Manager of Novartis so as to have access to this source of information. 
Novartis gave its approval so that the size of the Market will be measured from the 
information of the Vademecums issued in the period 1997 to 2001.
For evaluating the performance of the companies, information from IMS in pesos will be 
considered. The annual figures from Sales and Market Share will be those of December for 
each year. The process will be quantitative and a direct relationship will be sought between 
performance in Multinational Companies and the inclusion of a Pharmapolitics Manager in 
the pay roll of those companies. For validating the assumption that all Multinational 
Companies will try to sell their products making their best effort and that they will have a 
similar degree of Marketing, Promotion and Training activities, a survey will be made 
among Marketing Directors or Sales Managers. Accessibility to this group of people could 
be difficult so that when an interview could not be done, another person down in the 
hierarchy will be sought to answer the questionnaire. To double check the information
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received in the Questionnaire and proved its reliability, new introductions of 
products by 
these companies will be checked in the information provided by IMS. Launch
ing of new 
products is a valid information to measure the degree of Marketing activities a
s there is a 
considerable use of resources invested in a Launching.
The source of data, their availability and access
The source of the data will be two:
1) Surveys: There will be three different groups for the surveys.
a) The first one will be the Pharmapolitics Managers of the 16 Multinatio
nal 
Companies with Pharmapolitics Managers or Department. The accessibility is
 
easy and the information of the Questionnaire will be tabulated and processed in
 
Excel or Access. The size of the sample, although being the whole universe, is
 
too small to show any percentage of the conclusions. The number of mentions
 
will be stated instead of percentage.
b) The second one will be the Marketing Director or Sales Managers of 
the 
Multinationals without Pharmapolitics Manager. Accessibility to this group of
 
people could be more difficult. In case, there is no possibility of interviewing
 
one of them, a representative person will be sought down in the hierarchy. The
 
information will be processed and tabulated as in the first group. The same
 
consideration applies regarding the size of the universe. As it is too small, the
 
number of mentions will be stated instead of percentages.
c) The third group will be the same people as in group two for the compa
nies 
without Pharmapolitics Manager. In this case, it will be convenient to do the
 
survey together with the other one, as accessibility to this group of people is
 
difficult. For the companies with Pharmapolitics Manager, the Marketing
 
Director or Sales Manager will be interviewed. Information will be tabulated
 
and processed. Even if this group is bigger, mentions instead of percentages will
 
be considered. In case there is a company does not fulfil the criteria of similar
degree of Marketing, Promotion and Training activities, it will be withdraw for 
the final analysis of performance.
2) Information from IMS: There will be two different issues to be investigated: annual 
figures and introduction of new products by Multinational Companies.
a) Annual figures IMS: this information will be transferred directly from the 
database of IMS to assure its accuracy and it will not be taken from the books. The 
information will be taken in pesos ($). The methodology to gather the information 
will be electronic through IMS and Sales in pesos will be taken every year by the 
end of December. Market Share will be taken also in pesos. No over-the-counter 
products will be taken into consideration, as they are not incorporated into 
Vademecums. The importance of knowing the demand figures and not the internal 
Sales of the companies is its validity and reliability; internal Sales have always 
distortions related to the achievement of the forecasts. IMS figures are an 
international standard regarding Pharmaceutical Products. The sample of IMS of the 
Market is the Wholesaler chains accounting for 65 % of the total Sales in the Ethical 
Market. IMS measure the sales from Wholesalers to Pharmacies and their accuracy 
is high. Validations of the data are done every 6 months. There are some limitations 
as referred before. Sales made to Hospitals or Government directly by the 
Pharmaceutical Companies or Wholesalers, are not included in the calculation. 
Sales of products for Catastrophic Diseases as Cancer, Aids, and Haemophilia are 
not included as they are bought directly from HMOs or the Government.
c) Introductions of New Products: In this case, monthly information of IMS will be 
considered to determine which products have been introduced by the 
Multinational Companies in the period 1997-2001. This information will be 
tabulated and a table with the different companies will be done.
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The data collection process
Managers: the whole Universe was chosen, as the
sample is too small to proceed with any kind of sampling. The possibil
ity of taking the 
entire Universe makes the information reliable and valid. The interview
s will be done 
from March to June 2003. The interviews will be done in a neutral p
lace, not in the 
office of the Pharmapolitics Manager so that there are no interru
ptions and the 
atmosphere is relaxed.
2) Interviews with Marketing Directors/Sales Managers: the whole uni
verse of companies 
will be considered. The sample is too small to proceed with any kind o
f sampling. The 
information will be reliable and valid. Contrary to the Pharmapolitics
 Managers, the 
interviews will be conducted in the office of the Managers so that it will
 be easier to get 
an interview for the survey. These interviews will be done between 
April 2003 and 
October 2003.
3) Information from the Archive of Novartis: the information and th
e authorisation are 
now available. The collection of this information will be as soon as poss
ible as political 
changes within the company, could make the access impossible.
 Therefore the 
information will be collected in February 2002 and it will be tabulated
 and processed. 
There is also some Vademecums in electronic format. Those Vadem
ecums will be 
requested and kept in the researcher's file.
4) Information from IMS: IMS information has to be converted to 
an Excel or Access 
format. The processing is done by IMS. The information will be requ
ested on March 
2003. Authorisation has been obtained from Alconlabs to use this info
rmation for the 
Thesis. The request of the information will be done by Alconlabs to IMS
.
Complementary data collection processes
Another complementary process is going to be done to check the 
Questionnaire. Two 
retired Pharmapolitics Managers and two retired Sales Managers wil
l be interviewed to 
check the Questionnaire in order to test it before the real interviews tak
e place. Corrections 
will be made upon suggestions of the respondents.
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Analysing the data
1) The survey will be tabulated in two tables: Group 1 (Pharmapol
itics Managers) will be 
compared to Group 2 (Marketing Directors/Sales Managers) regar
ding the frequency 
and importance of Pharmapolitics activities. The same questionna
ire will be used so 
that figures will be comparable. Access will be used for the 
tabulation and the 
information will be displayed as Excel. Statistically significant i
nformation will be 
considered and outlined.
2) Survey of the Marketing, Promotion and Training Activities:
 The response of the 
different Managers will be tabulated and outliers will be analysed
 apart in order to 
confirm if there has been a different degree of activity to the oth
er members of the 
group. In case there is a company with fewer activities than the othe
rs, it will be taken 
away for the analysis. This information will be consolidated with the
 information about 
new introductions in the Market from IMS.
3) IMS provides the information in the format Access. For the pur
pose of the analysis all 
information will be in pesos and it will be annual figures. The info
rmation will be the 
one of the Total Ethical Products for the company. No over-the-coun
ter products will be 
included. Once the data is homogeneous, the statistical analysis too
ls of Excel will be 
used to find a correlation between the variables.
Ethical issues
Regarding the ethical issues of the data, permission was obtained 
from Alconlabs to use 
this information for the thesis. The information will be obtained fro
m Alconlabs data- base 
in a format access. The researcher as an employee of Alcon ha
s the right to use this 
information for research and for the Thesis. The permission of IMS
 to use the information 
will be valuable as the researcher can make this information public.
 The only authorization 
of Alconlabs is enough for the purposes of the thesis, but neverthel
ess the authorisation of 
IMS will be sought.
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Regarding personal interviews a consent form will be asked to all the p
articipants and it 
will be assured that neither information will be sent to the public or to 
their companies. 
Taped interviews will be avoided in the personal interviews, as the M
anagers are not 
accustomed to this practice.
Interviews to the politicians and members of the Multinational Companie
s Chamber were 
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